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I

The first link in the chain of events leading up to
the Crimean War was a dispute between Catholic and Ortho-

dox monks over the custody of the Holy Places of the Christian religion in Jerusalem.

The origin of this dispute

can be traced back to 1535 when King Francis

I of

France

allied himself with Suleiman the Magnificent, Sultan of Turkey, against Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of

Spain.

This alliance, widely denounced in Europe as an act

of apostacy on the part of a king whose ancestors had been

pre-eminent in the Crusades, was based on the fact that the
House of Hapsburg was the principal enemy of both potentates at this time.

Suleiman granted the French important

commercial, judicial, and religious concessions in an agreement signed in 1536.

These concessions

v/ere

matters of pol-

icy, not weakness, for the Turks were considerably stronger

than France in this period.

All Catholics in the Turkish

Empire were placed under the Judicial protection of France,
and Catholic monks were given control over the Holy Places

in Jerusalem.

These agreements between France and Turkey

were renewed on several occasions between 1536 and 17^0.

Except for a brief interruption early in the reign of
French RevLouis XIV, the alliance was maintained until the
Russia had
olution. In the course of the eighteenth century
Turks. Seeking
succeeded Austria as the chief enemy of the
had supplied the
to maintain their influence, the French

2

Turks with arms and advisors during the Russo-Turkish wars
of 1768-7^ and 1787-92.

Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in

1798 (which was the first step in a projected attack on

British India) brought about a Turkish alliance with Russia against France.

Although peace was restored between

Prance and Turkey in 1801, one of the long-term results of

their break was
salem.

a

decline of Catholic influence in Jeru-

Orthodox monks, with support from Russia, now ob-

tained custody of

a

number of Holy Places that had previ-

2
ously been under Catholic control.

The restored Bourbon monarchy in France, being occu-

pied with troubles at home after 1815» failed to take action that would restore the Catholic position in Jerusalem.

Nor did the anti-clerical regime of Louis Philippe desire
to do anything about this situation.

However, when Louis

Napoleon became President of the French Republic, one of his
main goals was to gain the support of the Catholic

Church.

He promptly demanded the restoration of Catholic control

over the Holy Places as had been provided for in
that France and Turkey had signed in 17^0.

a

treaty

The Turks at-

tempted to delay negotiations as long as possible, but the
visit of one of France's newest warships to Constantinople

persuaded them to agree to the French demands.
the situation at the end of 1852.

Such was

5

In the dominantly Protestant United States there was

little sympathy for either the Catholic or Orthodox side in
the Holy Places dispute.

Yet many Americans were concerned

with certain wider implications of the controversy.

Ameri-

can diplomatic relations with Turkey had been quite friendly since their formal establishment in 182?.

Captain Wil-

liam Bainbridge and the U.S.S. Georg;e Washinp;ton had visited Constantinople as early as 1800, at which time Turk-

ish naval officials had been very much impressed by the
quality of the ship's construction.

After the destruction

of a large part of the Turkish fleet at the Battle of Nav-

arino (1827)

»

"the

Sultan's government arranged to have sev-

eral warships built for Turkey in the United States.

The

Turks thereby hoped to avoid total dependence upon conti-

nental powers for their armaments, and obtain ships from

a

nation that had no political involvement in the Eastern
Question or the European balance of power.

For several

years American instructors were employed in Turkish navy
yards, although their role declined after 1840 when Brit-

ish personnel (after considerable pressure from Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary) were appointed to important

positions in the Ottoman navy.
The diplomatic cordiality prevailing between the

United States and Turkey was accompanied by

a

rapid in-

crease in American commerce with the Ottoman Empire.

As

many as thirty American vessels called at Smyrna in 1830,

4

including thirteen from Boston and seven from other Massachusetts ports.

In addition to purchasing large amounts of

figs and raisins, the Americans by 1828 were taking almost
the entire Turkish opium crop (mainly for the China trade).

In return the Americans sold such goods as cotton, worked

metal and rum.

The last item, mainly produced in New Eng-

land, brought distress to American missionaries in the Otto-

man Empire, most of whom, ironically, also came from New
England.

A contemporary observer appropriately described

the Smyrna trade as "a leading Boston interest." ^

Operating under the supervision of the American Board
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, American missionaries

(mainly Congregational and Presbyterian) first entered Turkish territory during the early 1820' s.

They established

schools in Constantinople and several other cities with the

initial object of converting to Protestantism, the Chris-

tian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire.

The missionaries

were able to win the allegiance of a large number of Armenian, Syrian and Nestorian Christians, but the adherents of
the Orthodox Church (who were by far the most numerous

Christian group in Turkey) were largely unresponsive.

But

such resistance failed to dampen the zeal of the American
clergymen, many of whom were young grarduates of Yale, Andover, Amherst, and Williams colleges.

They entertained

the nuhigh hopes that their new converts would provide
Turkish Emcleus for the eventual conversion of the entire

5

pire.

They were strongly supported by George Perkins

Marsh, American minister, and John Porter Brown, the chargA
d* affaires who had been at the Constantinople legation

since the early 1830's.

Both men believed that the Near

East could be regenerated through the influence of American Protestantism and democracy.

These American evangelists were assisted by Sir Stratford Canning, who had been an attach^ in the British em-

bassy at Constantinople as far back as 1808 and who was
Britain's ambassador to Turkey for much of the time between
1824 and the Crimean War,

During the early

184-0 's he

pres-

sured the Sultan's ministers into granting more toleration
to the Protestant converts than had previously been al-

lowed to new sects.

Other British officials in the Turk-

ish provinces frequently extended their protection to the

missionaries.

John P. Brown on one occasion formally

thanked Lieutenant Colonel W. P. Williams of the British
army for the assistance he had given in 1852 to the mission
in Kurdistan.

Colonel Williams replied: "The personal

knowledge of any and every one of the American Missionaries
in the East is quite sufficient to make

smile at fatigue, when by

a

a

British officer

little extra toil, he could res

o"
cue them from danger, or further their righteous cause

In a despatch to Secretary of State Daniel Webster (June
21, 1852), George P. Marsh paid tribute to Lord Stratford:

6

Lord Stratford has been throughout his diplomatic career, a firm and influential advocate
of reforms in Turkey, and many of the most liberal measures of the present government may fairly
be ascribed to his zealous and persevering efforts. ... It is but just to add that Lord
Stratford has treated all American interests in
Turkey with liberality and that American missionaries in remote districts of the Turkish empire have often been deeply indebted to the British embassy and consulates for prompt and efficient protection, when their persons and effectSr.
might otherwise have been seriously endangered.

Turkish policy during the 1848 European revolution enhanced its reputation in the United States.

Following the

Austro-Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolt, Nicholas I and Francis Joseph demanded the extradition of several thousand Hungarian and Polish refugees who had fled to

The Sultan refused their demand, and Britain and

Turkey.

France supported him by sending their fleets to the DardaWhile not acting Jointly with the British and

nelles.

French, Marsh and Brown also encouraged the Turks to resist.

Eventually, the Austrian and Russian governments

withdrew their ultimatum.
him into

a

The Sultan's action converted

hero for those Americans who sympathized with

the Hungarian cause.

The widely

publicized Turkish toler-

ation of Protestantism combined with Turkish protection of

European "republican" revolutionaries to inspire

a

growing

American view that the Sultan's government was more pro9
gressive than the Christian monarchies of biurope.

These events altered, if not entirely dispelled, an

older American image of Turkey as

a

semi-barbarous Moslem

despotism, a view enhanced by events during the Greek War
of Independence in the 1820' s.

Many Americans became dis-

illusioned when Greek policy made it more difficult for
American missionaries to operate in Orthodox Athens than
in Moslem Constantinople,

By the early 1850' s, then, the

Turkish government was usually presented in

a

more favor-

able light by the American press than were the major Euro^

pean powers.

10

During the early nineteenth century,

a

curious pattern

of friendship had developed between the Republic of the

West and the Autocrat of all the Russias.

The United

States and Russia had no major political or economic conflicts with each other at that time, and both nations were
often 'drawn together by their respective disputes with Great
Britain.

Although the Russian government did not estab-

lish diplomatic relations with the United States until
the
1809, the Empress Catherine had indirectly assisted

Great
American Revolution by refusing to furnish troops to

Britain, and by forming the League of Armed Neutrality.
one
Russian attempts to mediate between Britain on the

the other, came
side, and Prance and the United States on
with Emperor
to an abrupt end when Catherine's new alliance
Turkey) made a conJoseph of Austria (for the partition of

8

tinuation of the Revolutionary War favorable to Russian
interests.

"^^

During the War of 1812 Czar Alexander

I,

Britain's

ally in the conflict against Napoleon, offered to mediate

between the United States and Britain.

England rejected

this offer because she did not want Russia expanding into

Western hemispheric affairs.

Alexander's motive was equal-

ly nationalistic; he was interested in the continued existence of a United States navy as a partial counterweight to
B ritish naval power.

Russo-American tension developed

after 1815 when the Czar supported plans to restore Spanish
rule in South America and attempted to extend his influence

from Alaska to California.

British opposition blocked in-

tervention in South America, and the Russians soon abandoned their California ambitions.

12

The Polish revolt against Russia in 1850 aroused con-

siderable American sympathy.

At one point the Russian min-

ister in Washington protested to the State Department about
extreme anti-Russian articles in Washington's newspapers.
But American-Russian relations improved, due to several factors.

First of all there was the acrimonious dispute be-

tween America and France over claims for damages to United
States property resulting from French maritime seizures during the Napoleonic Wars; and Nicholas

I

detested King Louis

Philippe as a usiirper, and regarded France as

revolutionary menace.

a

perpetual

Secondly, there was the Anglo-French

effort to check American expansion by maintaining Texas as
an independent republic.

Third, both powers were giving

diplomatic support to Turkey against Russian influence at
this time.

After 1837

"the

Czar was represented in Wash-

ington by Baron Alexandre de Bodisco, who became highly

popular in Washington society and acquired
good parties.

a

reputation for

A widower in his early sixties, he did not

remain unattached for long after arriving in Washington and
his wedding was one of the most celebrated social events of
the age.

Still one more development bringing Russians and Americans together was railroad construction.

During the 1840 's

engineers and mechanics from the United States were building Russia's railroads.

Major George Washington Whistler

(father of the famous artist) supervised construction of
the Moscow-Saint Petersburg Railroad until he died of cholera in 1849.

The firm of Harrison, Eastwick and Winans

built the Alexandrovsk Locomotive Works near Saint Peters-

burg between 1844 and 184?, and this plant was managed by
Americans for eighteen years.

Moreover, several Russian

the
naval vessels were built in American shipyards during
and much of the hemp used by the United States navy

1840' s,

for rigging on its own ships was imported from Russia.

14

revRussia's support of Austria against the Hungarian
these generolution in 1849 represented a major setback in
said at Saint Helally favorable relations. Napoleon had

10

ena that in fifty years Europe would be all Republican or
all Cossack (a prophecy frequently quoted in the United

States), and increasingly after 1849 Russia loomed as
inant and reactionary European power.

a

dom-

In December of 1850

the American Whig; Review expressed alarm at the relentless

advance of Russian power:

this Russian policy, this terrific conspiracy, more fearful and a thousand times more vast
than that of the assassins, appalls and subjugates the world. Who its directors are is known
to few, all of them perhaps to none, some only to
any, but one or two to us, and that by mere report. For some centuries it has existed, receiving at regular intervals reports of deeds done
and deeds doable from its hydra-headed agents,
stowing them away in archives, and putting them
into action at the very nick and crack of time.
•

•

•

-.

William Dowe,

a

noted American author who was strongly pro-

Turkish, described Russian expansion:

"It still grows, as

it has continued to grow from year to year, till it stretches its bulk, like a horizon of storm clouds, nearly along
16
the entire northern edge of the habitable globe."

Despite deep concern with Russian power

—

further

stimulated by the much-acclaimed 1851 visit of Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian revolutionary leader

—

American hos-

tility for Russia was never so intense as that felt toward
Austria.

There remained indeed a considerable body of pro-

Russian sentiment in the United States, especially in the

South and among expansionists in every section.

According

11

to them, Russia and the United States were young and
grow-

ing, while Western Europe was effete and declining.

^'^

In January 1855 the Southern Literary Messenger, em-

phasizing this theme, informed its readers that all efforts
to halt Russian expansion would be futile.

Her power, in

contrast to Western Europe, was steadily increasing and

would extend as far west as Gibralter, "possibly before the
sod covers the remains of men now living."

While most Amer-

icans could admire the "American" style of Russian vitality,

fewer would agree with the conservative Messenger

,

wherein

distaste for the French Revolution and its long-terra effects

provided an additional reason for pro-Russian sentiment:

Almost every other power sunk mildewed and
crushed before this chilling curse - this bitter
est vial Almighty wrath had ever poured out upon
a guilty and crirae-ridden world. ... The Russians, as was incontestably proved in the terrific contest with France, are the best soldiers
on earth. ... No republican ideas ever have or
ever can penetrate within those wide extended
borders, from the very nature, both of the government and the inhabitants - all are equal save
one and with an eastern devotion they bow bef ore that one as a superior being. 18
;

In addition to becoming master of Europe Russia, ac-

cording to the Messenger

,

would also be the instrument of

Providence to spread Christianity in Asia and Africa.

Hu-

man progress had gone about as far as God would permit it
to go.

Any steps beyond nineteenth century civilization

would mean that man was trying to rival God,

After the

12

collapse of Western Europe the United States would join

Russia as one of the two great powers of earth:

Yet, though the United States cannot check
the march of Russia, it will in all probability
as inevitably extend its domain over a hemisphere. The republican institutions may possibly
change but, whether under a republican or monarchical government, the sceptre of the American
Continent from ocean to ocean, and from pole to
pole, at no distant period, will be swayed by the
Anglo-Saxon race, and the world will be divided
into two immense empires. What then? Here we
must pe use - speculation itself can go no further - the problem becomes too great for other
than Deity to solve. 19

Most significant perhaps was the relish with which a

Russian conquest of decadent, revolutionary Europe was anticipated, and the calm acceptance of the possibility that
the United States government might cease to be republican
as it extended its power over the Western Hemisphere.

Fear

that nineteenth century "progress" might go too far was

also apparent, resembling in tone the pro-slavery denunci-

ations of capitalism by George Fitzhugh, William J. Grayson,
and others.

predicted continIn the very month that the Messenger
was complicated
ued Russian expansion, the Eastern Question
Orthodox leaders had long
by a revolt in Montenegro. Its
he believed that
maintained close ties with Nicholas I and

13

the uprising signaled the impending break-up of the Turk-

ish Empire.

Priding himself on being the champion of Orth-

odox, as well as European conservatism, he was outraged by

the Turkish concessions to France, and regarded Louis Na-

poleon (now Emperor Napoleon III) as

a

usurper who would

someday start a revolutionary war in Europe to regain the

power once possessed by his uncle.

Nicholas felt that the

time had come to forestall the possibility of French gains

when the Ottoman Empire collapsed.

But for the moment he

was content to have Austria play the leading role in the

Montenegrin affair.

20

The Austrian government was determined to end the

fighting in Montenegro.

It feared that the insurrection

might spread to include the Orthodox Slavs under its own
rule.

There was also the possibility of Russia becoming

the leading beneficiary of a general Balkan uprising, someAl-

thing- that had long concerned the statesmen in Vienna.

though Nicholas

I

was a valuable ally against Central Euro-

pean revolutions, his presence in the Balkans would be highIndeed, had he fully appreciated the signif-

ly unwelcome.

icance of Austria's dual attitude there might never have

been a Crimean War.

Nicholas

I

21

assured Emperor Francis Joseph of his full

support when, in February, 1853, Austria despatched

a

spe-

an
cial ambassador. Count Leiningen, to Constantinople with

Montenegro.
ultimatum demanding an immediate cease-fire in

14

Commenting upon it, John P. Brown, in charge of the American Legation in Constantinople during the absence of Min-

ister Marsh, noted the "peremptory and menacing demands"
in a despatch to Secretary of State Edward Everett.

Brown

was certain that "the Austrian government is strongly sup-

ported by Russia, and it is believed they act in concert
against Turkey."

In his Judgement, Turkey would have to

look to England and France for support.
The Turkish government did consult Britain and Prance,
but these powers advised against resistance on the Monte-

negrin question.

The Sultan, as a result, agreed to a

cease-fire in Montenegro.

Brown consoled himself with the

fact that "the Porte has refused all intervention on the
part of Austria in the condition of the Sultanas Christian

subjects of Bosnia."

He also informed the State Department

that "the Porte has been much aided in sustaining this po-

sition by the French Ambassador and the British Chargi
Affaires, - particularly by the former."

d'

^

The American press extensively reported the events in

Montenegro.

Turkey, according to the New Bedford Mercury

,

was "effete," and the Montenegrins had "something of the
old republicanism of the early New England colony."

Ameri-

cans "may find a parallel in them; for they are in fact a

republic of small communities; each village having the
right to be governed by its own assembly."

24

The Mercury

concluded that "the perpetual puzzle of cabinets," the

15

Eastern Question, was about to be revived.
(Mass.) Republican

a

The Springfield

week later published an article from

its Vienna correspondent to the effect that the Montenegrin

conflict would have consequences across Europe:

The peace of Europe hangs by a thread, and
the little war in Montenegro may serve as the
dust in the balance, insignificant, but sufficient to turn the scale, and set thrones and empires tottering. It is evident to the merest
tyro in politics, that a trifle is sufficient to
disturb the delicately adjusted relations existing between the four principal continental powers, and the course events are now taking, seems
to indicate that clashing interests in the East
will commence the drama, 25

Many Americans sought to discover a struggle between

"republicanism" and "despotism" in every European conflict.

They could not be disturbed by the apparent irrelevance of
the republican issue in any Russo-Turkish dispute.

William

Dowe, -for example, uncovered strong elements of democracy

in Turkey;

Patriarchal governments are suitable to the
genius of the East; and the Turkish is one of
these, like the Chinese, Japanese, Persian, BurIn that patriarchal system there is
mese, etc.
In Turkey there
a certain spirit of democracy.
beis no hereditary nobility; nothing stands
tween the Padishah and the poorest Turk, who may
of his
rise by merit and bravery to the presence
sovereign - become Grand Vizier, and actually
If there is no
marry his sister or daughter!
democracy in this, we do not know what to call
there
democracy or where to find it. . . . '^^rely
of the
is much more of the fine old equality

16

primitive ages in Turkey than in the feudalized,
crystalized society of aristocratic England. 26

If war broke out between Turkey and Austria, it was

widely believed in the United States, the Turks would call
on Kossuth and other European revolutionaries for assist-

ance.

The.

New York Tribune expressed confidence in the

Turkish army and its possible allies:

"The Turkish army

is well disciplined and equal in valor either to the Aus-

trian or the Russian,

.

.

•

The hopes of Hungary, and indeed

of all Western Europe, are all directed to Constantinople,

Deliverance and liberty are for the present expected from
the East."

^'^

The New York Times had few doubts as to who was behind

rebellion in Montenegro:

"It is suspected that the Czar is

the operator, and that what is wrought out in Montenegro is

telegraphed all the way from Saint Petersburg."

The paper

editorially surveyed the background of this conflict:

Hopes have been adroitly instilled into
every people whose faith regards the Emperor as
Supreme Head in spiritual things, that at some
day not far off in the future, there shall be a
reassembling of the tribes, and a setting up of
a Sclavonic Empire, whose power and religious
unity shall in due time cover the earth. These
flattering tales mask the intention of Russia to
absorb the whole of Eastern Europe from the Peloponnesus to the North Cape. They are so understood in the political scheme of Europe. 28

17

A general European war, the Times editorialized on March
7,

was likely and it could produce

a

new round of revolutions.

There was little possibility, however, that the United

States would intervene directly in such

a war:

"It matters

nothing to us whether Paynim, Cossack, or John Bull own the
Dardanelles.

And we shall have too much on our hands at

home to permit us, even if so disposed, actively to interfere in favor of republicanism in the other hemisphere

While the American press pondered the implications of
the Montenegrin revolt, Czar Nicholas, encouraged by the

success of Count Leiningen at Constantinople, moved to consolidate Russia's position in the Balkan peninsula.

The

Czar was confident that England would support him in his
plan to eliminate French influence in Turkey because, early
in 1855 » Great Britain was in the grip of

sion panic."

a

French "inva-

Had he confined himself to demanding

a

re-

versal of the Turkish decision on the Holy Places question,
it would not have concerned the British greatly.

But Nicho-

las went further.

After staging military and naval maneuvers at Sevastopol, General Alexander S. Menshikov, the Czar's special am-

bassador, arrived in Constantinople with

military staff.

most impressive

a

He demanded that the Turks revoke their

recent concessions to France and agree to

a

Russian pro-

18

tectorate over the Sultan»s Orthodox subjects.

Turkish

assent would have amounted to an acknowledgment of Russia's
right to occupy any part of European Turkey on the pretext of protecting Orthodox Christians.

despatched
resist.

a

Napoleon promptly

fleet to the Aegean to encourage the Turks to

The British at first hesitated.

They had been

willing to support Nicholas so long as he seemed to be up-

holding the integrity of the Turkish Empire against France.'
Now the Czar himself had challenged this integrity.

ually England moved to the side of France.

Grad-

The veteran

British ambassador in Constantinople, Lord Stratford de
Redcliffe, advised the Turks to concede most of the Russian

demands on the Holy Places question, but to reject the pro-

posed protectorate; and they followed his suggestions.
John P. Brown, the American charge d* affaires, also

counseled the Turkish authorities to take
against Prince Menshikov.

a

firm stand

The Russian envoy had insisted

on the resignation of Fuad Effendi, Turkey's Foreign Min-

ister, and when Fuad assented, the British and French

charges (neither ambassador was in Constantinople when Men-

shikov first arrived) urged the Sultan to retain Fuad.
Brown, conferring with the Grand Vizir, also urged

lar stand.

a

simi-

He reported that it was proper for the United

States to join its influence to that of "other liberal and
constitutional Governments" in this crisis.

52
^

He even

sent a confidential letter to Fuad in which he tried to

19

persuade him to withdraw the resignation.

Since the United

States government had encouraged Turkey to protect Hungarian refugees in the past, he was convinced of America's ob-

ligation to give diplomatic support to Turkey.

Ali Pasha,

a former Turkish Foreign Minister, brought this matter up

in a conversation with Brown:

"He stated to me that the

Ottoman Government was placed in its present unpleasant condition towards Austria and Russia greatly in consequence of
having acted on the friendly recommendation of the Government of the U.S. in behalf of Mr. Kossuth."

Brown failed

in his immediate objective; Fuad Effendi did not return to
office.

He was succeeded by Rifaat Pasha, an official less

objectionable to Russia.
On May 12 Brown informed the new Secretary of State,

William L. Marcy, that the Holy Places dispute had been settled, but Prince Menshikov had presented a forty-eight hour

ultimatum to the Turks on the protectorate question.

The

French ambassador was giving strong support to the Turkish
government, and Lord Stratford, after some hesitation, also

advised the Porte to reject the ultimatum.

dation was followed.

The recommen-

Menshikov left Constantinople with

the announcement that diplomatic relations between Russia
54
and Turkey were now severed.

After Menshikov 's departure. Brown sent the State Department

a

series of documents on the Eastern Question.

He

Foreign
was encouraged by a new development in the Turkish

20

Ministry; Reshid Pasha, "a man of liberal views" who was
"very hostile to Russia," had succeeded Rifaat Pasha.

Brown requested the State Department to authorize him to
assure the Turkish government of "the friendly sympathies
of the Govt, of the U.S., and its interest in the mainte-

nance of the integrity of the Sultan's Dominions."

^"^

Brown soon had a chance to demonstrate American sympathy for the Turkish cause.

George P. Marsh was on official

business in Athens when he heard the news that Menshikov
had broken off diplomatic relations with Turkey.

Since

there might be popular disturbances in Constantinople

Marsh thought it would be good to have
protect American citizens.

a

warship there to

He requested Commodore Silas

Stringham to proceed to the Bosphorus on the frigate Cumber
land , flagship of the U.S. Mediterranean Squadron.

-

56

The almost continuous existence of this squadron since

1801 was testimony to the importance of American commercial
and missionary activity in the Mediterranean^

Jefferson had originally sent

a

President

fleet to the Mediterranean

to halt the attacks of the Barbary pirates on American mer-

chant ships.

These pirates were

a

memory by the middle of

the nineteenth century, yet the squadron was maintained to

protect American merchants and missionaries in the frequently turbulent ports of the Levant.

^'

Brown, upon

Stringham 's arrival, arranged for him to be received in
assured the
Court where, on Brown's advice, the Commodore

21

Sultan of "the sympathies of the Government and People of
the United States in the present unjust endeavors to in-

fringe upon his Sovereign Rights, and the independence of
his Government,"

Shortly after the breakdown of the Russo-Turkish negotiations, the British and French fleets were ordered to

Besika Bay, adjacent to the Dardanelles.

The Russian army

crossed the Pruth River and occupied the principalities of

Moldavia and Wallachia which were under nominal Turkish
suzereinty.

Brown informed the State Department on June 25

that the British and French planned to attack Sevastopol
and destroy Russia's Black Sea fleet if war broke out.

The

American charge was convinced that "the future liberties,
and advancement of all mankind will be involved in this

struggle."

He was pleased to note that "even Austria" was

beginning to turn against Russia.

The United States, Brown

thought, should not "remain a silent spectator of the struggle."

Upon returning to Constantinople, Marsh informed the
State Department that a majority of the Sultan's advisors,

including the British ambassador, were opposed to treating
Russian occupation of the Principalities as an act of war.
The mass of the Moslem population in the Turkish capital
was for war, Marsh admitted, and he feared "great tumults"
if the Sultan conceded too much to Russia.

He thought that

American citizens in all the major Turkish ports might need
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naval protection.

Therefore, Marsh decided to keep the

sloop Levant at Constantinople and requested Commodore

Stringham to detach another vessel from his squadron "to
cruise between the different ports of the Levant while the

present state of affairs continues."
Marsh fully approved of the vigorous policy that Brown

had pursued in his absence and was displeased with English
hesitation.

He wrote to Secretary Marcy on July 15 that

the British and French should have taken the Russian occu-

pation of Moldavia and Wallachia as a casus belli .

The

season for fleet operations in the Black Sea would soon be
over:

"The fleets might now strike a powerful blow at Rus-

sia by annihilating her marine in the Euxine and destroying

the towns upon its coasts, and the Turkish forces are in

better condition, morally and physically, than they have
usually been in recent wars."

^"^

The State Department had

up to -now approved of the policies of Brown and Marsh.

But

Secretary Marcy thought that Marsh was going too far when
he advocated an immediate Anglo-French attack on Russia.

Writing "omit" next to the strongest paragraph in Marsh's
despatch, he thereby made certain that the State Department clerks would not include this passage when they made
copies of the documents.

Yet Marcy sent no rebuke to ei-

ther Marsh or Brown.
The general tone of the American press was pro-Turkish

during the months of the Menshikov mission.

Typical was
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the Springfield Republican ^ foreseeing- great gains for

European revolutionists if war broke out between the Great
Powers over the Eastern Question.
editorialized, every effort

Consequently, the paper

would be made to avoid war:

"The powers of Europe are all afraid of a war*

Let but the

match be lighted, and the continent will blaze.

The great

powers are determined there shall not be a war.

We shall

see."

On July 15 the Republican printed a letter from

the Reverend Edwin Bliss of West Springfield, a missionary

Exemplifying the attitude of most Amer-

at Constantinople.

ican missionaries, Bliss believed that Russia hoped to consolidate the power of the Orthodox priests and prevent the
spread of Protestantism:

Nobody would think it strange to see the
Russian fleet coming down the Bosphorus at any
hour of the day. ... Of course all these
things give us some anxious thoughts in regard
But the Lord reigns, and we may
to the future.
rejoice. The coming in of the Russians would
seem to be a great calamity. But the Lord can
take care of his own work, and of us also. We
will seek to do just what He would have us do,
and be found where He would have us be, and then
we need not be anxious.

^

The National Intelligencer ,

than the Republican

,

a

more conservative paper

also thought that war would lead to

revolution in Europe. Unlike the latter, it had little sympathy for European revolutionaries and, while occasionally
nation,
printing some praise for Russia as a growing young

2^

its main interest was in the preservation of peace.

On

June 20 the Intellig;encer contained a letter from an Ameri-

can in Genoa, whose opinions reflected its own:

national policy has become

a

"Inter-

policy of reciprocal interests.

Xt is the age of civilization and commerce, and diplomacy
arbitrates in place of the sword."
The Intelligencer even printed

a

letter from Roger A.

Pryor, the editor of its Democratic rival, the Washington

Union , which expressed

em

Question,

a

conservative opinion on the East-

His letter centered upon the recently pub-

lished The War of Ormuzd and Ahriman by Henry Winter

I^avis,

later famous as a Radical Republican congressman during the

Civil War.
inevitable.

Davis claimed that an American- Russian war was

Concerned with this prophecy, then being

spread by European radicals and their American disciples,

Pryor rejected the view that the United States represented
the spirit of light and Russia was the incarnation of darkness.

He cited the long history of friendly Russian-Ameri-

can diplomatic relations.

He also praised Russia for not

having made "the abolition crusade an engine of warfare against republican institutions":

"It is a favorite dream

of our American disciples of Louis Blanc and Ledru Rollin,

the men of the Mountain, that the United States and Russia
are fore-ordained foes - that it is their mission ulti-

mately to rush in dread collision, and by wager of battle
to determine the grand problem of human freedom.
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The New York Tribune on April 12, 1853 published an

editorial entitled "The Real Issue in Turkey," written by
Karl Marx, one of its European correspondents.

Marx crit-

icized the British for not taking stronger action against

Russian expansion and, like most European liberals and socialists, he regarded Russia as the "international gendarme" of reaction.

Any defeat of Russia would increase

the strength of bourgeois liberalism and ultimately of so-

cialism.

Marx wrote that in

a

conflict between England and

Russia "the interests of the revolutionary Democracy and

England go hand

m
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hand."

The Washington Union

'

,

the semi-official organ of the

Pierce administration, had denounced Davis' The War of Or-

muzd and Ahriman when it was published.

Speaking of the

"immense genius" of Nicholas I and describing the great

progress of Russia under an absolute monarchy, it took note
of similarities between Russian and United States expan-

sion.

But as Russian pressure on Turkey continued, the

Union switched to a strongly pro-Turkish stand.

On July

17 it described Russia as "the arch enemy of the cause of

free government in Europe."

Commodore Stringham's inter-

view with the Sultan prompted the following comment:

"It

will be seen that Commodore Stringham understands the

pulse of the American heart, and in

a

very handsome manner

has given the Sultan assurances of the sympathies of our

countrymen in his resistance of unjust aggression."
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New York Times was incensed by the Union 's early

1?he

pro-Russian position and commented on it at length.

In a

satiric vein it described the Union 's editor dining late

with Baron Bodisco and then imagining that Nicholas, rather
than Pierce, was his master while he was "tottering homeward." SO

The Times published further editorials on this

subject and linked the Union'

s

attitude towards Nicholas

with the expansionist policy of the Pierce administration:
"No more sympathy for nations struggling for freedom, un-

less annexation be intermixed with the plan.

The American

Government has decreed that its sovereignty is to move a-

breast with its principles.

This may come to be called the

51
•Pierce Doctrine'." ^

On June 9 the Times asserted that

a great

conflict be-

tween Russia and the Western powers over the "lifeless
corpse of Turkish rule" was inevitable:

"Possibly a war,

a

new crusade may result from the defeat of the Russian demands.

The religion of Jesus may, as in the days of Peter
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the Hermit, bring upon the earth not peace but a sword."

Hiring the spring of 1855 American reaction to the

Russo-Turkish dispute, both official and unofficial, was

predominantly pro-Turkish.

Several decades of increased

American diplomatic, commercial and missionary contacts with
the Ottoman Empire had contributed to this sentiment.
was influenced primarily by

a

It

circumstance already important

in American foreign policy decisions.

Turkey had provided
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aid and comfort in recent years to republican revolution-

aries highly popular in the United States.

Russia, on the

other hand, had given its full diplomatic and military support to Austrian attempts to repress liberal and nationalist revolutions.

CHAPTER

II

The apparently close cooperation between Russia and

Austria during the spring of 1853 was

a

major factor which

intensified pro-Turkish sentiment in the United States,
For several years American diplomatic relations with Austria had been hostile, and there were numerous popular dem-

onstrations against the Hapsburg monarchy and support for
its revolutionary opponents.

Before

184-8 the

Austrian policy of maintaining the ter-

ritorial and political status quo , established in Europe by
the Congress of Vienna (1815), had been highly unpopular in

the United States.

Then in 1848 Prince Metternich, the

chief architect of this policy, was overthrown, and for

a

few months the Austrian Empire seemed to dissolve into its

national components.

But the army remained loyal to the

monarchy, and Austria's position in Italy was re-estab-

lished by Count Joseph Radetzky.

Hungary's rebels, how-

ever, briefly succeeded in expelling most of the Austrian

troops from their territory.

Although there was consider-

able dissension between Louis Kossuth and General Gorgei,
the Hungarian political and military leaders, the con-

cerned Hapsburg government was forced to call on Nicholas
I for military assistance to crush the rebellion,

Gorgei

then surrendered to the Russians while Kossuth fled to Turkey.

The Austrian commander. General Haynau, already known

in England and America as the "beast of Brescia" for his
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ruthless suppression of

a

revolt in that Italian town, pro-

ceeded to execute all the Hungarian leaders he could capture, including several who had been more moderate than

Kossuth.

American enthusiasm for the Italian and Hungarian revolutions was very great.

It was intensified by two factors

the brief overthrow of the Pope, and Kossuth's Protestant

faith.

The combined spectacle of European peoples imitat-

ing the American Revolution, and

a

"Protestant hero" strug-

gling against the leading Catholic power in Europe, appealed to the mood of mid-nineteenth century America.

Domestic

anti-Catholicism had recently been strengthened by the
great influx of Irish immigrants; and consequently, support

for European freedom easily fused with fear of Catholic political control of American cities.

Such tendencies did

not always coincide (some revolutionary sympathizers were

against nativism, while some nativists were almost as anti-

revolutionary as they were anti-Catholic), but whether operating together or separately they were always anti-Aus-

trian and anti-papal.

2

When Pope Pius IX, in 1850, announced the restoration
of a Catholic hierarchy in England, American Protestants

shared the indignation of their English brethren against
this "Papal Aggression."

Since Louis Napoleon had restored

the Pope to Rome with the French army, and the Italian and

Hungarian revolutions had been suppressed by Austrian and
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Russian military forces,

a

united front of the Catholic

and Orthodox monarchies seemed to exist.

provoked

a

This development

strong American (and English) popular reaction.

The Methodist Quarterly Review consoled itself with the

thought that the papacy's days were numbered:

The papacy, though not dead, is dying; and
like an expiring giant, it puts forth gigantic
energies, even in the death struggle. Its latest
usurpation, the daring attempt to re-establish
its ecclesiastical rule and cast the fetters of
its worn-out superstition over gospel enlightened England, is not the effect of conscious
health and power, but rather a spasm of waning
vitality. 5
,

The Hungarian question produced

a

major diplomatic

dispute between the United States and Austria, which had
not ended when a European war threatened to erupt over the

Eastern Question in 1853.

Four years earlier. President

Zachary Taylor's administration had sent A, Dudley Mann,

a

special emissary, to the Hungarian rebel government with

discretionary power to recognize it.

The United States had

already recognized several provisional governments in 1848,
most of which had soon collapsed.

Although Mann accom-

plished nothing, the indignant Austrians were convinced
that he had refrained from recognizing Kossuth's governhe
ment only because it was on the verge of collapse when
^
arrived.
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Chevalier Johann Hulsemann, the Austrian minister in
Washington, protested the aid and comfort given to his Emperor's disloyal subjects.

In reply, Secretary of State

Daniel Webster reminded Hulsemann that United States territory was now so vast that the possessions of the House
of Hapsburg were but a small part of the earth's surface

by comparison.

This defiant response, strongly implying

that the United States was now powerful enough to secure her

interests in all parts of the world, increased Austrian concern about future American meddling in Europe.

Although

Webster was genuinely pro-Hungarian, he privately admitted
that the bombastic tone of his note was partly designed to

divert American attention from the slavery controversy by

focusing attention on the Union's proud position in the
world,

,

While Webster was engaged in controversy with Hulse-

mann over the Mann mission, Louis Kossuth left Turkey on
board the American steam frigate Mississippi .
rival in the United States Kossuth received

popular reception.

a

Upon his ar-

tumultuous

Parades and banquets were held for him

in most of the leading cities.

In New York, his denunci-

ation of the Jesuits as associates of Austrian tyranny was

hailed by Protestant clergymen, protested by the Catholic
Archbishop John Hughes, and created heated controversy in
the press.

George Templeton Strong, a New York Whig lawyer

with little taste for revolutions, confided to his diary
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that American enthusiasm for Kossuth was based
more on the
old No-Popery cry than on any genuine interest in
Hungarian

nationalism.

New York's large Irish population, not sur-

prisingly, displayed little enthusiasm for the Magyar lead6
er.
er.
Kossuth, impressed by the rapid increase of United

States wealth and power, sought to persuade Americans to a-

bandon their traditional policy of avoiding European po-

litical alliances, and to support the next round of Euro-

pean revolutions, hopefully in alliance with Britaino ^
Kossuth repeatedly reminded his audiences of the need to
establish American political ideals on the Continent.

Em-

erson's welcoming speech, when Kossuth visited Concord in
May, 1852, seemed to meet the Hungarian's highest expec-

tations:

Sir, whatever obstruction from selfishness,
indifference, or from property (which always
sympathizes with possessions) you may encounter,
we congratulate you that you have known how to
convert calamities into power, exile into a campaign, present defeat into lasting victory. For
this new crusade which you preach to willing and
unwilling ears in America is a seed of armed men.
And as the shores of Europe and America ap.
.
.
proach every month, and their politics will one
day mingle, when the crisis arrives it will find
us all instructed beforehand in the rights and
wrongs of Hungary, and parties already to her
freedom. 8

The high point of Kossuth's trip was his visit to Wash-
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ington.

President Millard Fillmore received him, and Con-

gress voted funds to pay his hotel expenses.

At a banquet

in his honor, Secretary Webster seized the opportunity for

another public rebuke to Austria.

He proposed a toast to

"Hiingarian Independence," and would rejoice, he declared,

"to see our American model upon the lower Danube and on the

mountains of Hungary."

Although this was mainly political

rhetoric as far as Webster was concerned, it was taken seriously by Hulsemann as another indication of impending Amerlean intervention abroad.

q^

Kossuth, continuing his journey, began to be caught in
the dangerous cross-currents of American politics.

Although

it was Senator Henry Foote of Mississippi who had first sug-

gested that a warship be sent to convey Kossuth out of Turkey, the South generally responded less favorably to revo-

lutionary speeches than did other sections.

Many Southern-

ers were aware that Kossuth's arguments could be used to

justify

a

At the same time the abo-

slave insurrection.

litionists were irritated with Kossuth's refusal to commit

himself on the slavery question, claiming it was none of
his business to make pronouncements on purely American issues.

10

Despite a fad for Kossuth beards and hats, it soon became evident that neither the American political leaders

nor a sizeable element of the people had any desire to intervene abroad in support of

a

Hungarian or any other revo-
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lution.

Above all, few American politicians would dare to

appear pro-British in the eyes of their constituents, and
Kossuth's hopes were based on the idea of Anglo-American

cooperation in support of European revolutions.

Democratic

Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois, who often spoke in
favor of a more active American foreign policy, repudiated
any idea of Anglo-American cooperation until England made

major concessions to Ireland.

Less hostile to Britain, the

Whigs were, more than the Democrats, opposed to any thought
of adventures in Europe.

illusioned man.

Kossuth left for England

a

dis-

President Fillmore and Secretary Webster

had made it clear to him in private conversation that any

American action abroad was out of the question.

The Hungar-

ian leader now began to write articles for The New York
Times

,

which were highly critical of American emphasis on

business success to the exclusion of
11

a

spirited foreign pol-

icy.

Kossuth's hopes were not entirely misplaced.

A group

of highly vocal politicians and journalists calling them-

selves "Young America" were more genuine interventionists

than Webster.

Most of them were Democrats and ardent ad-

vocates of American territorial expansion.

They combined

their expansionism with strong support for the 1848 Euro-

pean revolutionary movements.

Unlike the Whig Webster, who

was generally pro-British (more so in private than in public statements), the "Young Americans" regarded England as
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the chief obstacle in the way of further extension of Amer-

ican power in the Caribbean and Central America.

Their en-

thusiasm for revolts included Irish attempts to overthrow
British rule; but, being Southerners or Northerners indifferent to the moral aspects of the slavery question, they
were against any anti-slavery agitation.

The two leading

figures in "Young America" were George N. Sanders,

itor of the Democratic Review
las of Illinois.

,

tt^e

ed-

and Senator Stephen A. Doug-

The former became notorious after offer-

ing the Hungarian republicans 144,000 old muskets for use
in a new revolution.

The latter derided an "Old Fogy" for-

eign policy which opposed American intervention in Europe.

"^^

In early 1853 "Young America" appeared to be growing
in strength, for the new Democratic president, Franklin

Pierce, selected several' of its manbers for important dip-

lomatic posts.

Pierre Soul6, a former French republican,

was appointed Minister to Spain.

(As Louisiana senator,

Soul^ was a leading advocate of American expansion in the

Caribbean and Central America.)

The rising New York banker

August Belmont became American minister to the Hague.

George N. Sanders of the Democratic Review became the Amer-

ican consul in London.

Pierce, in his inaugural, struck

an expansionist note by deploring the timidity of those who

opposed any further extension of America's boundaries.

Everything seemed to foreshadow an administration whose for
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eign policy would be similar to that of President Polk.

In late June of 1853 an incident occurred at Smyrna

which suggested that "Young America's" foreign policy might
be implemented and Austria's worst suspicions confirmed.

Austrian officials seized a Hungarian refugee, Martin Koszta, and imprisoned him on the brig Hussar .

Koszta, an as-

sociate of Kossuth, had gone to the United States after the

collapse of the 1849 Hungarian revolt.

He had taken out

naturalization papers, but had not yet been naturalized at
the time of his arrest in Smyrna.

David Off ley, the United States consul in Smyrna, im-

mediately protested the Austrian action to the Turkish authorities, informed John P. Brown, the American charge in

Constantinople, of the incident, and consulted with Commander. Ingraham of the U.S. corvette Saint Louis , which was

anchored in the Smyrna harbor at the time.

They agreed to

take no action until Brown forwarded instructions.

Ini-

tially, Brown sent a note to the Austrian envoy in Constan-

tinople demanding the release of Koszta, but it was rejected
and Brown was informed that Koszta was still an Austrian

subject.

While these negotiations were going on, Offley a-

gain consulted with Ingraham aboard the Saint Louis .

As

the two men were talking in the Commander's cabin, an offi-

cer broke in to warn that the Austrian warships in the har-
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bor were loading their guns.

Ingraham then gave orders to

load the guns of the Saint Louis .
The situation remained tense for several days.

On

June 28, Brown instructed Ingraham to attempt the forceful

release of Koszta if necessary.

In a note to Offley, Con-

gressman Caleb Lyon of New York, in Constantinople at the
time, added his hearty concurrence:

"Don't let this chance

slip to acquit yourself nobly and do honor to our country,
.

•

•

The eyes of Nations are upon the little St. Louis and

her Commander.

For Godsake and the sake of humanity, stand

for the right."

"^^

After receiving Brown's despatch on July 2, Ingraham

informed the captain of the Austrian ship Hussar that he
would open fire unless Koszta was released in

a

few hours.

At first the Austrians prepared to resist, but then recon-

sidered and an agreement was soon reached under the terms
of which Koszta was placed in the custody of the French consul.

Most of Smyrna's European inhabitants as well as the

Turks supported the American action, and Brown as well as

Off ley thought that Koszta 's rescue had greatly enhanced
the prestige of the United States in Europe.

16

The Continental press reacted vigorously.

CJonserva-

tive and liberal papers agreed that the event was the be-

ginning of

a

more active United States policy.

Austria,

the London Morning Herald stated, would be likely to lose

her Italian provinces if

a

new insurrection were to take
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place there, and might find an American fleet in the Adriatic helping the Italian rebels.

An Italian paper, II Parla-

^ento of Turin, thought that the vast extent of American

commerce made it inevitable that the United States would be

interested in the destiny of the Ottoman Empire.

America,

it predicted, would be an important force contributing to

the downfall of the Vienna treaty system of 1815.

''"'^

While the European press was debating the possible con-

sequences of the Koszta affair, Austria sent the United

States a strong protest note which was supported by Russia.

Austria's charg*, Hulsemann, accused the United States of

having violated the rights of
its action in Smyrna.

a

neutral nation (Turkey) by

This resort to the favorite American

doctrine of neutral rights against the United States was rejected by Secretary William Marcy.
mann,-

In his reply to Hulse-

Marcy claimed that Turkish authorities had approved
It was the Austrian seizure

Commander Ingraham's action.

of Koszta which violated Turkish sovereignty, stated Marcy,

who justified his rescue on the grounds that Koszta 's dec-

laration of intent to become
ican protection.

a

citizen entitled him to Amer-

'^^

a

Vienna also complained to other European courts about
the conduct of the American commander, and re-asserted its
I'ight to seize

refugees in neutral ports.

France expressed

partial sympathy for the Austrian position, but was not inclined to seek a quarrel with the United States.

Anti-Aus-
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trian sentiment was very strong in England.

Kossuth had

been received here almost as enthusiastically as in the

United States.

Moreover, English opinion had recently been

outraged by the arrest of several Italian Protestants in

Tuscany (which was ruled by
ly), for possessing Bibles.

a

branch of the Hapsburg fami-

Such public feeling made it

impossible for the British government to support the Aus-

trian protest, despite its deep concern about the longrange effects of American involvement in European affairs.
The London Advertiser

,

which thought English policy on the

Eastern Question too weak, expressed the hope that the appearance of the Stars and Stripes in the Mediterranean
19
would shame the "muddy old Union Jack" into activity. ^

Commander Ingraham*s rescue of Koszta was generally
Hailed by the American press (except for conservative Whig
0:<jurnals)^

The New York Tribune's editorial of August 6,

1853 was typical:

We state an obvious fact in saying that Cap'
tain Ingraham, had he sunk the Austrian corvette
in Smyrna harbour, as it was but a chance he did
not, would almost inevitably have been the next
President of the United States. Had the two
ships been cruising off the harbour, instead of
at anchor within it, where action must have been
a gross outrage on neutral rights and resulted
in a woeful destruction of life and property on
shore, the collision could not have been averted. 20

On September 2^ the Tribune carried

a

letter from

^0

Marx which described the reaction of the conservative Euro-

pean press to its editorial.

Some of these oournals were

predicting American intervention on behalf of Switzerland
if that country were to be attacked by Austria.

(The Swiss

were presently engaged in a dispute with Austria over their

protection of refugees from Austria's Italian provinces.)
According to Marx, widespread rumors of American plans to
intervene in Europe show how seriously the events at Smyrna
were regarded.

The Paris Constitutionnel was particularly

severe in its criticism of American policy.

States defended Koszta as

a

The United

revolutionist, not as an Amer-

ican citizen, it declared, and claimed that no European

government could ever admit an American right to protect

European revolutionaries with armed force.
dismissed, as

a

The paper then

"ridiculous pretence," the American claim

that Koszta had announced his intention of becoming a citFinally, it warned that the American navy might not
21
win such easy triumphs in future situations.
izen.-

An editorial in the Washington Union (which rarely agreed with the Tribune ) also praised the rescue of Koszta
and brought the case within the general scope of American

Manifest Destiny:

There is clearly no resisting a manifest
destiny. V/e are fated to intervene in European
affairs - morally, by the potent example of liberal institutions; economically, by the powerful
traction of national equality and prosperity
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upon the population; politically, by such incidents, quite unexpected and casual, as that which
occurred the other day at Smyrna. While our conservative presses were uttering their sagest admonitions against any participation in the Oriental question, we were up to our ears in it.
•
.
« The act has made us a party to the fate of
Turkey. 22

Baron Bodisco, the Russian minister, was so incensed that
he cancelled his subscription to the paper.

The Union re-

ported the cancellation with great pleasure, as

a

convinc-

ing rebuttal to The New York Times' recent charge that it
was pro-Russian.

25
^

The National Intelligencer took

a

very different stand.

A conservative Whig paper, it disliked the thought of Amer-

ican aid to European revolutionaries, warned against the

doctrine of intervention, and denounced Kossuth, Mazzini,
and Ledru Rollin (the last two were the leaders of Italian

and French republicanism), whose belief in universal free-

dom really meant "universal license."

Another editorial

denied that Koszta was entitled to full American protection merely because he had declared his intention of be24
coming a citizen.
.

•

In the abolitionist camp, a sharp division of opinion

about the Koszta affair appeared.

The pacifist William

Lloyd Garrison, editor of The Liberator , condemned the rescue as an example of American official hypocrisy.

At the

very time when attempts were being made to enforce

a

strin-
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gent fugitive slave law in the North, an American naval
of-

ricer went to the brink of war with

a

to secure the release of a Hungarian.

major European power,
But Gerritt Smith,

the New York abolitionist and congressman, saw the issue

quite differently.

Until 1853 Smith had been a strict Gar-

risonian pacifist.

Now he approved Commander Ingraham's

action.

Indeed, he thought that Ingraham should have im-

mediately opened fire on the Austrian brig.

Garrison was

dismayed by Smith's about-face, and rebuked him in a Lib erator editorial for eulogizing

a

"professional fighter."

The response to Ingraham's action, in both Northern
and Southern journals, indicated a powerful national senti-

ment in favor of

pean affairs.

a

more progressive American policy in Euro-

Praise for him was

a

logical sequel to the

enthusiasm with which Kossuth had been received.

Yet the

encounter at Smyrna marks the culmination of the series of

American official actions in favor of European revolutionaries, although no one in either America or Europe could

suspect that this would be the case in 1855.

Also, despite

the strength of "Young America" in the Pierce administration,
a combination of domestic controversy, diplomatic inepti-

tude, and Anglo-French opposition would frustrate most of

Pierce's projects.

There was no spectacular increase in

the size of the United States during his presidency as there

had been during Polk's.

Indeed, the course of events would

also reveal some astonishing turn-abouts in American opin-

ion.

But in the summer of 1853 most Americans were con-

vinced that Turkey was being bullied by Austria and Russia, and they identified its cause with that of Europe's

liberal patriots.

I

CHAPTER

III

For a short time, in August 185$, while the United
States and Austria were exchanging notes about Koszta, the

Russo-Turkish dispute seemed on the verge of settlement.
Representatives from Great Britain, France, Austria and

Prussia drew up a proposal at Vienna which was accepted
without conditions by the Czar.

But the Sultan, under in-

creasing pressure from the pro-war party at Constantinople,
insisted on adding several interpretative reservations to
the Vienna note.

On August 15 George P. Marsh, the Amer-

ican minister in Constantinople, sent a despatch to Secre-

tary William Marcy which endorsed the Turkish position on
the Four Power peace proposal.

The proposal. Marsh in-

sisted, conceded the substance of all Prince Alexander Men-

shikov's demands.

He criticized the course of Anglo-

French policy, charging that the two Western powers were
ineffectual in the face of Russian power and arrogance.

Failing to take action, they might soon find it too late
to prevent the extension of Russia's empire into the Med-

iterranean.

The American minister, however, did not offer

his advice to the Turkish government, probably because he

knew that an appointee of President Pierce would soon replace him.

Marsh's fears about the consequences of the

Vienna note were unnecessary: Nicholas

I

rejected the Turk-

ish modifications, and once again Russia and Turkey were on
the verge of war.

^5
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By this time the Sultan's militant advisors, aided by
the religious excitement in Constantinople, had gained the

upper hand.

Turkey issued a declaration of war against

Russia early in October 1855.

It would be put into effect

in 8 month if the Russians refused to evacuate Moldavia
and Wallachia.

The Russians remained in their positions

and fighting began in early November,

Up to this point

Nicholas had thought that Austria and Prussia would support him in any conflict with the Western powers.

He now

learned to his dismay that Austria, fearful of Russian ex-

pansion in the Balkans, was leaning towards the West.

The

British and French fleets were ordered to sail through the
Dardanelles to Constantinople to help the Sultan maintain
order in the city (particularly if anti-Christian riots
broke out in Constantinople).

This was a significant step

towards Anglo-French involvement on Turkey's side - an in-

volvement which would have strong impact on American opinion,

^

In 1853 the United States and France were engaged in
a minor diplomatic dispute,

typical of the many controver-

sies that had arisen between the two former allies.

A

French adventurer, Count Raousset de Boulbon, had made an
unsuccessful incursion into Sonora with the intention of

detaching that province from Mexico.

Although the French

government disavowed the action, it was known that de Boulbon had influential friends in Paris.

American concern

over French designs on Mexico increased.

^

The formal alliance between France and the United

States had not survived the storms of the French RevoluWhen it became apparent that France was following

tion.

a course quite different from that preferred by Americans,

enthusiasm for her revolution had waned.

After the unde-

clared naval war (1798-1800) between France and the United
States, Napoleon Bonaparte agreed to a convention which ab-

rogated the alliance of 1778*

His sale of Louisiana in

1803 greatly strengthened American power, but Franco-American relations remained cool because of Napoleon's decrees
against neutral trade with Great Britain, and attacks on

American shipping by French privateers.

The United States

declaration of war against Great Britain in 1812 pleased
France, but neither power attempted to renew the old alliance.

4

After the 1815 European peace settlement the restored

Bourbon monarchy began to reconsider French policy toward
the United States.

The regimes of Louis XVI and Napoleon

generally had operated under the assumption that

a

strong

and independent United States was valuable to France as

permanent source of trouble for Great Britain.

a

Yet by the

1820* s, French statesmen began to fear that the young co-

lossus across the Atlantic might become a rival more dan-

gerous than Great Britain herself.

President James Mon-

roe's message to Congress of December 1823, in which he

warned against any further European colonization in the

Western Hemisphere, was regarded by the French as the beginning of

a

campaign to establish American supremacy in

Central and South America.

The conservative Catholic sen-

timent that pervaded the court of King Charles X (18251830) was greatly disturbed by the thought of a Protestant

republic dominating the entire Western Hemisphere.

Short-

ly before the 1830 Revolution French diplomats and consuls

in South America were instructed to use their influence against American economic penetration. ^

Many Americans were enthusiastic about the July Revo-

lution (the aged Marquis de Lafayette played

a

leading

role in it), but there was no improvement in diplomatic re-

lations between the two countries.

Indeed, disputes seemed

even more open and acrimonious than before.

There was con-

siderable talk of war during the negotiations concerning
the United States maritime claims against Prance.

(Iron-

ically, England's mediation contributed to the settlement
of this dispute between two nations once allied against

her.)

Although the Church's influence, so strong during

the Restoration period, disappeared under Louis Philippe,

both he and his Prime Minister, Francois Guizot, also were
eager to check United States expansion.

Guizot likened

the threat of an American "universal republic" in the West-

em

Hemisphere to the old fear of any one power establish-

ing a "universal monarchy" in Europe.

establish

a

The French hoped to

balance of power in the New World by joining

Great Britain in maintaining Texas as an independent repubThese plans for Anglo-French cooperation were thwart-

lic.

ed in 1840, when France supported Mohammed Ali, the Pasha
of Egypt (who had almost succeeded in overthrowing his

overlord, the Sultan of Turkey), and Great Britain re-a-

ligned herself with Russia, Austria and Prussia,

During the early 1840 's an attempt was made to revive
the Anglo-French entente vis a vis Texas, but the negotia-

tions failed because England refused to commit herself to

anything beyond diplomatic action.

The French had in-

sisted that if any joint steps were to be taken, England
must, as a last resort, agree to military action against
the United States.

Anglo-French relations suffered fur-

ther deterioration when it appeared likely that

a son of

Louis Philippe might inherit the Spanish throne by marriage.

England had once fought

a

long war against France

to block a similar event and was no more inclined to ac-

cept such

a

union in 1846 than in 1700.

'

When Louis Philippe was overthrown by the 1848 Febru-

ary Revolutionaries, an over-eager American minister in

Paris was the first foreign diplomat to recognize the new

provisional government.

Once again it seemed likely that

the "twin republics" might work closely together.

But the
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new revolution took

a socialist turn and the bloody "June

Bays" dismayed conservative Americans, North and South.

Ralph Waldo Emerson commented on the difference between the

English and French ideas of liberty.

In England, he ob-

served, "Life is safe, and personal rights, for what is

freedom without security? whilst, in France, 'fraternity,'
•equality,' and 'indivisible unity' are names for assas-

sination." ^
The powerful conservative reaction that followed the
"June Days" was no more favorable to Franco-American

friendship.

After Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was elected

President of the French Republic in December 1848, relations between the two republics deteriorated rapidly.

For

one thing American Protestants detested Napoleon's pro-

Catholic educational policy and his 1849 intervention at
Rome to restore the Pope to his throne.

In addition. Napo-

leon renewed Louis Philippe's effort to arrive at an under-

standing with Great Britain which might check American expansion. 9
As early as 1839, while Louis Napoleon was living in

exile in England, he concluded (in

a

manner similar to that

of Alexis de Tocqueville several years earlier) that the

United States and Russia were the two most progressive powers in the world.

Worried by the possibility that Western

Europe in general and France in particular might someday be
supplanted, he declared:
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note with regret that at the present time
only two governments fulfill their providential
mission; these are the two Colossuses, one existing at the extremity of the new, the other at
the extremity of the old, world. Whilst our old
European center resembles a volcano, v/hich consumes itself in its crater, the two nations of
the East and the West march without hesitation
on the road of improvement - one of them through
the will of one man, the other through liberty, 10
I

The 1840 's saw the extension of American boundaries to
the Pacific and the Rio Grande, through military force and

strong diplomatic pressure.

The Caribbean seemed to be the

next great area of American expansion.

In Southern states

there was agitation in favor of seizing Cuba from Spain
(if Spain refused to sell the island to the United States),

and General Lopez, with informal American help, led an at-

tempt to conquer the island in 1851.

After Lopez's fail-

ure, France and Great Britain presented a joint protest

note to Washington, which implied that they would give mil-

itary support to Spain against any American attempt to
seize Cuba.

At the outset of the Crimean War, then, any

lingering sentimental regard for France had suffered from
recent abrasions.

There was no such sentimental background for American

relations with Great Britain.

In 1855 the memory of two

wars with Britain was very much alive in the United States.

The War of 1812 was well within the recollection of many

Americans.

Furthermore, although the British abandoned

their efforts to create an Indian buffer state in the Old

Northwest after the Treaty of Ghent, they still sought to
check American expansion wherever possible.

There were

more disputes between England and the United States during
the years from 1815 to 1853 than between the United States

and any other European power.

The Maine boundary clash of

1859 » the Caroline and Creole affairs, the Oregon contro-

versy of 18^4-46, troubles over Texas, and the Central

American dispute that began in 1848, were but touchstones
in a condition of permanent animosity.

In addition to ter-

ritorial questions, America's refusal to permit the Royal

Navy to search United States ships suspected of engaging in
the slave trade contributed to the tension.
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British statesmen differed considerably as to how they
should proceed in attempting to check American expansion.

Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, who alternated as Foreign Secretary for most of the time between 1828 and 1851,

exemplify these differences.

Aberdeen generally followed

a conciliatory policy towards the United States, while

Palmerston thought that Yankee aggressiveness should be
handled in a firm manner.

Any major British effort to es-

tablish a balance of power in North America required the
cooperation of France.

This was attempted in the case of

Texas and failed for reasons already mentioned.

British
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statesmen all agreed that the re-establishment of French

military power in the Western Hemisphere was too high

a

price to pay for the containment of the United States.

'^^

Anglo-American relations were further embittered by
commercial rivalry.

America's merchant marine expanded

greatly after the War of 1812 and by the 1850 's was almost
as large as the British.

In the early 1850 's the new Amer-

lean clippers were the world's best sailing ships, and the

Collins Line steamers established speed records for transAtlantic passages that surpassed those of the British Cunarders.

These developments annoyed the British, who had

long regarded the sea as their province.

Impressive, too,

was American machinery sent to the London Exhibition of
1851» making it apparent, that the United States possessed

industrial as well as commercial capabilities.
Vanderbilt

•

s

Commodore

arrival in England in 1853, aboard his luxuri-

ous steamer North Star , was another portent of the poten-

tialities of Yankee enterprise.

14-

There were still other factors that contributed to

Anglo-American animosity.

For example, much of the travel

literature of English visitors expressed great distaste for
the democratic habits of Americans or for their hypocrisy
on the slavery issue (i.e. Mrs. Frances Trollope and

Charles Dickens).

The condescending tone of English news-

papers and literary journals also was

a

source of anger in

the United States, where all insults were reprinted along
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with appropriate editorial comment.

Hostility between the

two countries was further stimulated by the arrival of

large numbers of impoverished Irish immigrants following
the 1846 Potato Famine,

These Irish remained in the large

Eastern cities and, because their votes were important,
Democratic and Whig politicians were highly competitive in

their "twists to the lion's tail."

Irish nationalists such

as John Mitchel continued their anti-British agitation af-

ter coming to the United States.
Despite an almost unbroken history of ill feeling be-

tween the United States and Britain, there were certain
factors that worked for better relations.

Their commerce

drew them together at least as much as it divided them.
In a war, the British navy could sweep American merchant

ships off the seas, as both powers knew, while American

privateers would ruin British trade.
remained.

Strong cultural ties

Most of the literature that Americans read

v/as

English; New World periodicals extracted many articles from

their English counterparts; American writers tended to follow British models in their own works.

Much of the knowl-

edge that Americans obtained about European events came

from English newspapers.

In addition, British and American

reformers worked closely in promoting such causes as the

abolition of slavery and the temperance movement.

Wealthy

Americans tried to imitate the style of the English gentry,
as they had since colonial days.

Finally, there was the

incipient idea of Anglo-Saxon solidarity against
the rest
of the world.
Although this doctrine was frequently
ex-

pressed in American periodicals and newspapers in
the
1850 's (mainly in Whig organs and certain
religious publications), it was still far from acquiring the influence

that it would exert a half -century later.

Too many areas

of conflict remained for such a theory to achieve wide
pop-

ularity in the 1850' s.

George P. Marsh was not easily convinced that the

British and French would give military and naval assistance
to Turkey.

In a despatch to Secretary Marcy shortly after

the Turkish declaration of war on Russia, he denounced the

"treacherous policy" of the two Western powers.

Marsh

thought the Turks would be forced by their allies to make

concessions to Russia.

The Anglo-French fleet was still

outside the Dardanelles at this time, and Marsh did not believe rumors concerning its forthcoming passage of the

straits.

As late as October 15 he was still not convinced

that hostilities would take place.

The Turks, to be sure,

were sending men and munitions to the frontier, but he be-

lieved that the British and French would not permit any

clash between the Turks and Russians.

17
'

Notwithstanding Marsh's distrust of British policy in
the Eastern Question, he was essentially sympathetic to the
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idea that closer Anglo-American ties would be valuable be-

cause they would offset the influence of the Continent's
"despotic" powers.

"^^

After all, most Americans had earli-

er assumed that Austria and Prussia would support Russia a-

gainst Turkey.

Many still expected Austria to fight along-

side Russia if the Czar became involved in a war with Eng-

land and France.

The idea of an Anglo-American alliance

was in part a response to the overthrow of the Second Re-

public in France by Louis Napoleon.

From 1851 to 1855 it

was widely believed that Napoleon would ally himself with
the three traditionalist monarchies.

During the "invasion

panic" in England in late 1852 the United States minister
in London, Joseph Ingersoll, wrote the following to Secre-

tary of State Edward Everett:

Among the topics of frequent conversation
here is that of the probability of an assault of
some kind from the other side of the channel.
Military officers of great distinction consider
The trainings of militia and
it a probability.
other movements of caution are induced by it. I
mention the circumstances because it is often
connected with remarks of a friendly character
towards ourselves. The idea is familiar that if
the powers of the Continent, relapsing, as they
are supposed to be into high toned principles of
government, should manifest hostility to constitutional freedom by assailing it in its stronghold in England, the people of the United States
would join in the defence of a common cause.
There is certainly a tendency to cultivate good
feelings with our country which is worth cultivating in return. 19
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The American Whig; Review

,

in its article on "Russian

Ambition," had advocated such an alliance several years
earlier.

Anglo-American solidarity was also favored by

eral Episcopal and Evangelical Protestant magazines.

sev-

The

National Intellip;encer regarded England and the United
States as twin examples of ordered liberty, opposed to both
the absolute monarchs and the revolutionists of Continental

Europe.

However, despite its strong feeling of kinship

with England, the Intelligencer stopped short of endorsing
a

political alliance with that country.

The Democratic

press, which frequently placed the British government in
the same category as the Continental monarchies, was total-

ly opposed to such an idea.

When England and France drew together in 1855, American and British interest in a united front against the Con-

tinental powers (which was now irrelevant in any case)
waned rapidly.

Many Americans still clung to their pro-

Turkish attitudes, however, until Britain and France prepared to take the offensive, and it became clear that AusAmerican action in the

trian policy was not pro-Russian.

Koszta case was an affirmation of

a

policy which Britain

and Prance had supported since 18^9, when they sent their

fleets to Besika Bay to strengthen Turkish resistance to
the Austro-Russian demand for the extradition of Hungarian

refugees.

Believing Austria too pro-Russian to be

a

good

mediator, Ingersoll was in favor of American mediation of
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the Eastern Question before war broke out.

In his opinion

America's prestige would greatly increase if she made the

offer and, were the mediation to succeed, she would receive
full credit for preventing war.

Ingersoll was succeeded by James Buchanan in London in
August 1855.

Shortly after his arrival Buchanan conferred

with Musurus, the Turkish minister, who told him that Turkish modifications of the Vienna note were more than "merely
formal."
no war.

However, the Turkish envoy thought there would be

Buchanan concurred with this sentiment.

His eval-

uation of the situation was similar to that of Marsh, although he was less angry about the hesitancy of the Western
powers to take action against Russia:

France and England are so much indisposed
to go to war with Russia, that they will find
means to avert it, even if the Emperor should refuse to accede to the modification made by the
Sublime Porte. . . . But there will be no war unless the fanaticism of the Turks should unexpectedly compel the Sultan to commence hostilities. 22

Buchanan was also pleased to note that Musurus expressed
great satisfaction with the conduct of Commander Ingraham
23
in the Koszta affair.

During the early 1850 's Buchanan had been the American

minister at Saint Petersburg and had been on friendly terms
with Nicholas I.

He had served as Secretary of State under
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President James K. Polk during the negotiations with Great

Britain over the Oregon question.

Although opposed to

British expansion in the Western Hemisphere, he believed
that the commercial interests of the two nations were simi-

lar in some parts of the world.

In Buchanan's opinion the

opening of China to Western commerce would promote

a "noble

and generous rivalry" between Britain and the, United States,

which would "contribute most effectually to promote the
cause of Christianity, civilization and freedom among this

ancient and strange people."

Oh.

On September 16 Buchanan informed Secretary Marcy of
the Czar's refusal to accept the Turkish modifications of
the Vienna note.

The American minister still thought that

Britain and France would make every possible effort to prevent the outbreak of war.

He was concerned because many

Poles and Hungarians, presently in London, who had declared

their intention of becoming American citizens, wanted to
obtain United States passports in order to cross Europe and
Join the Turkish array.

Buchanan's refusal to grant

a

pass-

port to anyone who was not already an American citizen led
one angry Polish refugee to threaten to appeal over his
25
head to Secretary Marcy in Washington.

Buchanan at this time was involved in

a

controversy

with the British Court over Marcy 's Dress Circular to American diplomats, forbidding them to wear the heavily-orna-

mented type of formal attire that was the rule at European
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royal receptions.

In a conversation with a British offi-

cial, Buchanan compared British and Russian procedure in

this matter, to the advantage of the latter:

observed that the rules of etiquette
at the British Court were more strict even than
in Russia. Senator Douglas of the U.S. Senate had
just returned from Saint Petersburg. When inivited to visit the Czar in costume, he informed
.Count Nesselrode that he could not thus appear.
The Count asked him in what dress he appeared before the President of the U.S. Mr. Douglas answered:
In the very dress he then wore. The
Count after consulting with the Emperor said that
this was sufficient; and in this plain dress he
visited the Emperor at the palace and on parade
and had most agreeable conversations with him, on
:both occasions. 26
I

Eventually

.

a

the Court.

.

.

compromise was reached between Buchanan and
The American minister appeared before Queen

Victoria in his usual sober black suit, but with
sword added.

a

dress

'

<

At their first meeting Buchanan discussed the Eastern

Question with Lord Clarendon.

The British Foreign Secre-

tary spoke of the determination of France and Great Britain to sustain the Sultan, at least by naval means.

believed there was still

a

He

chance of avoiding war since

Austria and Prussia were now not likely to support Russia,
and since the Czar's prestige in Europe had greatly ebbed

during the past year.

Clarendon was concerned about the

possibility of a crop failure in Britain, and about domes-

tic consequences if the supply of Russian grain
was cut
off by war. Buchanan concluded that "under
these circum-

stances, the prospect of war is anything but agreeable
to

British Statesmen."

In the course of this interview the

two diplomats discussed the British establishment of

a

pro-

tectorate over the Mosquito Indians in Central America and
the Cuban question.

Clarendon denied that England had any

intention of acquiring Cuba.

Buchanan replied that the

United States would never seek the island "except by purchase or by other fair and honorable means." ^®

A few days later Buchanan and Clarendon met again.

Clarendon seemed less certain that there would be no war,
but he was doing everything possible to settle the Russo-

Turkish dispute.

The discussion then proceeded to the ques

tion of American expansion.

Buchanan reported their con-

versation as follows:

told him that whilst our good mother had
been all the time engaged, for one hundred and
fifty years, in annexing one possession after
the other to her dominions, until the sun never
set upon her empire, she raised her hands in
holy horror if the daughter annexed territories
adjacent to herself, which came to her in the
natural course of events. His Lordship replied;
Well, you must admit that in this respect you
are a chip of the old block. Very true, I observed; but we could not imagine why iingland
should object to our annexation; we extended the
English language, Christianity, liberty and law
wherever we went upon our own continent and converted uninhabited regions into civilized communities, from the trade with which they gained
great advantages. With much similar conversaI
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tion, especially in regard to the annexation of
Texas, this long interview terminated. 29

The Pierce administration's interest in Pacific as

well as Caribbean expansion aroused considerable concern
in Britain and France.

Preliminary negotiations for an

annexation treaty with the King of the Sandwich Islands
were going on at this time.

On December 4 Secretary Marcy

informed Buchanan that John F. Crampton and Eugene de Sartiges, the British and French ministers in Washington, were

uneasy about the rumors of an impending American acquisition of the islands.

Sartiges was particularly worried

about his nation's Catholic missionaries who had recently
gone to the Sandwich Islands.

For some years there had

been much rivalry between these missionaries and their

American Protestant counterparts who

had preceded them.

50

While Buchanan and Clarendon discussed the Eastern

Question and American expansion,

a

Turkish army under the

command of Omar Pasha, crossed the Danube into the Principalities early in November 1855-

Russia's army stood on

the defensive here, but its Black Sea fleet took the offensive.

Although peace negotiations continued after the

fighting began, and it is possible a settlement might have
been concluded,

a

spectacular Russian naval victory de-
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stroyed these hopes.

A Turkish squadron carrying rein-

forcements and supplies for Turkish troops on the Caucasus
frontier, was caught by the Russian Black Sea fleet outside the harbor of Sinope and virtually annihilated.

The

Russian ships were equipped with long-range shell-firing
guns, while the shorter-range Turkish cannons fired only

solid shot.

Because of the disproportionate losses of the

Turks, the battle was reported in England as a "treacherous massacre."

That Russia and Turkey had been at war for

almost a month was forgotten.

English public opinion, and

much of her press, clamored for war with Russia,

Lord

Palmerston, now Home Secretary, had been known to oppose

Russian expansion, and his abrupt resignation from Lord
Aberdeen's coalition government was rumored to have been
forced by "pro-Russian" ministers.

Prince Albert, the

Royal Consort, was hissed in the streets of London, because
he and his German relatives, suspected of being Russian

sympathizers, were thought to have pressed for Palmerston 's

dismissalo
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As a result of this great excitement, Palmerston was

back in office in

a

few weeks,

British and French fleets

were ordered into the Black Sea in early January 185^,
The Czar instructed his ambassadors to leave Paris and London.

Even now, war between the two western powers and Rus-

sia had not begun.

But Britain and France, encouraged by

the possibility of enlisting Austria on their side, for-
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warded an ultimatum to the Czar demanding
that his forces
evacuate the occupied Principalities by
April 50.

same time Napoleon sent him a personal
letter,

peal for peace.

a

At the

last ap-

Now less eager for war than the British

government and people, Napoleon had hoped to
avoid actual
conflict and sought merely a diplomatic victory
over

Rus-

sia.

But alliance with England, he thought, which
was some-

thing his uncle never had, might be worth

a

war to keep.

Nicholas ended Napoleon's vacillation by informing him
that the Russians would prove to be the same in 185^
as

they had been in 1812.
lenge.

Napoleon could not refuse this chal-

Britain and Erance declared war on March 28,

185^.

Late in 1853, as diplomatic negotiations collapsed and

fighting erupted between Russian and Turkish armies on the
Danube, pro-Turkish sentiment in the United States reached
its height.

The Turks had the better of several encounters

in the first month of the war, and these successes (sometimes considerably magnified in the newspaper accounts)
were applauded in America as being unmistakable evidence of

Turkish vitality.

In some quarters pro-Turkish sentiment

was also synonomous v/ith pro-British sentiment, even though
it was not certain that Britain would enter the war.

Anglo-

philism was most notable in the Protestant religious maga-

zines, which tended to neglect the close cooperation of

Catholic France with Britain.

view sang

a

The Methodist Quarterly Re-

hymn of praise to England:

What is England now? Preeminent among the
nations of Europe, in 'all that the wise most
seek to know, or the good most desire to do.'
•
•
• Her empire encircles the globe; her keels
vex every ocean; her influence reaches to the
ends of the earth; and; 'she sits like a star on
the lap of the ocean,
emitting a mild and
healthful radiance on the surrounding darkness. 35
'

Russia, on the other hand, was "the impersonation of

despotism."

The Review noted that Russia had become a

great European power at about the same time that the

United States had achieved its independence.

Both coun-

tries possessed the "bounding vigor and elasticity of

a

youthful existence," clear evidence of providential design.
But there the similarity ended.

Continent, "by the defeat of

a

Since Russia dominated the
single power, when the ful-

ness of the time for Russia's fall has come, tyranny might
be extinguished forever, blotted by a single blow from the

face of the whole earth."
The Church Review and Ecclesiastical Register

,

Episcopal magazine, was pro-Turkish and pro-British.

an

It

was hostile to autocratic Russia but also to European revo-

lutionaries such as Kossuth.

Representing "constitutional

liberty" rather than "anarchy and lawless licentiousness,"
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England was hated by the revolutionists as well as by the

Czar and the Austrian Emperor.

The Church Review

,

despite

its distaste for radicalism, approved of Commander Ing-

rah^m's conduct in the Koszta case.

The American flag,

like that of Britain, it commented, would "rebuke Austrian

impudence and Russian despotism wherever it encounters
tkem."

America would remain neutral in the forthcoming

war and the prosperity that would come to her through the

carrying trade would hasten the day when she would "take
her place as a great ruling power among the nations of the
35
earth." -^-^

There was one exception to the American policy

of neutrality.

If all the Continental powers were allied

against England, then the United States would enter the
war:

We note this exception because we see a twofold effort now making in the newspapers of the
day to sow the seeds of alienation and distrust
between these two great Protestant powers. The
myrmidons of popery and the political scapegraces of the old world, who have fled their
country for their country's good, and who had
yet to learn the very alphabet of true liberty,
these are both at work among us, leveling their
envenomed shafts at old England, the Church, and
the British Constitution. They will exhaust
their inane twaddle and their Jesuitical cunning,
and still they cannot sunder the bonds which
bind these two great nations together in enduring concord. One, to a great extent in the lineage of the glorious old Anglo-Saxon race, one
in language and literature, one, more and more,
in religion, one, in the apparent destiny of unparalleled influence, they may yet be found one
also in doing battle for the common cause of the
Truth of God and the rights of humanity. 56

Both Democratic and Whig newspapers leaned to the

Turkish side but with differences in degree.

The Koszta

case had led the Democrats to identify the Turkish cause

with that of the European revolutionaries, and they were
therefore extremely hostile to Russia.

•

At the same time,

Democratic hostility to Britain continued unabated.

The

Whigs, who were unenthusiastic about revolutionists, pre-

ferred Turkey but made some effort to present the Russian
viewpoint.
The resounding Russian naval victory at Sinope a-

roused much excitement in the United States, but it did
not lead to any major change in public sentiment.

Pro-

Turkish feeling remained dominant but, in marked contrast
to the English reaction there was no tendency to describe

the Russian attack on the Turkish fleet as "treacherous."

On December 27 the New York Tribune reported that "the

country was startled" by the news, but it explicitly criticized the British press for its talk of Russian treachery.

The Tribune thought that the chances for peace might

have improved, since the Czar's forces had won a victory

which would enable him to save face if he evacuated the
Principalities.
The New Orleans Picayune called the Russian success

"important but not decisive."

It emphasized its belief

that if England, France, Austria and Prussia took

a

reso-

lute diplomatic stand they could force Russia to back down
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without an extension of the war.

However, it doubted

whether the four powers were sufficiently united to do
this.

Although not agreeing with the English press, the

Picayune called it "more truthful to its vocation" than
the controlled French press, which played down the battle,

since it was a setback to Napoleon's hopes of avoiding
war. 59

The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported Sinope with

a

flourish, along with several other exciting events:

News! News!! News!!! Read the paper all
over today. The contents are worth a year's subscription. The unparalleled naval battle between the Turks and Russians and the annihilation of the former; riot and death at Erie; the
Pope's Nuncio mobbed in Cincinnati; great ship
Republic burned in New lork, &c. 8cc. • '4-0

The Albany Evening Journal described the news of Sinope as "painfully exciting" and agreed that Britain and

France would now be forced to enter the war.
bany paper, the Argus

,

Another Al-

expressed similar thoughts and

printed a key London Times editorial in which that Journal
abandoned its earlier conciliatory stand on the Russo-Turkish dispute and called for

a

"sterner alternative."
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Although the Washington Union, the semi-official voice
of the Pierce administration, had no direct editorial com-

ment about Sinope, its general stand on the war was clear.

On November 25 the Union brought out an extra edition
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which announced the outbreak of hostilities between Russia
and Turkey, and which included the Czar's war manifesto.

Every American heart would be enlisted on Turkey's side,
it editorialized on the following day, and Russia could

have no friends in such a struggle.

The day after the news

of Sinope arrived, the Union placed on its front page a

London Times editorial entitled "Gloomy Prospects of Russia."

Since the Union frequently engaged in polemics a-

gainst the English "Thunderer," it is significant that it

printed this call for strong action against Russia, without any criticism.

The Union's strong pro-Turkish stand

was nonetheless mitigated by continuing suspicions of Brit-

ish and French motives in the Western Hemisphere as well as
in Europe.

Cuba was the main foreign preoccupation of the

Pierce administration in 1853

and the Union regularly de-

nounced British attempts to "Africanize" the island by persuading Spain to abolish slavery.

According to an editor-

ial of early November England would stop at nothing to

keep Cuba out of American hands.

Great Britain might even

permit African pirates to become active in the Gulf of Mexico, as she had once tolerated the depredations of Alger-

lan pirates.

4-2

The Springfield Republican favored vigorous action by

Britain and France to check Russia's "Godless, grasping,

grinding ambition."
from

a

On September

5 it

printed

a

letter

London correspondent which expressed the hope that
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if the United States and England ever fought
again it

would be on the same side.

After the rejection of the Vi-

enna note the Republican found war inevitable.

It dis-

missed Russia's demands on Turkey as "mere trumpery" and

described the Turks as deserving of the sympathy of the

Christian world.
During the last months of 1853 the National Intelli gencer

,

the voice of Whiggery, was a notable exception to

the anti-Russian tone prevailing in the American press.
Yet, since it opposed all plans for American acquisition of

Cuba, it seldom expressed hostility to Great Britain.

The

Intelligencer agreed that an Anglo-French war with Russia
over the Ottoman Empire was inevitable but thought it

could still be delayed for some time.

It predicted a de-

fensive strategy by the Russians on the Danube, which would
make it more difficult for Britain and France to intervene.

Although the Intelligencer was correct about Russian land
strategy, it did not foresee the naval offensive in the

Black Sea which led to the Battle of Sinope.
On October 25 the Intelligencer published three pro-

Russian items.

One described Nicholas

I

as the wisest

sovereign in Europe and praised his consistent friendship
for the United States.

An article on Russian educational

improvements (from the New York Evening Post ) was also
printed.
a

Then, curiously enough, there was

a

letter from

"Major W.H.C." which praised Russian expansion as bene-
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ficial to civilization and portrayed Siberia as being full
Qf "smiling villages and comfortable homesteads."

"May

the flight of the Russian and American eagles," he con-

cluded, "be continued until Christianity, civilization,
and conservatism encircle the earth!"

The Intelligencer foresaw "a danger of universal an-

archy in Continental Europe." It advised Americans not to
give too much credence to reports of early Turkish victories,

American policy in the Koszta case was criticized as

well as the general idea of support for European revolu-

tionaries.

On December 27 the paper contained

a

report of

a meeting held at Eckhart's Hotel in New York on December

22 which had as its purpose the organization of volunteer
•

companies to assist the Turks.

Most of those present were

Germans, French, Poles or Hungarians:

The scene was picturesque in the extreme
men with large beards,
. men of every nation,
,
,
from whose mouths curiously shaped pipes projected; desperate looking fellows, destined probably to be the saviours of the Ottoman Porte and
the terror of the Autocrat of all the Russias.
A letter was also read from a Baltimore
,
o
.
lady, drawing the attention of the society to a
gun which can be fired ten times in a minute,
carrying eleven balls at a time, to the distance
of three hundred yards. 46

As Britain and France moved closer to war with Russia, newspaper readers discovered some exceptions to the

general pro-Turkish tone of the American press, notably in
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the case of the WashinR;ton Union .

In early March 1854 the

Union ran a series of articles on the Eastern Question by
"A Retired Statesman."

The first established the tone of

what would follow by criticizing the deference of American

Journals to opinions in the British press.

A second letter

pointed out that British attempts to halt Russian expansion were identical with her efforts to limit American
growth.

The protection of Turkey was similar to the "pro-

tectorate" established by Britain on the Mosquito Coast of

Central America.

The third and fourth contributions pic-

tured the Ottoman Empire as no longer having any territorial integrity to preserve.

The "Retired Statesman" also

warned against an Anglo-French attempt to set up
of

power in America.

a

balance

Britain had always been hostile to

the United States, and France had been so since the early

1830 ''s.
The fifth article in this series elaborated upon the

menace posed by Anglo-French cooperation in the Western
Hemisphere.

It was in the interest of the United States

to maintain good relations with Russia because no territorial or economic rivalry existed between the two nations

anywhere in the world.

Both powers were progressive, even

though their forms of government differed.

The menace of

the new Western alliance should also persuade Americans to

stop arguing about the slavery question and abandon"uni-

versal philanthropy" for blacks and European revolution-
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aries alike

In some distant age, and amid those
lutions of time which produce miracles, revotnese
giants of the two worlds may possibly meet
where and shake hands, or buffet each other:somebut
whoever anticipates this must dive so deep
into
futurity that in all probability he will never
come up again.
I cannot, therefore, but
hope
that the Congress of the United States, which
alone can speak for the people of the United
States, will take an early occasion to show the
world that they are neither asleep nor blindthat they see clearly into the policy of this
new alliance, and mean to prepare for its consequences.
It is high time for us to get out of
the lirabo of niggerdom, and pay some little attention to the interests of our white fellow citizens. 48

While the New York Tribune supported Turkey against
Russia, its only hope for the regeneration of Turkey was

the substitution of Christianity for Islam,

There would

be some gain for Europe if Russian expansion were checked,

but on the whole the Tribune deplored the outbreak of hos-

tilities as

a

disaster for civilization.

It pointed out

that weapons of destruction were considerably more formi-

dable now than during the Napoleonic Wars.

There was

little chance that the masses of Europe would benefit from

such

a

conflict, unless the revolutionists were able to

take advantage of it.

Almost as hostile to Britain and

Prance as it was to Russia, the Tribune emphasized the

duplicity of British diplomacy (i.e. British support of
Russia against Prance in the Egyptian crisis of 1840).
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Napoleon III was

a

"perjured assassin" (i.e. the coup

d'etat of December 2, 1851) in the opinion of the Tribune
.
Nevertheless, the paper regarded Nicholas
ly responsible for the war.

I

as being main-

It compared his demands on

Turkey with Senator Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska
Bill, which had just been introduced in the United States

Congress.

William Lloyd Garrison, still adhering to his total

nonresistance stand, had already clashed with his fellow
abolitionist Gerritt Smith over the Koszta affair.

The

editorials in The Liberator continued to advocate pacifism
in dealing with the -Eastern Question.

One article praised

the "crushing speech" which John Bright (a staunch oppo-

nent of British entry into the Russo-Turkish war) delivered in reply to Admiral Sir Charles Napier's defense of

war at the World Peace Convention at Edinburgh in the fall
of 1853*

The Liberator refrained from taking any direct

stand on the conflict between Russia and Turkey, but crit-

icized the Washington Union for the anti-British tone of
its editorials.

Garrison attributed this attitude to the

determination of the "Slave Power" to seize Cuba.
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Some of Garrison's colleagues in the anti-slavery
cause were openly hostile to Russia.

Higginson preached

a

Thomas Wentworth

sermon on the Nebraska Bill in which

he charged that Senator Douglas was working in collabora-

tion with the Czar to disrupt the American Republic so
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there would be no possibility of American intervention in
Europe.

Referring to Douglas* recent visit to Saint Peters-

burg, Higginson reminded his audience that there was a motto
of European statesmen which warned, "Beware of the man who

came last from Saint Petersburg,"

According to Higginson

the history of Europe for the past century was only the

history of Russia,

Since Russian power was so far-reaching,

Americans would be foolish to think that the Czar would
not consider

a

scheme to divide the United States in order

to further his projects in Europe,

The explanation of the

introduction of the Nebraska Bill is beyond "the politics
of one continent only,"

The Springfield Republican was sympathetic to both

Turkey and the Western allies.

It desired the liberation

of all those Europeans whose hopes had been frustrated in

1848-49.

It was better "that liberty should be purchased

at the price of so much life and treasure, than not to be

obtained at all."
can

'

s

On a more practical note, the Republi -

Business Report on March 5 stated, "the European

troubles are daily blessings to America."

The Republican

was disturbed by the statraents of both Southern politi-

cians and newspapers about the danger of the Anglo-French

alliance to the United States.

It predicted Russian sup-
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port for the South 's ambition in the Caribbean.

The National Intelligencer maintained its moderate

tone in reporting the war early in 1854,

The regular con-
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tributions of its London correspondent were pro-British,

but the Intellig;encer also expressed concern over English

belligerence prompted by the Battle of Sinope.

When the

Russian minister, Baron Bodisco, died in January 1854 the

Intelligencer wrote that he was in "his conduct here ever
true to the character of a minister of peace."

The

paper regarded the war as regrettable, more "on the score
of common humanity" than of American interests.

One of the

articles from London predicted that the war would determine
the fate of Europe for the next half century at least.

Britain and France had tried diplomacy for peace long enough.

Another published item,

a

letter from Cairo,

warned against illusionary hopes of Turkish regeneration.
It deplored the British and French failure to support Po-

land and Hungary in 1851 and 1849.

If these nations were

independent they would be the formidable barrier against

Russian expansion that Turkey could never become.

While

discussing the Eastern Question, the Intelligencer continued its editorial battle with the Union over Caribbean matters.

It rebuked the Union for denouncing Great Britain

in connection with the Spanish seizure of the American

merchant ship Black Warrior near Cuba.

According to the

Intellig;encer the United States was "on terms of the most
55
friendly intercourse with Great Britain."

Thus as the war between Russia and Turkey widened into
a

to
European war, American opinion still leaned strongly

the Turkish side, although evaluations of
the motives of
Turkey's Western allies differed widely. Such
confusion,

reinforced by the strength of historic attitudes,
would
cause a major shift in American sentiment when
the war
changed from a defensive conflict on the part of Turkey
an Anglo-French invasion of Russia in the fall of
1854,

t

CHAPTER

IV

The outbreak of the Crimean War almost immediately

produced a conflict between the State Department and the
American minister in Constantinople.

Carroll Spence, who

had been appointed by President Pierce to succeed Marsh,
left the United States in late 1853 when pro-Turkish sen-

timent was at its height.

Upon arriving in Turkey Spence

was appalled by the poor morale of the Turkish army.

It

was apparent that British and French support would be needed to save it from defeat.

According to Spence the Turks

had acquired many Christian vices and had lost "the Chivalric and enterprising characteristics of the Saracen,"

Constantinople's stores were filled with English and French
goods, and even the Turkish bazaars appeared less oriental

than they had been a few years earlier.

stantinople as
ucts.

a

Spence saw Con-

potentially good market for American prod-

Coarse cotton goods from the United States had re-

cently been competing successfully with those of Great

Britain in South America and China; they might also do so
in Turkey.

Spence visited the Sultan in the company of Captain

Long of the U.S. steamer Saranac and Commander Turner of
the U.S. corvette Levant .

Upon presenting his credentials,

the new minister commended the protection extended by Tur-

key to the Hungarian refugees and then expressed United
States' sympathy for Turkey.

America's policy of avoiding

"national interference" in European quarrels, he
stated,
would never restrain the United States from lending
moral
support to any nation fighting for a just cause,
Spence

concluded by voicing the hope that "the termination of
the
conflict between your Majesty and the Czar of Russia may
accord with your most sanguine expectations." ^
Spence 's statement reflected what he thought was the

seeming unanimity, both official and unofficial, of American sentiment in support of Turkey.
just before he had sailed.

This had been evident

But lately, with the entry of

Britain and France into the war, State Department policy,
not to mention public opinion, had begun to shift.

Shortly

before Spence 's interview with the Sultan, Lord Clarendon
(in an address to the British Parliament) had stated that

the Anglo-French alliance implied a united front by the
two powers on questions concerning both hemispheres.

This

assertion aroused worry in both the State Department and
Congress.

Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan was particularly

emphatic in warning his colleagues that the new alliance

posed a threat to the Monroe Doctrine.

With this in mind,

the Pierce administration did not want to give the impres-

sion that the United States was fully sympathetic to the

Allied cause.

Spence, to be sure, had not gone beyond

what Commodore Stringham had said to the Sultan the previous summer, but much had changed since then.

The new en-

voy learned this* with considerable surprise, in

a

despatch
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from the State Department.

Marcy reprimanded Spence for

having taken an excessively pro-Turkish stand in the light
of potential dangers inherent in the Anglo-French alli-

ance. 5

Spence, defending his action, denied that his kind re-

marks to the Sultan had in any way committed the United
States.

He recalled the pro-Turkish sentiment prevalent

at the time of his departure:

Did not both native-born and

naturalized citizens abhor the expansion of the Russian Empire as "the extension of the area of despotism in Europe"?

Spence also alluded to the conviction of leading Protestant churches that a victory for Greek Orthodoxy would

spell the destruction of all other Christian sects in Turkey,

But the essential difference between Marcy and Spence

was that the latter did not regard the Anglo-French alli-

ance as a threat to American interests in the Western Hem-

isphere.

In his reply, Spence emphasized the traditional

Anglo-French rivalry and predicted that the alliance would
not last long.

The American minister was beginning to have some

doubts about his own position.

Following his arrival

Spence had talked with many Central European refugees in
Constantinople, and he now concluded that their enthusiasm
for Turkey, based on the expectation that Austria would
support Russia, was waning.

Spence toodid not expect Aus-

tria to enter the war, but it disappointed him to discover
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that his opposition to Russian expansion (with or without

Austrian support), was not shared by the revolutionaries,
who only seemed interested in fighting Austria.

These rad-

icals were obsessed, and it appeared to Spence that they

might even support Russia if Austria came out openly on the

Allied side, ^
Spence *s confidence in his policy was further shaken
by a Turkish decree expelling all Greeks from Constantinople.

The pro-Russian sentiment already existing among

these people had been intensified by an insurrection of

their fellow nationals in Epirus,

a

Turkish province.

The

American minister interceded on behalf of the Greeks; but
assured Reshid Pasha of his purely humanitarian motives and

denied any intention of working against Turkish interests.

Having urged the Turks to follow the same lenient policy
they had so far observed towards the Russians resident in

Ottoman territory, Spence was able to report to Marcy that
his appeal on behalf of the Greeks had some success.

Many

of them had been permitted to remain.

Some of the most intricate diplomatic issues growing
out of the Crimean War concerned the maritime rights of

neutrals.

With the war impending, Buchanan attempted on

February 1? to persuade the British to agree to

a

"free

ships, free goods" policy in dealing with neutral commerce.

The American position was that non-contraband
goods on enemy ships - if they originated in a neutral
nation - as

well as similar material on neutral ships should
not be
seized by a blockading squadron. Moreover, the United

States refused to recognize any port as being blockaded unless the dominant naval power actually was able to close

the harbor.

Prussia, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian

countries supported the American position.

Even more sig-

nificantly, Count Walewski, the French ambassador in London, had revealed that France also urged Britain to follow

this course. ^

In his February 17 conversation with Buchanan, Lord

Clarendon seemed apprehensive about the possibility of Russian privateers being fitted out in United States ports.
In this connection Buchanan advised President Pierce to

issue a proclamation calling for vigilant execution of the

Neutrality Law.

A few weeks later, however, Clarendon sug-

gested a treaty between the United States, Great Britain
and France, in which the captains and crews of privateers

would be considered pirates.

Buchanan, objecting strenu-

ously, drew up a list of eight reasons against such an a-

greement.

He emphasized that the treaty would violate

United States neutrality by attempting to punish as pi8
rates, American citizens who served on Russian privateers.

Buchanan was particularly concerned about the repercussions
that would follow if the British executed any naturalized

Irish- Americans captured aboard these privateers.

(Brit-

ish law did not recognize the naturalization of British

subjects as American citizens at this time.)

After dis-

cussing Buchanan's objections, Clarendon admitted that some
were valid.

On March 22 he informed the American minister

of his intention to abandon the proposed treaty, ^

Several days before the British government withdrew
its anti-privateering proposal, Lord Clarendon announced

England's acceptance of the "free ships, free goods" principle for the duration of the war.

Buchanan, failing to

notice a certain vagueness in Clarendon's statement, was

highly pleased.

The decision seemed to mark the abandon-

ment of that traditional British policy which proclaimed an

unhampered role for her powerful navy in times of international crisis.

Proud of his own part in this historic

event, Buchanan speculated:

The effect of this, . . . will be to give
our vessels a great advantage over British vessels in the carrying trade. ... Should Russia
be prevailed upon to adopt the liberal policy towards neutrals announced in the Queen's declaration, we may expect a harvest for our carrying
trade such as it has never before experienced.
I could almost wish myself to be in St. Petersburg for a fortnight. 10

In Washington the State Department was less satisfied

with the British declaration on neutral rights than Buchanan, and decided to seek a clarification of British policy

on certain specific issues.

Secretary Marcy requested that

Buchanan ask the British government to permit
American merchants to take those goods out of Russia which
had been

purchased both before and after the blockade began.

In

complying Buchanan discreetly refrained from presenting
Marcy's second point.

His hesitation proved to be justi-

fied, for Clarendon raised several objections to allowing

American vessels to take out cargoes purchased even before
the blockade had begun.

It was immediately apparent that

Buchanan's enthusiasm about the initial British announcement on maritime policy had been premature.

There was

still a great gulf between the American and British inter-

pretations of

a

"free ships, free goods" policy.

On July

4, 185^ Clarendon informed Buchanan that American vessels

which already had their cargo on board when the blockade
•*.

,

.

was established could leave, but no ships which were not

actually laden, even if the cargo was purchased before the
blockade began, could pass through the squadron^
Clarendon's response was

a

'^'^

great disappointment for

Buchanan, and his bitterness increased when, in the spring
of 185^, the Allied governments established the blockade
of the Russian coast.

Instead of mentioning only specific

ports, as Buchanan had hoped, their proclamation inter-

dieted trade with the Russian shores of the Baltic and
Black Seas.

In a despatch to Secretary Marcy Buchanan ex-

pressed his chagrin at both Clarendon's note on American

84

commerce with Russia and the nature of
the Anglo-French
blockade:

This long delayed answer is different from
what might have been expected from my conversations with him and Sir James Graham, and from
what I have some reason to believe it would have
been if the interests of the United States had
been seriously involved. . . . France and England
might as well have declared in a sweeping clause
that they had blockaded all the coasts of Russia,
both
Europe and Asia. Their declaration much
resembles the old orders in Council and the Berlin and Milan decrees. 12

m

In addition to the maritime controversy, Buchanan re-

mained worried over the general policy of Britain and
Prance towards the United States.

He agreed with the sen-

timents expressed by Marcy in his rebuke to Spence with respect to the danger that the defeat of Russia by these pow-

ers might lead to an alliance between them to check American
expansion.

In particular, this association might be a

threat to American acquisition of Cuba.

But Buchanan did

not, however, foresee any immediate danger of such action.

He was convinced that, presently already engaged, the British would not risk a war with the United States over Cuba.
It would bring "utter ruin" to many English manufacturers;

and their influence would therefore be sufficient to block

such a conflict.

Napoleon III, according to Buchanan re-

garded the possibility of American control over Cuba with

much greater hostility than did the British.

Worried a-

4

bout the influence of the Empress Eugenie,
whom he described as being "in heart and soul a Spaniard,"
Buchanan
believed that it would be advantageous for the
United

States to purchase Cuba while Britain and France were
engaged in war with Russia.

While Buchanan was negotiating with Clarendon in London, President Pierce and Secretary Marcy took two impor-

tant initiatives concerning the European war.

They at-

tempted to interest the belligerent powers in American mediation, and proposed an international agreement on the

rights of neutrals.

The idea of American mediation had

been suggested by Joseph Ingersoll, Buchanan's prede-

cessor in London, even before hostilities had begun. Eli-

hu Burritt, the most famous American pacifist, dined with
Pierce at the White House on March 24, and urged the President to make an offer of mediation to the belligerents.

Pierce and Marcy were pleased with the idea.

Continuation

of the war could only solidify the Franco-British alliance.
It was also true that such an action, if successful, would

greatly increase American prestige in Europe.

(It would

also acknowledge services previously rendered by the bel-

ligerents; Russia had offered to mediate during the War of
1812, and England had helped settle the debt dispute be14
tween the United States and France during the 1830 's.)

Marcy requested information from Thomas
Seymour, the
American minister in Saint Petersburg, as
to how the Rus-

sian government would react to an American
mediation proposal. Seymour's recent interviews with Nicholas
I had

convinced him that the Russians were eager to gain
whatever
American support they could, were it only benevolent
neu-

trality.

Even before the formal Anglo-French declaration

of war on Russia, Seymour had observed that many
persons

in Saint Petersburg were hoping that the British blockade
of the Baltic would produce clashes between Britain and

the United States similar to those preceding the War of
1812.

The Czar expressed the desire to see more of the

American flag in the Baltic, and implied that the war presented an opportunity for the United States to seize the
Baltic trade, heretofore dominated by Britain.
An American challenge to the blockade would have been
a great victory for Russia

American conflict.

whether or not it led to Anglo-

For not only would an increase in Amer-

ican trade in the Baltic help Russia by ending England's

pre-eminence in this area, it would, if such conflict
broke out release

ish commerce.

a

swarm of privateers to prey upon Brit-

But since American trade with Russia was

comparatively small, the United States government was not
likely to risk war with England for that reason alone.

American shippers were soon to discover that providing
transports for Britain and France was

a

more lucrative in-

vestment than increasing their activities in the Baltic.
Seymour, on May 26, informed Marcy of the Russian gov-

ernment's probable acceptance of American intercession.
In early July Marcy told Baron de Stoeckl, the Russian min-

ister in Washington, that the United States would soon offer its mediation to the belligerents.

England, Stoeckl

commented, was likely to reject the suggestion; and Marcy
said:

"Let her do so.

her in our eyes.

It will be one more count against

You surely cannot object to that."

Al-

though skeptical about the American plan, Stoeckl advised
Saint Petersburg to accept it.
The Russian minister was correct in his prediction con-

cerning the Allied response to American mediation.

Drouyn

de Lhuys, the French Foreign Minister, informed his repre-

sentative in Washington, Eugene de Sartiges, to reject the

proposal politely, since

a

dangerous precedent would be

set if a European war were ended by American diplomatic ac-

tion.

After this rebuff, which was supported by the Brit-

ish government. Pierce and Marcy abandoned their idea of

American mediation.
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At the time that Marcy broached the European powers

on mediation, he proposed a permanent "free ships, free

goods" convention to Russia, Britain and France.

Both

Stoeckl and Count Nesselrode, the Russian Chancellor, saw
the offer as an opportunity to strengthen the friendship

between Russia and the United States.

On July 22 the two

nations signed the neutral rights convention
in Washington
The United States Senate unanimously ratified
the treaty
on July 25.

Britain and France, however, reacted coolly to the
proposed treaty. Both powers insisted that such an agreement must be accompanied by an American renunciation of

privateering.

Allied rejection of United States mediation

and of the neutral rights convention helped shift American

opinion, both official and unofficial, in a pro-Russian
on

direction.

Allied military activity, in the months following the

Anglo-French declaration of war on Russia, was somewhat
less spectacular than many observers had expected.

British public had anticipated

a great

The

victory when Admi-

ral Sir Charles Napier's fleet sailed to the Baltic, but
the only substantial achievement of his campaign was the

capture of the Russian fortress of Bomersund in the Aland
Islands.

Apart from this the British limited themselves

to blockading the Russian ports and to occasional raids on

the small Baltic harbors.

21

Napoleon III was in favor of an immediate attack on
Sevastopol, Russia's naval base in the Crimea, but the Brit
ish vetoed this suggestion because they expected a Russian

advance on Constantinople.

But the British fear of an at-
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tack on the Turkish capital soon proved to be
as unfounded
as their exaggerated hopes of a Baltic
Trafalger. After
crossing the Danube the Russian array was held up for
two

months at the Turkish fortress of Silistria.

Now an event occurred which had

a

major impact on the

outcome of the war and an important effect on American public opinion.

Emboldened by Russian defeats, the Austrian

government saw an opportunity to establish itself as the

dominant power in the Balkans.

It sent an ultimatum to

Saint Petersburg, demanding the withdrawal of Russian
troops from Moldavia and Wallachia and threatening to join
the Anglo-French alliance if Russia refused to comply.

Nicholas I, bitterly recalling the events of 1849 but not

wishing to acquire another enemy, ordered the evacuation of
the Principalities.

With the Russian army stalled at Silistria, the British and French realized that they had exaggerated the dan-

ger to Constantinople.

They sent a small squadron to the

Russian Black Sea coast, which bombarded the port of Odessa, and moved their troops from Constantinople to Varna on

the Bulgarian coast.

Shortly afterward,

a

cholera epidemic

broke out among the Allied troops and caused heavy losses
even before their first encounter with the Russians. Before the Anglo-French force could advance to the relief of

Silistria, the Russians had abandoned the siege and had

withdrawn from the Principalities.

Austrian troops now oc-

cupied Moldavia and Wallachia.

Having lost the opportuni-

ty to engage the Russians near Silistria,
the British and
French governments now ordered their forces
to invade
the

Crimea and capture Sevastopol.

Divisions in American public opinion became more pro-

nounced during the few months following the Allied declaration of war.

The nearly unanimous pro-Turkish sentiment

of 1855 rapidly evaporated.

Most Southern newspapers and

politicians became ardently pro-Russian (or, at least,
anti-British).

Northern Democrats and expansionists alike

also revealed new admiration for Russia, often manifest in

anti-British diatribes.

Whig politicians and newspapers

tended to lean to the British side, although their public
statements rarely were enthusiastic.

The Whigs advocated

a policy of strict neutrality for the United States and

the avoidance of any expansionist adventures that might

produce

a

clash with Britain and France.

The abolition-

ists and the Protestant clergy who were interested in mis-

sionary activity preferred the Allies and sought to retain

their early enthusiasm for the Turks.

Catholic opinion was

divided between those who supported France against the Russian "schismatics" and those who, like Orestes Brownson,

regarded English "heretics" as being worse than these
"schismatics."
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On April 5 the Washin5:ton Union

,

the organ of the

Pierce administration, described the
entry of Britain and
France into the war as the "most effectual

check" given to

American sympathy for the Sultan's cause.

Emphasizing

Anglo-American commercial rivalry, it took the
Whig New
York Courier and Enquirer to task for its
pro-British
stand.

It found particularly obnoxious the
Courier 's

statement that Anglo-Saxon solidarity should contribute
to
Anglo-American unity:

The allegation that we are descendents of
Englishmen is as ridiculous as the rest of the
Courier 's casuistry. It belongs to a bygone
age^
Tt is part of a dead and buried philosophy. The ties of blood that bind us to England
are growing weaker and weaker, from physical as
well as political causes. She never regards
these ties when she can stay our progress or defeat our designs. 26

The Union strongly supported the Pierce administration
in conflicts with Britain over maritime rights and priva-

teering.

It printed another letter from the "Retired

Statesman" which suggested that the United States draw up
a

new code of maritime law.

America's policy of neutral-

ity was enabling the nation to assume

world's great powers.
selves to fear now:

a

place as one of the

The American people had only them"If they do not turn upon themselves

and commit suicide by becoming the dupes of political

priests and abolition traitors, it needs no prophet to pre-
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diet that they will, at no distant
period, become the foremost nation of the earth, and transcend
even the glories of

their illustrious parent."

^'^

In the enthusiasm of its new policy, the
Union saw
Russian and American expansion as similar in
nature. The
paper made its point quite clear in an editorial
entitled
"The Two Sick Men - Cuba and Turkey." Russian
control of
I

Constantinople was as logical and justifiable as
American
domination of Cuba. In each case, Britain and France

were

trying to prevent
imate destiny.

a

young nation from fulfilling its legit-

The United States should strengthen its

harbor defenses to meet the threat from the elderly powers:
"We should then be able to set at defiance all selfish and

treacherous combinations of other powers, which look as im-

pudently to the West as they do imperiously to the East." 28
The anti-administration National Intelligencer contin-

ued to advocate

a

policy of non-intervention in the Euro-

pean war, and deplored all talk of annexing territory in
the Caribbean.

It prided itself on the impartiality of its

war reporting.

While pro-Allied articles from its London

correspondent appeared regularly, the paper often included
letters from persons sympathetic to Russia and editorially
opposed the idea of

a

"revolutionary" crusade against "des-

potism" in general or Russia in particular.

It praised a

Connecticut Courant editorial which denounced "Young America" and its

filibustering expeditions.

This article
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warned of the inevitable defeat of the United States
in any
naval war with either England or France. The break between
Austria and Russia pleased the Intelligencer because it
pushed many European revolutionaries into
sition.

"Young America" no longer had

European monarchies to denounce.

a

a

pro-Russian po-

united front of

A Paris correspondent

flatly asserted "the democratic party in Europe are proRussian."
One contributor to the Intelligencer

,

in a communica-

tion from Marseilles, favored Turkish expulsion from Europe
by Russia.

He believed that Russian conquest of Constan-

tinople "would be in favor of the United States in every

way as regards commerce and free trade."

The Intelli -

gencer lauded Britain and France for adopting the "free
ships, free goods" principle and simultaneously praised

the American-Russian treaty which permanently endorsed it.^^

_Hunt*s Merchants' Magazine

,

a

leading commercial jour-

nal of New York, agreed that the United States would enjoy

commercial gains if Russia controlled Constantinople.

One

author, in an article entitled "Commercial View of the

Russo-Turkish Question," denounced the Allies for attempting to monopolize world trade.

Apprehensive about the

possibility that they would attempt to check the spread of
American commerce, he wrote:

No American can be indifferent to the result
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of this war.
It affects us as an expansive, acquiring, and commercial people; it affects us
as
a liberty-loving and independent nation;
for if
It succeed
drying up the stream of a mighty
nation's trade, it will check in it the development of civilization, the intelligence of the
masses, and their approach to independence; for
Commerce has never yet failed to banish tyranny
from the midst of that people who cherished her,
and by her magic touch, barren regions have
blossomed like a rose, and the slaves of tyrants
became the noblest defenders of human liberty. 51

m

The South 's foremost commercial journal, De Bow's Re-

view of New Orleans, took

a

similar stand on the war.

In

an article entitled "An American View of the Eastern Ques-

tion," William H. Trescot, a Southern diplomat, argued
that, with the exception of the United States, Russia was

the only power in the world with a fixed foreign policy and
the only one making constant progress.

He thought English

policy to be commercial rather than political in nature;
it was continually changed to remain consonant with "the

interest of Manchester and Liverpool."

Russia, on the con-

trary, had made the extension of her empire to Constanti-

nople the sole diplomatic goal for two centuries.

Trescot

commended Russia for its role as "the natural and necessary
support of the conservatism of the world."

sympathy for the events of 1848,

a

time when "the future

fortunes of all Europe were compromised by
tion."

He had little

a

rash revolu-

Contrasting Russia's political conservatism with

the commercial conservatism of England, Trescot expressed

95

his dislike for the latter because it attempted
to prevent
the "natural" growth of other nations, particularly
the
United States and Russia.

In Trescot's opinion all healthy societies attempted
to expand at the expense of their neighbors.

This invari-

able historical tendency was stigmatized by hypocritical

English publicists when it benefited any nation besides
their own:

You cannot bring into contact an earnest,
living will, and a feeble, effete nature, without the absorption of the one into the other.
Place England alongside India, the United States
by Mexico and Cuba, Russia by Turkey, and a half
century of diplomacy or war will not, cannot,
prevent the inevitable result. The first principle of life is progress, $$

Trescot did not wish to see the power of Britain di-

minished.

In fact he complimented the English for their

pioneering role in commerce and constitutional liberty.
After all, "nursed at her bosom, great empires have grown
into the perfected manhood of national life."

But for a

long time England had been interfering all over the world.
The growth of a counterbalancing European power therefore

would be

a

gain for everyone,

Russia was best suited for

this role, since her conservatism was the best counter-

weight to the restlessness that afflicted both Britain and
France,

In the past, the mutual rivalry of these two pow-
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ers had helped to maintain a balance of
power in Europe and
the rest of the world. Their alliance,
at this time, was
a dangerous portent.

It might now be impossible for Eng-

land to renew her accord with Russia if Napoleon
III attempted to wage a revolutionary war to overthrow
the Vienna settlement of 1815. In the Western Hemisphere,
Anglo-

French unity would be a serious threat to American security.

For the United States to play

a

proper role in "the

troubled times at hand" it would need three things:

a re-

formed diplomatic service, a stronger navy, and "an honest,

determined neutrality."

In Trescot's opinion, America

should warn the belligerents that it would not permit the
war to be extended into the Western Hemisphere:

No New

World possessions would be allowed to change hands except
in subordination to American interests.

This warning would

be mainly directed against any British attempt to seize

Alaska from the Russians.

The United States must have a

stronger navy to enforce such

a

policy, because no weak

nation could maintain an honest neutrality.

Trescot point-

ed out that "if the fleet of Sir Charles Napier were now

in the Gulf, what would be the force of our protest?"

-^^

The New York Tribune remained moderately pro-Allied

during the early months of the war.

It warned against Rus-

sian diplomatic attempts to arouse support in the United

States.

The Tribune was particularly scornful in comment-
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ing upon the pro-Russian stand of the
Washinp:ton Union
"The editorials of the Washington Union
astonish European
statesmen, who are silly enough to associate the
:

name of

Jefferson with the present Democratic party, and
to fancy
that the Cabinet of President Pierce indeed has
sympathy
for liberty, or at least brains enough to make people
believe that it has such sympathies."

Although the Trib-

une deprecated pro-Russian tendencies in America, it was
less than enthusiastic about the Allies.

When Austria

seemed on the verge of Joining the Western powers, the

Tribune lost what little interest it possessed for their
cause, commenting ruefully that Austria might come out of

the war stronger than ever.

The peoples of Europe would

gain nothing from the conflict.

^'^

The Springfield Republican advised the United States
to follow a policy of strict neutrality.

It was generally

sympathetic to the Allies and hoped that Italy and Hungary

would benefit from the war.

Nevertheless, the paper felt

that "we cute Yankees" ought to be able to keep cool during
the conflict.

The United States could gain much through

neutral trade, it speculated, since there was demand for

American flour, cotton, and provisions.
William Lloyd Garrison's Liberator retained its pacifist position, but its editor was convinced that Nicholas
I was

mainly responsible for the war.

One editorial, a

"psychometric" study, described the Russian Emperor as
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follows

The Emperor is invincible in the conviction
that he is designed by God to spread the Muscovite government over territories of the heathen.
Russia is moved by its chief towards the East.
His moral nature is so constituted that suspicion of human nature is inevitable. He is enough superstitious to believe himself the spiritual and legal head of a God-made institution:
but his nature is unable to form a clear and
steady belief in the intrinsic goodness of any
fellow being. This silent conviction - I might
say skepticism - tends to render him cruel, despotic, absolute. 39
_

^

_

The Liberator also printed a letter from Angelina

Grimke Weld which compared the war in Europe to the struggle over slavery in the United States.

Mrs. Weld predic-

ted that America would soon be faced with a "desperate and

bloody struggle" equal to the European conflict.

She

thought the slaveholders in the West were as determined to

murder liberty as was the Autocrat of Russia in the East.
Orestes A. Brownson, now

a

convert to Catholicism,

took sharp issue with the Archbishop of Paris, who had
called the war with Russia a crusade against the "heresy
of Photius."

Brownson agreed with Trescot in viewing Rus-

sia as a valuable conservative force in the world. Brown son' s Quarterly Review was one of the few American Journals

to defend the Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolu-

tion.

Brownson denied that giving assistance to

power to put down

a

rebellion was intervention in

friendly

a
a

polit-
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ical or legal sense.

He described the Anglo-French alli-

ance as an attempt to secure "the universal dictatorship
of both hemispheres."

In Brownson»s opinion the Slavic

peoples were the least aggressive in Europe.

When Britain

and France rebuked Russia for being aggressive, it was like

Satan rebuking sin.

^"^

America, Brownson believed, would ultimately supplant

Britain as the greatest commercial nation in the world.
She should shake off the remains of colonial dependence and
do everything possible to hasten the arrival of this day.

Brownson advised

a

"close alliance" with Russia, Spain and

the states of South America to counterbalance the Anglo-

French alliance.

States to build

It was also essential for the United
a

strong navy which would "enable us to

cope with that of the greatest maritime power."

42

The spring and summer of 185^ saw American opinion

shift against the Allies.

duce this change.

Several factors combined to pro-

When Britain and France joined forces,

fear of a possible extension of this alliance to the Western Hemisphere immediately developed.

Anglo-French rival-

ry had heretofore generally been beneficial to American

interests (i.e. the French sale of Louisiana in 1805 to prevent its capture by the British).

If the two powers acted

in concert in the New World they could probably prevent fur-

ther American expansion.

Southern political leaders were

particularly sensitive to British threats to their interests
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in the Caribbean, and in addition
they disliked England as
the home of abolitionist agitation.
The Pierce administration generally supported Southern
viewpoints in both domestic and foreign affairs. British
threats to American
policies were not really dissipated by
Clarendon's obvious
attempts to please Buchanan.
As Austria moved away from Russia
towards the Allies,

Americans found

a

further reason to change their stand.

Austria was more widely hated in the United
States than
Russia at this time, and her action in demanding

the Rus-

sian evacuation of the Danubian Principalities
convinced
most Americans that the war was not a struggle
between the
liberal and reactionary forces of Europe. It was no
longer

possible to regard Turkey as the underdog deserving sympathy in

a

conflict with a bully.

The two empires which

had Joined in protesting Commander Ingraham's rescue of

Koszta were now close to war with each other.

This pro-

duced a particularly dramatic change in the attitude of
"Young America."

By the middle of 1854 this group was

openly praising Nicholas I, whom it had only recently de-

nounced as the assassin of Hungarian liberty.
a great friend of the United States.

He was now

Thus, as the Allied

armies prepared to invade the Crimea, American opinion had

already swung drastically against them.

CHAPTER

V

After the withdrawal of Russian forces from the Danubian Principalities the Anglo-French army, commanded
by
Lord Fitzroy Raglan and Marshal Jacques Saint-Arnaud,

era-

barked from Varna for the long-awaited attack on Sevastopol.

This undertaking was a hazardous one so late in the

season, but the British press was clamoring for decisive
action, and neither Allied power wished to see the year

pass without any military successes.

President Pierce was

not one of the Allies' well-wishers.

Hoping for British

defeats, he had obtained

a

large map of the battle zones

and puzzled over it after every arrival of overseas news.

Allied forces landed in the Crimea in early September,
185^ and marched south towards Sevastopol.

They were con-

fronted by Russian troops occupying a strong position on
hills overlooking the Alma river.

After several hours of

hard fighting in which little tactical skill was displayed
by the generals on either side, Anglo-French forces cap-

tured the Alma heights.

2

The Allies now decided upon

a

wide detour around the

city, to establish supply bases at Balaklava (British) and

Kamiesh (French).

They then proceeded to advance against

the south side of Sevastopol.

This complicated maneuver

gave the Russians time to construct, under the direction
of a brilliant engineer, Colonel Todleben,

system of earthworks.

a

remarkable

A preliminary Allied bombardment
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failed to silence the Russian
batteries, leading to the
postponement of the assault. ^
The excitement created in London
by the news of the
Battle of the Alma was closely observed
by Nathaniel Hawthorne, whom Pierce had appointed to
the American consulate
in Liverpool as a reward for writing
his campaign biography in 1852. In London when the news of
the victory of the
Alma arrived, accompanied by a false rumor
of the capture
of Sevastopol, Hawthorne was relieved
when he heard that
Sevastopol was still in Russian hands;

I am glad of it.

In spite of his actual
sympathies, it is impossible for a true American
to be otherwise than glad. Success makes an
Englishman intolerable; and already, on the mistaken idea that the way was open to the prosperous conclusion of the war, the Times had begun to
throw out menaces against America. I shall never love England till she sues us for help, and,
in the meantime, the fewer triumphs she obtains,
the better for all parties. 4

Unlike the majority of his fellow New England intellectuals, Hawthorne had approved of the Mexican War.

contrasted English unity (which he regarded with

a

He

mixture

of distaste and admiration) with the bitter political dis-

sension among Americans during the invasion of Mexico.

In

England "each man comes forward with his little scheme for

helping on the war," but in America the situation was very
different:

.

.

.

"When our soldiers fought as good bat-
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ties, with as great proportionate loss, and far more
valu-

able triumphs, the country seemed rather ashamed than proud
of them." ^

Hawthorne's pro-Russian thinking was shared by George

Templeton Strong, the prominent New York lawyer and trustee of Columbia College, who several years earlier had

been skeptical about Kossuth and the enthusiasm displayed

for him in New York.

In domestic affairs Strong was e-

qually opposed to Northern abolitionists and Southern proslavery expansionists, finding both groups to be lawless.

When the Crimean War began Strong was torn between

a

sense

of kinship with England, an aversion for Napoleon III, and
a feeling that Russia was the future power in Europe «

The

Continent was past its prime, he felt, and Russian domination might be better than

a

victory of the revolutionists;

These months are important in the history
of the century, perhaps of the age. ... That
the' civilization of Western Europe, continental
Europe, at least, is effete and worn out, like
that of the Roman Empire, I can't doubt. Should
the ultimate triumph of Russia introduce a new
element, Cossack or Slavonic or whatever it may
be, into the social life of the Old World, shattering and destroying all its present organizations, the disruption may well prove a blessing. 6

Although Strong described himself as

a

partisan of the

Czar in this war, he disliked the thought of being antiBritish, "our brethren in race, speech and culture

.

.

.
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Pref erring an Anglo-Russian entente against France,
as in
1812-1815, he could see no good reason for the Anglo-French

alliance.

The war was being waged "to maintain the debil-

itated existence of Mahometanism and polygamy in Europe."

The Pierce administration was in full accord with the

sentiments of Hawthorne and Strong on the first Allied victory in the Crimea.

This was evident to Sir Edmund Head,

the newly appointed Governor General of Canada, when he

visited Washington before proceeding to his post.

interview with President Pierce at the

V/hite House,

After an

Head

noted the administration's pro-Russian sympathies:

President Pierce is an ordinary looking man
and, I should think, possesses very ordinary
faculties, though it is unfair to Judge him from
an interview which took place when he was ill,
arrayed in a dressing gown and slippers. Marcy,
the Secretary of State, is a cunning, slow
speaking, and intensely tiresome person. He has
some humor but it is so long in coming out that
the point of the story evaporates before one can
catch it. . . . The U.S. Govt, and its supporters are really most anxious for the defeat of
the French and the English in the Crimea. - Our
success is gall and wormwood to them. I could
clearly see this by the way the President talked
- how 'he could not understand the way we got to
Balaklava etc. etc.' unfolding his map. I did
not give him much comfort but said (what turns
out to be the case) that it could only be accounted for by the complete command of the surrounding country given us by the battle of the
Alma. 8
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Pierce had good reason to wish for an Anglo-French
defeat in the Crimea. Early in 185^ his Cabinet
had concluded that the European war provided an invaluable
opportu-

nity to acquire Cuba.

Pierre Soull, the volatile American

minister in Madrid, constantly emphasized this theme in his
despatches to Washington.

The decision to press Spain on

Cuba was made after Spanish authorities in Havana seized
an American merchant ship, the Black Warrior.

Soule was

instructed to present an ultimatum to Madrid demanding immediate redress.

Although the Spanish government ignored

Soule 's forty-eight hour time limit, they eventually agreed to pay damages to the owners of the Black Warrior. ^

Hoping to gain Cuba by negotiation in the near future,
the administration did not insist upon Soule

's

time limit.

Piercers Cabinet was united in desiring to acquire the island, but there was much difference of opinion over how

far the United States should go to obtain it.

Marcy favored

a

Secretary

cautious policy, while Jefferson Davis, the

Secretary of War, and Caleb Cushing, the Attorney General,
were willing to take greater risks.

The Cabinet eventually

decided to request the American ministers to Britain,
Prance and Spain - James Buchanan, James Y. Mason and
Pierre Soule, to meet in Europe to make suggestions for the

acquisition of Cuba.
Both Mason and Soule were convinced that the Allied
pov/ers were too preoccupied with the Russian war to risk a
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conflict with the United States over Cuba.

Mason empha-

sized the importance of American commerce to
France, and
Napoleon Ill's need of a victory over Russia to establish
his dynasty firmly on the French throne.

While acknowledg-

ing the close ties between France and Spain, Mason
thought
that these other factors would prevent the Emperor from

taking any action in support of Spain.
In London, Buchanan was more cautious.

He regarded

Napoleon III as "the controlling spirit behind the Crimean
alliance" and anticipated

a

break only with France, since

Napoleon was more deeply committed to upholding Spain's
control of Cuba than were the British.

Of course, if both

Britain and France supported Spain, matters would be even
worse for the United States.

Russia could render little

service to America in the event of
more of the maritime powers.

a

conflict with one or

Buchanan predicted the even-

tual capture of Sevastopol by the Anglo-French

only after an immense loss of life.

array,

but

But, he thought, the

war would not be ended by this event. 12
In the meantime, the United States faced the prospect
of a naval conflict at a time of domestic crisis.

Some of

Napoleon's advisers were reported to believe that the slavery question was about to split the Union.

Although Bu-

chanan asserted his willingness to risk war to acquire
Cuba, he was clearly more concerned about the possible con-

sequences of the forthcoming consultation than were his
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colleagues in Paris and Madrid.

He warned Marcy against

annexing the Sandwich Islands, which might provoke
with Britain and France.

a

clash

In any case, these islands would

be indefensible unless the United States greatly increased

the size of its navy.

Buchanan also complained to Lord

Clarendon of the hostility of the French government, which
the Foreign Secretary denied.

While Buchanan, Mason and Soule prepared to meet,
Carroll Spence, the American minister in Constantinople,
sent a vivid description of the Battle of the Alma to Wash-

ington.

After speaking of the European Journals' accounts

of the engagement as "most discordant," he went on to give
a "succinct" report of the fighting from "reliable infor-

mation." In his opinion few battles in history have resulted

in*

such heavy casualties in so short

lasted three hours).

a

time (the battle

Although Spence praised the parade-

ground advance of the British infantry, he pointed out
that two more such costly victories would be more disas-

trous than a defeat.

As for the fate of Sevastopol, the

American minister doubted if the city's defenders could
hold out for long.

1^

All the leading American newspapers devoted extensive

space to the Battle of the Alma.

William Howard Russell's

description in the London Times was widely reprinted in the
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United States.

Russell's letters were a milestone in the

history of nineteenth century oournalisra, since he was the
first regular war correspondent to be employed by a newspaper.

Of significance in the coverage was the lack of

pro-British sentiment - despite the fact that American papers derived most of their information about the war from
British sources.

On the whole, the dependence of the Amer-

ican press on British sources seems to have had little in-

fluence on the editorial policies of the newspapers, except
those few which sympathized with Britain from the start.

"^^

Two weeks before the Battle of the Alma, the Washing -

ton Union had again stressed Russian-American similarities.

Each power had expanded "naturally across

a

continent while

England and Prance conversely were constantly establishing
overseas colonies.

The great differences between America

and Russia were outweighed by their common rivalry with the

powers of Western Europe:

Notwithstanding that the opposing principles
which /jnerica and Russia respectively represent
shall eventually run into lines which must meet,
and, when they do, with forces whose concussion
will shake the world to its very centre; yet, for
many generations to come, they are likely to be
kept far asunder by the old principles ruling
Western Europe, which intervenes between them.
.
.
. They are first destined to crush out these
abnormal and effete systems of government, which
degrade, brutalize and enslave the masses under
the 'law and order' principle, by maintaining, as
vested and sacred rights, the privileges of dynasties, families, and castes, irrespective and
regardless of the claims and rights not only of
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individual men, but also of entire races
and
peoples. 16

The initial Anglo-French victory in the
Crimea was

"gall and wormwood," admitted the Union

,

but the paper was

encouraged when the Allies failed to follow up their
success with an immediate assault on Sevastopol. The
paper

contrasted the rapid progress of the American campaign in
Mexico (particularly the capture of Vera Cruz) with the

hesitations of the Anglo-French army.

which pleased the Union

,

A French commentary,

conceded that the Crimean cam-

paign was being ridiculed by many Americans:

'*To

see our

American brethren almost daily lavish their raillery on the
slowness of the operations on the Black Sea and the Baltic,
it is easy to perceive that, in their opinion, the Eastern

war forms a miserable contrast with that with Mexico."

"'"'^

Unlike Buchanan, the Union regarded Britain rather

than France as America's most dangerous foe.

It praised

the bravery of the French troops at the Alma while pointed-

ly omitting any similar compliment to the British.

It also

considered the tone of the French press to be less anti-

American than that of the British.
ed the Union

,

In the long run, stat-

Russia possessed great sources of strength

which her opponents lacked.

One of the most potent of

these was her "exemption from revolutionary convulsions."

1 ft

The New York Tribune also published an article corapar-
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ing the Crimean and Mexican Wars.

On September 14 the an-

nual celebration or the capture of
Mexico City by veterans
of that war took place:
"Col. Wheat . . . eulogized Gen.
Scott as owing his elevated position to
his sword only. He
was quite certain if the Anglo-French army
in the East
could get rid of their generals and admirals
and have Gen.
Scott to lead them, in a short time they would
not have an
enemy on the face of the earth."
On October 17 the Tribune reported the Battle of the
Alma and the false rumor of the fall of Sevastopol.

A se-

ries of headlines preceded the story:

Fall of Sevastopol!
The Russian Force Annihilated
Ten Ships of War Sunk
Ten Thousand English and French Killed and Wounded!
Eighteen Thousand Russians Dead
Twenty-Two Thousand Prisoners
A Thousand Guns Captured
Fort Constantine Blown Up
Sxirrender of Menchikoff 20

The casualty figures were wildly exaggerated and the Allied

forces had not even attempted an assault on Sevastopol.

Editorially the paper expressed skepticism about the announced capture of the Russian fortress.

A few days later

its incredulity was confirmed by new headlines:
of Sevastopol a Hoax,"

"Downfall

"The City Not Yet Attacked."

De-

spite this deception, the Tribune believed that the Allies

would take Sevastopol by mid-November.

Shortly afterwards,

Ill
the paper printed a full report of
the Battle of the Alma,
including Russell's despatches to the
Times
.

The Sprinp;field Republican based its
reporting of Crimean events on the articles in the Tribune
.
Its initial
comment, before the news of the hoax had
arrived, lamented
the "incongruities of civilization and
enlightened education in this age." There had been great
anguish over the
loss of 250 lives when the passenger ship Arctic
sank some

weeks earlier, but the world "receives with more of
rejoicing than of sadness the intelligence that thirl^y
thousand

men have perished in fighting on the shores of the
Black
Sea."

The Republican also reported the new Anglo-French

plan to attack Sevastopol and commented on the deficiencies
in the British medical service which would become notorious

during the coming winter.

It asserted that the official

report of the Battle of the Alma gave "a graphic panorama
of this unfaltering and hard-fought conflict, which seems
to revive, somewhat, the sanguinary memories of Europe un-

der the reign of the first Napoleon."
The Liberator maintained its strict pacifist stand

through 185^.

It condemned Kossuth's efforts to persuade

Britain and France to proclaim their support for Hungarian
and Polish independence (an action which would have brought

Austria into the war on the side of Russia).

Such an ex-

tension of the war, according to Joseph Barker, one of the

Liberator's English correspondents, would be of no benefit

11

to the European masses.

Barker even believed that Russian

rule (at least for a short time) might
be a good thing for
Europe's people:

The despotism of a Russian conqueror would
awake and unite them, whereas now they are
divided and half asleep.
I therefore rather wish for
the success of Hussia.
I certainly wish for the
downfall of the English Aristocracy. I hate the
English Aristocracy more heartily than I can
hate any other tyranny, except for the American
slaveholding oligarchy. 25

The initial reaction of the National Intelligencer 's

New York correspondent to the news from the Crimea was similar to the Republican 's.

He contrasted the "comparative

indifference" with which the news of heavy battle casualties was received with the "wail of distress and sorrow"
that followed the Arctic 's sinking.

The Intelligencer 's

London reporter, continuing his pro-British stand, criticized Prussia for permitting the smuggling of contraband
goods for Russia through its ports.

Because the Prussian

people were at the head of German civilization they should
be the natural allies of Prance and England against Russian

despotism.

Unfortunately, Prussian foreign policy was sub-

servient to Russia.
The National Intelligencer saw hope for progress in

Russia through the development of "public opinion" (i.e. an

informed and influential middle class such as existed in
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Ensland and America).

But it thought a century must
elapse

before this tendency could seriously
modify the traditional
Russian system of government. Two "parties"
existed in
Russia, the paper editorialized; one was
the Old Russian
(or Panslavic) party, the other the Saint
Petersburg
(or

German) party.

The former were ardent expansionists while

the latter were cautious and conservative.

In a statement

clearly intended as

a

commentary on the "forward" policy of

the Washington Union

,

the Intelligencer declared that "the

party of Old Russia in the eastern continent bears, we see,
a striking resemblance to the party of Young America in
the

Western."

The strength of Russian religious patriotism was

also emphasized.

While the British and French were installing their
siege guns south of Sevastopol, the Russians brought up

large reinforcements and, on the morning of October 25,
they surprised and routed a Turkish unit at Balaklava.

A

classic cavalry charge by the British Heavy Brigade pre-

vented the Czar's horsemen from exploiting this success.
The victory of the Heavy Brigade was the decisive event of
the battle, but it was followed by the famous attack of the

Light Brigade on the Russian artillery, in response to

a

misinterpreted order.
On November 5 the Russians, hoping to force the Allies
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positions on Mount Inkerman.
for several hours until

a

The English held their ground

counter-attack by

force compelled the Russians to withdraw.

a large

French

Lord Raglan and

General Canrobert (Saint-Amaud had died in late September)

now realized that their forces would have to spend the winter in the Crimea.

After Inkerman the Anglo-French army

was in no condition to assault Sevastopol.

^'^

The British suffered yet another disaster on November
14 when a storm wrecked many of their ships outside the

harbor of Balaklava, including the vessel which was carrying all the winter clothing and most of the medical sup-

plies for the army.
•

This calamity, combined with gross in-

competence and red tape in the medical and supply departments, caused a high death toll from disease and exposure

during the winter of 1854-55*

(Florence Nightingale became

famous through her efforts to correct these conditions.)
In Sevastopol, the Russians suffered from many of the
same ills that afflicted the British.

As there were no

railroads south of Moscow, all reinforcements and supplies
had to be sent over the abysmal roads of the Ukraine.

The

Russians probably lost more men by disease and exposure on
the march to Sevastopol than in the fighting itself.

In

general, the Russian medical corps was afflicted by abuses
29
similar to those in the British service.
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The progress of the Anglo-French campaign
was avidly
followed in the United States. The North American
Review

remarked how "the various items of information have
been
eagerly devoured by the American public upon the arrival
of
every steamer."
This appetite was so great that Henry
David Thoreau thought his countrymen were obtaining

a vi-

carious release from their own problems by reading about
the battles across the sea:

They have a census-table in which they put
down the number of the insane. Do you believe
that they put them all down there? Why in every
one of these houses there is at least one man
fighting or squabbling a good part of his time
with a dozen pet demons of his own breeding and
cherishing
If perchance he resolve at
length that he will courageously combat them, he
says 'Ay, ay! I will attend to you after dinner!'
And when that time comes, he concludes that he is
good for another stage and reads a column or two
about the Eastern War! Pray, to be in earnest,
where is Sevastopol? Who is Menchikoff? And
Nicholas behind there? Who the Allies? Did not
we fight a little (little enough, to be sure, but
Just enough to make it interesting) at Alma, at
Balaclava, at Inkerman? We love to fight far
from home. Ah! the Minie musket is the king of
weapons. Well, let us get one then. 51

....

The general shift in the American attitude towards the
war, which was already evident before the invasion of the

Crimea, appears clearly in the newspaper accounts of the

battles near Sevastopol during the autumn of 185^.

As the

winter came on and Sevastopol still held out, much of the
American press took great delight in ridiculing the incom-
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petence of British generalship and military administration.
The French army was generally spoken of with greater respect, although Napoleon III was frequently denounced.

The

Washington Union even recalled the old alliance between
France and the United States in a generally favorable edi-

torial on the French army.

Clearly the majority of the

press (unlike Buchanan) tended to regard Britain as the

main enemy of the United States and rejoiced in her setbacks.

The courage of the Russian defenders of Sevastopol

received increasing emphasis in newspaper reports.
Press comments on the Charge of the Light Brigade, not
surprisingly, show that a chance to ridicule the British

simply could not be ignored.

Laughter was widespread, a-

long with remarks which insulted, condescended, and drew
the inevitable contrasts between British and American mili-

tary prowess.

After Lord Tennyson produced his poem on the

Charge, Graham'

s

Magazine published a scathing review:

It is to be remarked that the British poet
Laureate can find nothing to celebrate so much as
a bloody blunder - an insane and ghastly charge
proving the disgraceful generalship of British
British poetry can find no genuine inleaders!
spiration in the war movement itself, a movement
in which England is governed by imbecile councils
and leagued with despots. The poet turns aside
from the great argument to sing his dirge of admiration and sorrow over the courage and slaughter of a cavalry brigade. 35

The Washington Union reprinted with great pleasure an
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extract from The New York Times (a
paper it rarely agreed
with) on Lord Cardigan, entitled
"The Soldier of Civilization." The leader of the Charge of
the Light Brigade,
Cardigan is portrayed as a frivolous
sensualist and a beautiful animal, quite similar to his
horse:

Withm

week after Cthe death of a mistress!
we saw the spoiler in his accustomed spot
in the
opera-box, with his jewelled lorgnette planted
some new beauty with a steady, sensual stare, on
His light brown hair he wears in short
.
.
•
curls, and carries a weighty moustache of the
same hue. . . . Like it chis horse'J
he obliges
every mute instinct and passion; like it, he rejoices in the battle and rushes forward with a
glorious animal courage against the foe; but he
is nothing more. 34
a

,

Some Americans had a different view of the Battle of
Balaklava.

Thomas W. Higginson, the abolitionist leader,

who had warned against Senator Douglas' supposed intrigues

with Nicholas I, admired Lord Cardigan's performance.

asserted that Cardigan was
than he was in London.

a

He

nobler man on the battlefield

Ralph Waldo Emerson also had high

praise for English courage and enterprise, which he con-

trasted with Russian passive obedience:

Of absolute stoutness no nation has more or
better examples. They are good at storming redoubts, at boarding frigates, at dying in the
last ditch, or any desperate service which has
daylight and honor in it, but not, I think, at
enduring the rack, or any passive obedience, like
jumping off a castle roof at the word of a Czar. 35
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By the end of 1854 the pro-Russian
tendency was definitely predominant in Southern
newspapers, while New England remained the only section of
the nation where sympathy
for the Allies was widespread. In
New York, such diverse
journals as the expansionist New York Herald
and the antiexpansionist Tribune became champions of the
Czar against
British imperialism. Commercial circles in
the city diffared widely in their evaluation of the war.
Hunt's Merchants' Map;azine favored Russia, while the Journal
of Commerce supported the Allies. Still, the year
1854 closed
with the balance tilted in favor of Russia in the New
York
press.

Western opinion was also predominantly pro-Russian.

Senators Cass of Michigan, Douglas of Illinois and Gwin

of

California frequently denounced British policy in the Senate,

All were proponents of "Manifest Destiny" and saw

England standing in the way of the United States, just as
she was barring Russia from Constantinople.

In short, the sectional division of American opinion
on the Crimean War was remarkably similar to that which had

prevailed during the second war with Britain from 1812-14.
The United States had declared war in 1812 mainly at the

demand of the South and West, while in 1854 the expansionist designs of these sections once again clashed with Great

Britain.
In 1812 New England had opposed war with Britain and

saw its interests crushed by Southern and Western aggres-
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sion.

The South had supported Napoleon,
whom New England

Federalists detested as both a Jacobin and

a

despot.

Simi-

larly, in 1854, New England again was
confronted with a

militant South, attempting to extend its
control over new
Western and Caribbean territories, and singing
the praises
of Nicholas I.
The West, of course, remained more "Canadian-minded" than any other section.

In each case Britain

and New England had much in common (hostility to
Napoleon

in 1812 and opposition to Russian and American expansion
in 1854).

Some New Englanders contemplated secession from the

Union during the Crimean War, as had the Hartford Convention in 1814.

While the domestic controversy over slavery

was the chief source of this latest secessionist mood,

there was considerable similarity between the New England

secessionists of 1814 and those of 1854 -56.

In 1814 the

people of Bangor, Maine had welcomed British troops and re-

quested permission to renew their oath of allegiance to

King George III.

New England farmers also had supplied

much food to the British forces in Canada.

During the Cri-

mean War the London Times once predicted that New England

would side with Britain in

United States.

a

conflict with the rest of the

If the Pierce administration had found it-

self at war with England as a result of an attempt to seize
Cuba, it is quite possible that this prophecy would have
come true. 38

The growing American sympathy
for Russia was explained by the Washington Union:
"The Czar," editorialized
the Union, "has never allowed
even the slightest shade of
misunderstanding to arise between him
and our government.
Britain and Prance, in contrast, had
been involved in constant altercations with the United
States. The Union then
returned to its favorite theme: the
futility of all ef-

forts by old and declining powers to
check strong young nations like Russia and the United States.
The Allied blockade was like "Harlequin attacking the
Giant with his wooden sword" since the Russians were not
dependent upon overseas trade. Because of this commercial
independence they
could continue the war indefinitely:

The masses of the population of Russia don't
care a cent for the price of stocks, and are such
incurable barbarians that it matters not to them
whether the bulls or the bears are in the ascendant at the Paris Bourse or the London Exchange.
They think more of the Virgin Mary and the saints
than of bankers, brokers and stockjobbers, and
are governed in a far greater degree by their piety than by their politics.
In short, they are
a very dangerous people to take by the beard.
59

The Allies, according to the editorial, could hardly count
on Austria and Prussia to bail them out of their perilous

position at Sevastopol.

If these powers entered the war,

they would probably be on opposite sides, since they were
rivals for the leadership of the German Confederation.

Russian military power in the Crimea was highly
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praised by the Union, which
as.e.ted that the boasts
of an
eas. Victory round in the
British press had been
thoroughly discredited. According
to the Union the Allied
failure
to capture Sevastopol
demonstrated the ability of
any welltrained people, fighting on
their
soil, to defeat an
invader. This truth should
be of great significance
to the

United States, "whose progress
is constantly interrupted
by
at least one of the powers
now engaged in the conflict
of
the Crimea,"
The Union criticized the
National Intelli^enc.r fo.>
asserting that ardent American
democrats were as eager Tor
war as any kings. Considered an
attack on the spirit of
Manifest Destiny, it was countered by
a denial of any
"similarity between American progression
and European aggrandizement." American expansion, stated
the Union, always meant "liberty and peace" while
European imperialism
produced "oppression." Nor was there
reason to believe
that America's appetite for war was on
the increase.

While the Union championed Russia against
the Allies,
its Whig rival in the capital, the National
Intellig:encer .

continued to follow

a

middle-of-the-road course when re-

porting the Crimean campaign.

It still favored Turkey a-

gainst Russia as far as the original quarrel was
concerned,
seeing it as a case of right struggling against might.
But the other powers, found the Intelligencer

,

were con-

cerned only with establishing their own supremacy.

The

threat posed by Russian
possession of Constantinopl e
was
minimized; it would not
necessarily be disastrous to the
West.
That was merely a British
obsession. Once again the
Intelligencer reminded its readers
that "Russia is an inteL
ligent despotism." The alliance
of Austria with the Western powers made a general European
war more likely. Such
a possibility made it essential
for the United States to
display great wisdom to avoid being
drawn into
the con-

flict.

By remaining aloof, America would
escape many miseries and reap a rich harvest of neutral
trade. The war
also revealed, according to the
Intelligencer the failure
of popular enlightenment to extinguish
the martial spirit:
,

"Popular passions and so-called national
interests take
the place of princely passions and dynastic
interests" in
the nineteenth century,

Disagreeing with the Washington Union on most domestic
issues, the New York Tribune frequently equalled the
Union
in anti-British sentiment.

Horace Greeley, the Tribune 's

editor, believed that Great Britain was collaborating with
the American "slave power" in an attempt to repeal the pro-

tective tariff.

If free trade were established, the United

States would become
ain.

a

permanent economic "colony" of Brit-

The South would then be able to import British goods

more cheaply than it now did and would find satisfaction
in the decline of Northern industrial power.

Because Rus-

sia was maintaining the highest protective tariff in Eur-

ope, Greeley sympathized with
the Czarist Empire, despite

his general opposition to the
principles on which it was
based.
Greeley suspected a connection between
the British
war against Russia and Britain's
cooperation with the
Southern slave-owning oligarchy: The
objective of both enterprises was to spread free trade and
English industrial
supremacy all over the world.

When the United States Senate ratified the
"free
ships, free goods" treaty with Russia, the
Tribune

ex-

pressed high praise for this agreement which "must
constitute a new chapter in international codes," The
paper did
not fail to note that the new accord would be "very
unpalatable to England."

While the Tribune commended the cour-

age of the British troops at Inkerman and thought they had

proven themselves to be superior in quality to the Russian
forces, it denounced British diplomacy for seeking an al-

liance with Austria.

The Tribune made public a London ad-

dress by Louis Kossuth, in which he advised Britain to
"throw her overboard" and encourage the Polish and Hungarian revolutionaries.

England was now more in need of Po-

land and Hungary than they were of her.

Kossuth concluded

with sentiments subscribed to by the Tribune

:

"With us,

victory; without us, defeat or a disreputable, insufficient

armistice.

Putnam

Mine is the advice, yours the choice."
'

s

Magazine asserted that the United States must

improve its armed forces.

The collapse of the British com-

s

s

missariat and medical service in the
Crimea showed the folly of imitating the English military
system;
France and

Prussia provided better models.
Graham
'

s Mag;azine

applauded Nicholas

I

for trying to

develop Russian industry behind the shelter
of
tariff. Its editor agreed with Greeley
that

a

protective

free trade

was a doctrine admirably suited to enrich
England but im-

poverish the rest of the world, which could not
yet compete with British industry. No ruler should be
called

"a

fool or tyrant" because his policy aims at increasing
the

wealth and power of his country by means which are opposed
to British interests.
At a time when many other American newspapers and pe-

riodicals were moving in the opposite direction, Littell

Living Age took

a

strong pro-Allied editorial stand.

believed the British had made

a

'

It

great mistake in not de-

claring war on Russia in 1849, at the time of the Hungarian
revolt.

The United States would probably have allied it-

self with Britain under such circumstances.

Now, its edi-

tor stated, the American people distrusted the half-hearted manner in which Britain seemed to be waging the war.

The alliance with Austria was further calculated to reduce

American enthusiasm for the Allied cause.

England and

Prance had thrown out "some most impolitic hints as to the
future regulation of American affairs."
tell

'

Nonetheless Lit -

was opposed to those Americans who "desire to see

Russia hold her ground

.

.

strongly and long."

.

Allied

Victory would end Russian
support for despotic govex..ent
in Germany and enable a united
German state with a constitutional government to be established.
The revival of Poland, Hungary and Italy would
also be possible
if "the

Northern plague" were removed.
Thus, American attitudes towards
the Crimean War had
divided along sectional lines by the
end of 185^. Broadly
speaking, New England was pro-Allied
while the rest of the
country was pro-Russian (or at least
anti-British), The
South was the stronghold of the most
enthusiastic pro-Russian sentiment. Domestic debates over
slavery, national
expansion, and the tariff played a vital
role in determin-

ing attitudes towards the war.

istration followed
leanings.

a

President Pierce's admin-

policy of neutrality with pro-Russian

Ironically, Southerners saw Britain as the lead-

er of an international abolitionist conspiracy,
while Horace Greeley believed that the British were working
hand in

glove with the "slave power."

bined to produce

a

demand for

These cross-currents coma

new American mediation

effort when Congress reconvened in December 1854.

CHAPTER

VI

Shortly after Congress convened
in December 1854 Eep
resentative Tho.as L. Clingman
of North Carolina
suggested
a joint resolution of
the House and Senate which
would request the President to tender
an offer of mediation to
the
belligerents. The war threatened
"to be of long duration,"
the Clingman resolution
asserted, "and disastrous to
the
industrial and social interests
of a large portion of the
civilized world." It defended
the value of American interposition on the grounds that the
United States had "no
immediate interest in the contest
and no purpose to interfere forcibly or in an unwelcome
manner." ^

Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts
introduced a
similar resolution which called upon
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to consider the
expediency of American
mediation to end the conflict. He too
stressed the destructiveness of the war and the commercial
disruption it
created.
Although the proposals of Clingman and Sumner
were almost identical, the motivation behind them differed
considerably. Sumner hoped to end hostilities before
the South
would be tempted to seize Cuba while Britain and
France
were distracted by their Russian campaign.

jective clear in

a

He made his ob-

letter to the Earl of Carlisle which

emphasized the need for Britain to make peace with Russia:

prised by any audaci^?
dicament of Enslanrt an^
by the war wf?f ^Sss?a!

'

*

'Ph^^"
Present pre-

llTelkAlr^'

lay bare their policy anri
we should have a North,

f

-i

^oll

^^agSi and
^^^^

Clinsman, on the other hand,
gave prominence to a mat.
ter close to the heart of the
South when he connected the
decline of cotton prices from
1851 to 1854 with the European war. This decline was not
Clingman's only reason for
supporting mediation. Speaking in
the House on January
3,
1855, he exaggerated the war's effects on
shipping interests.
The value of sea-borne freight was
reported to be
from twenty to fifty percent lower
than it had been at the
outset of the conflict. American farm
produce was in danger of losing some of its markets,
because heavy war taxation would reduce food consumption in the
belligerent
countries. ^

Stock prices in the United States had already fallen
sharply as a result, and Clingman feared that a
prolonged
war also would adversely affect American purchasers of
European goods.

Furthermore, the increased manufacture of
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war material would decrease
production o£ civilian goods,
thus raising prices. ^
Clingman, throughout his speech,
endeavored to rebut
the claims of those who thought
the United States would
benefit from the war, economically or
politically. Dramatizing his commercial argument, he
asked his audience to
imagine America as the only civilized
nation on earth and
the rest of the world as inhabited by
savages. Under these
circumstances the United States would have
neither imports
nor exports. The destruction of wealth due
to the war
would lead to an approximation of this situation
and con-

sequently reduce the volume of American trade.

In the

realm of politics, if the European balance of power
were
shifted in favor of either Russia or the Western nations,
the United States would also stand to lose. ^

Believing the European conflict the result of numerous
misunderstandings, Clingman looked for
to an American mediation offer.

a

favorable response

He regarded the leaders of

both sides as being too sagacious to hope for
victory.

a

complete

Clingman recalled the Russian offer to intercede

in 1812, Britain's help in the American-French dispute dur-

ing Jackson's administration, and French assistance to the
United States during the Revolutionary War.

It was the

duty of the American government to reciprocate these services. 7
In Clingman' s opinion, revolutions resulting from the

Crimean War would be of no benefit
to the Europeans, since
genuine liberty could not be established
in the midst of

war:

"There are some who look with hope
and pleasure to
this condition of things. . . . You
may see one tyrannical
government overthrown and another, stronger
and more tyrannical, erected in its stead. The only
liberty which
is

worth preserving is that which is founded
upon law." ^
The contention that the United States would

profit

from neutral trade was regarded by Clingman
as the argument of a "vulture" and thoroughly unworthy of
a great nation. He saw American mediation as a means
of dispelling

European convictions about the grasping and rapacious
character of Americans. Clingman described the war as one
"between the different branches of the great Caucasian

family - the white races of men, who have shown by their
superior mental and moral endowments, their right to control the world and regulate its destinies."

Its end would

set European civilization back on the road of progress. ^

Congressman E, M. Chamberlain of Indiana opposed

Clingman on the mediation issue.
bring no help to Europe's masses.

In his view peace would
It would, instead,

"thrust them back into that most helpless of all conditions,

where the silence of despotism is the synonym of peace."

Chamberlain predicted that America would be able to find

new trade channels as

a

result of the conflict; the sta-

tistics cited by Clingman, he declared, indicated only the
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initial effects of the war.

War could give the European
revolutionaries an unparalleled opportunity, Chamberlain
contended; the aspirations
Of the Forty-Eighters had
ended in failure because all
the
great powers had been at peace
with each other and had been
able to devote their full
attention to suppressing internal
disorders. If the Crimean conflict
were prolonged and were
to spread into Italy and Germany,
the European monarchies

would exhaust themselves and the
revolutionaries would have
their chance. In addition, he pointed
out, continuation of
hostilities would provide the United States
with an
oppor-

tunity to evaluate the performance of
the improved weapons
being used at the siege of Sevastopol.
American ingenuity
could put this experience to good use in
some future crisis.
Chamberlain, a strong supporter of American
expansion in
the Caribbean, then recommended a revision of
the nation's
traditional neutrality policy, one which would permit
its

citizens to engage in military action anywhere in the world
at their own risk.

He concluded by denouncing the United

States Navy's interference with filibustering expeditions
against Cuba.

"'""^

The Clingman resolution received the support of Repre-

sentative C. W. Upham of Massachusetts.

He emphasized

America's indebtedness to the belligerent powers for their

previous intercession.

Since she was invulnerable to in-

vasion but had no designs of aggression, America's media-

tion would display both her strength
and disinterestedness.
Above all, it would be a great
service to civilization. ^2
This attempt to revive America's
effort to end the war
failed, the House and Senate committees
on foreign affairs
voting to table both the Clingman and
Sumner resolutions
on the grounds that the administration
had already offered
assistance to the European powers but had
received little
encouragement. Petitions in favor of American
mediation
had been submitted by various citizens groups
in New York,

Delaware and South Carolina (notably from the
Chambers of
Commerce of New York City and Charleston), but these
pe-

titions were filed away along with the resolutions.

The extent to which the Crimean War affected domestic

trade and economic conditions was clear by the spring of
1855.

American commerce did not reap the windfall of neu-

tral trade that had been predicted by some at the war's
outset; yet, on the other hand, the disruption of normal

trade patterns was less damaging than had been anticipated.

There was a major decline in American-Russian trade due to
the Allied blockade, but such trade had always been only
a small part of the total overseas commerce of the United

States.

Most of America's exports to Russia consisted of

cotton, and the decline of this commerce partially explains
the militant pro-Russian sentiments of some Southern polit-
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ical leaders.

.

Despite occasional

Russian hints of favor-

able commercial concessions,
the United States sovernment
made no attempt to challenge the
blockade in the Baltic and
Black seas. An American steam
frigate was directed to the
Baltic, but it developed engine
trouble shortly after leaving Southampton, England. Similar
plans for a Black Sea
cruise were abandoned when the British
and French advised
Commodore Stringham that they would
not look with favor on
such an action.

One reason for the absence of agitation
against the
Allied blockade was the lucrative prospect
opened by the
Anglo-French need for troop and supply transports.
The

American clipper ships were the fastest sailing
vessels afloat, and many of them went into the English
and French
service. Their chartering helped to offset the
war's ini-

tial unfavorable effects upon the American economy.

In

the spring of 1854-, for instance, the British and
French

withdrew large sums invested in the United States.

This

action, combined with revelations about financial scandals
on Wall Street, had precipitated a minor panic.

There was

much unemployment in the large Eastern cities during the

winter of 1854-55, but economic conditions improved in the
spring.

Even earlier, in the fall of 1854, a large number

of American transports sailed to Constantinople, and an

American observer in France noted that six clipper ships
were plying regularly between Marseilles and the Crimea by

July 1855, carrying Prench
troops and supplies.
Captain John Codman, an American
merchant marine officer, who served both the French
and the Turks during the
war as commander of a steam
transport, later recalled his
experiences. He noted their rivalry,
claiming that both
the British and French held the
Turks in contempt
and all

three had greater respect for the
Russians than for each
other. Codman thought that Napoleon
was pleased at the
publicity given to the conditions in the
British army during the winter of 185^-55, since, by
contrast, it made his
own forces look superb and enabled the
Prench to humiliate
their old rival.

Codman was convinced that England erred in not
accepting Nicholas I's 1855 suggestion for Turkish
partition.
Since the "sick man" was bound to die sooner or later,
the
war only temporarily checked and at great cost, Russia's
advance.

The British, he concluded, had failed to make

such an agreement with the Czar because they feared Napoleon's reaction to it.

Codman also noted that the British

had iinderestimated Russian resistance in the Crimea.

Or-

thodox religion gave powerful support to Russian patriotism, he declared, and "the lesson of Bunker Hill had been

forgotten.

No people should be despised who have their

own soil to defend."
The effect of the Allied blockade on American commerce

with Russia is evident in statistics on the export trade.

15^

In 1853 the value of such
soods was S2, 313,175;
$335,521
in 1854; in 1855 it diminished
to ^..8,940.
Cotton continued
to make up the great bulk of
this reduced trade, while
rice
was the second largest item.

The Russians had encountered
difficulties in increasing their small arms production,
and pre-emptive buying by
the British in Belgium limited
Russian access to an important source of weapons. These
difficulties were increased
in April 1855 when Prussia forbade
the shipment of Belgian
arms across its territory. Of the
13,000 muskets ordered
from Belgium by the Russians, only
3,000 were delivered
during the war. The Czar, then, was eager
to get whatever
he could from the United States and
did purchase a small
amount of American arms. Samuel Colt,
visiting Saint Petersburg, negotiated a contract for several
thousand muskets. He then returned to America accompanied
by a Russian

officer disguised as his valet,
gainst
party.

a

necessary precaution a-

possible search by an English or French boarding

a

The muskets were loaded in New York and shipped to

Russia under some cotton bales, but they were only

a

small contribution to the total Russian war effort.

very
Al-

though the Russians hoped to obtain larger orders in the

United States, most American companies did not want to risk

running large amounts of contraband goods through the
blockade.

"^^

Agricultural exports did not increase as rapidly as

expected.

During the summer of 1854
a severe drought affected all the farming regions
of the United
States.

The

resulting poor harvest left no
large surplus to ship overseas.
But weather conditions improved
in
1855 and the Al-

lies were able to purchase large
quantities of American
foodstuffs for their armies. Suffering
from poor harvests
in 1854 and 1855, the French also
imported much American
food for home consumption. They even
reduced the tariff
duties on American salted meats to
enable larger quantities
to enter France.
In addition to foodstuffs, the French
purchased large quantities of American
tobacco for their
Crimean forces. American agriculture's
importance
to

France was fully appreciated by the French
government, and
helped to reduce the chances of drastic anti-American
action
in the Western Hemisphere.

Despite the profits that American farmers were making
as a result of the Allied demand for agricultural
products,

pro-Russian sentiment occasionally appeared in farm
nals.

em

Greeley's Tribune had

a

a'our-

great influence upon north-

and western agricultural periodicals, and their edi-

torials on foreign affairs often echoed his opinions.

Plough

,

the Loom and the Anvil praised the growth of Rus-

sian industry and the extension of Russian railroads.

described the role of the American Major

a letter,

It

G. W. Whistler,

the construction of the Moscow-Saint Petersburg line.

quoted

The

It

written by an English officer imprisoned

in

in Russia, commending the
slow pace of Russian life
as compared to the hustle and bustle
of English cities, a descrip.
tion equally applicable to the
United States in these
years. Moreover, even on political
matters the Plough and
Loom was only mildly critical of
the Russian autocracy:

Some of the requisitions here set
seem arbitrary, and a few of them are forth
so, but
conduce materially to the good or^llK^^l^"^community. In
fact, something like
^hL
them exists
some of the New England
We have personally known an applicant, States,
in
mont, refused the 'citizen's oath,' which Vergives
the vote, on the ground of immoral character.
There IS such a thing as being too lax,
as well
as being too strict. 21

'

m

The cornerstone of Russian (and American)
industrial

progress, according to the Plough and Loom , was
a protective tariff.

Here again the opinions of Horace Greeley

were echoed.

The Russian system (like that of the United

States) was "attractive of population," and French, German
and American mechanics found a great demand for their services within it.

But the effects of England's economic pol-

icy presented a dismal contrast to this pleasing picture
of Russia and America prospering behind their tariff walls:

"That of England is repulsive, as is seen by the forced ex-

port of men from England, Scotland, Ireland, and India,

now followed by whole cargoes of women sent by aid of public contributions, presenting

a

spectacle almost as humil-
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latins to the pride of the sex as
can be found in the slave
bazaar of Constantinople."

Neither the fears of Congressman
Clingman nor the
hopes of Representative Chamberlain
concerning the

impact

of the Crimean War on the American
economy were fully realized. Nevertheless, most commercial
interests in the United States favored the early
re-establishment of peace. The
editorials of the National Intelligencer
(which was closely

connected with Whig businessmen in both North
and South)
and the petitions in favor of mediation
make

this evident.

Even though some American merchants profited
from the war
(a fact acknowledged by the Intelligencer
^
the mercantile
community feared the conflict would eventually involve

more

European powers or spill over into the New World.
Thus Whig opposition to American filibustering in the

Caribbean related to the desire to end Crimean hostilities.
If Allied support of Spain in Cuba extended the European

conflict to the Caribbean, the profits made in the carrying
trade would be almost immediately wiped out.

Eor the ef-

fectiveness of the British blockade in 1814 was

memory on the Eastern seaboard.

a

living

All things considered,

most American businessmen preferred

a

return of peaceful

commerce to the risks of an extended war.
It is significant that the extensive role played by

American merchants in supplying
and transporting AngloFrench forces, failed to generate
strong pro-Allied sentiment among them. Similarly, the
dependence of American
newspapers on British sources for war
news had
not pro-

duced a dominant pro-British bias
in the press. Indeed,
Huntis Merchants Magazine, one of the
leading commercial
organs of New York, was pro-Russian.
Britain was the chief
purchaser of Southern cotton, but the Czar's
cause was held
in higher esteem in the cotton states
than elsewhere. Conversely, industrial New England was in
direct competition
'

with British industry, but the Allies found
most of their
support here.
The reasons for these inconsistencies varied.

Most

American merchants who loaned out their ships or sold
farm
products to the Allies, were merely seizing a business
op-

portunity and had little- sense of ideological commitment.
In general, these merchants hoped for an end to the war for
the reasons already stated.

However, since there was no

possibility of total Allied defeat, with

a

concomitant

shift in the political and economic balance of power, Amer-

ican businessmen were able to preserve a more neutral attitude.

Some of them were well aware that Britain was the

chief competitor of the United States, and that some Brit-

ish political leaders were hostile to American growth.
Southerners, in assaying the political and economic

implications of the Crimean

V/ar,

considered the general

welfare of the slaveholding system
to be paramount.
regarded Britain as the center of
abolitionism

They

as well as

the chief opponent of American
expansion into the Caribbean
and Central America. Russian serfdom,
on the other hand,
seemed comparable to Southern slavery.
Thus, the Richmond
Enquirer could write that nowhere outside
Russia could a

more contented laboring class be found
except in the American South.

Southerners were increasingly regarded as "the enemy"
in New England. Just as they saw Britain and the
American
abolitionists as the chief threat to their society, so the
New England industrialists (although far from being abolitionists) were coming to regard the expanding, low-tariff

South as the foremost menace to their interests.

England's

economic rivalry with New England became insignificant when

compared to the potential threat of Southern political economic domination of vast Western and Caribbean territories.

Since the American Revolution, New England leaders

had generally sought to prevent economic rivalry with Britain from developing into major political animosity.
was

a

This

central theme of Federalist and Whig political doc-

trine, and is illustrated by Daniel Webster's conciliatory

policy towards Britain when he was Secretary of State during the Tyler administration.

However, the most ardent

New England supporters of Britain's war with Russia were
not industrial or commercial men, but the professional
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groups: clergymen, intellectuals,
and reformers. ^8
In sum, it is evident that narrow
economic motives
did not primarily shape American
attitudes toward the belligerents, or produce strict neutrality
and mediation resolutions. Long-range economic interests
were combined with
broader social considerations, ideological
preferences, and
domestic political rivalries. The general
effect of these
varied pressures was to strengthen the American
resolve to
remain neutral, and to evoke some sentiment
in favor of mediation to end the war.

Some businessmen (chiefly in the South and New York
City), those closely connected with the expansionist wing
of the Democratic Party, favored Caribbean policies that

threatened to provoke
the Allied powers.

a

clash between the United States and

The activity of these expansionists,

and the remarkable document emanating from the meeting of

Buchanan, Mason and Soule ended any chance for American mediation, even if Congress had approved the Clingman and

Sumner resolutions.
The rapid increase in American business activity in

Central America had followed upon the gold rush to California.

A railroad, financed by American capitalists, was

built across the Isthmus of Panama, and there was much dis-

cussion of constructing

a

canal in either Nicaragua or Pan-
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ama.

In 1850 the United States
and Britain signed the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty which provided
for joint administration of any canal that might
be built.
The two powers
also promised not to annex any
territory in Central America. However, a dispute soon
arose involving the interpretation of this agreement. The British
had established a

protectorate over the Mosquito Indians in
1848, at a time
when there was a possibility that the
United States might
follow up its victory over Mexico by moving
into Central
America. Britain claimed that the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty
did not apply to actions taken before
1850.
The United
States, on the other hand, insisted upon a
retroactive in-

terpretation of the anti-annexation clause
Buchanan's main task in London was to secure British

withdrawal from the Mosquito Coast protectorate and the island of Roatan in the Bay of Honduras, which the Americans

feared would be transformed by Britain into
val base like Gibralter or Singapore.

a

powerful na-

By the summer of

1854 the British, now heavily committed to the Crimean War,

decided to withdraw from Honduras.

But an event occurred

which caused Britain to take a stronger stand in Central
America.
A riot broke out at Greytown, the "capital" of the

Mosquito kingdom, destroying American property and slightly

injuring Solon Borland, the American consul and one of the
leading members of the Democratic Party's "Young America"

faction.

In response, President
Pierce decided on a, show
of force, and ordered Captain
William Hollins of the U.S.S.
C^ane to demand reparation.
When it was refused, Hollins
bombarded Grey town, then landed
his marines, who burned the
town to the ground. Both the
Northern and the British

press denounced this action.

Buchanan, acting on his own

initiative, assured Lord Clarendon
that the administration
would disavow Hollins' action.
But the American minister was mistaken.

Secretary

Marcy also deplored the destruction of
Greytown, but Hollins* actions had not specifically
violated his instructions, although they were more extreme
than the President
or his Cabinet expected. Public disavowal
of this bombardment would be too great a loss of face for the
United

States, in the midst of the Central American
negotiations.
The British Cabinet similarly concluded that
abandonment of
the Mosquito protectorate when confronted with such
a bold

American challenge, would also be humiliating.

Thus Clar-

endon informed Buchanan that Britain would not withdraw.
A few months after the Greytown affair, American re-

lations with Britain and France were further strained by
the revelation of the Ostend Manifesto, drawn up at the

meeting of Buchanan, Mason and Soule.

This document, in-

tended to be confidential but soon disclosed by both American and European newspapers, asserted that the United

States would be justified in seizing Cuba if Spain refused

to sell the island since it was
vital to American security
and domestic tranquility (i.e. the
possible effects on the
South if Spain emancipated the slaves
in Cuba).

Soule's influence had been dominant
at the conference,
and his chief argument for decisive
action to acquire Cuba
was the involvement of Britain and
France in the
Crimea.

However, the angry reaction to the Manifesto
in both the
European and Northern press was so great that
Secretary
Marcy immediately disavowed it. In addition
to possible
international complications, the Pierce administration

feared that support of the Manifesto would complete
the
ruin of the Democratic Party, which had already been
badly
split by the Kansas-Nebraska Act.
Although the Ostend Manifesto was

a

diplomatic fiasco,

setting back any chance of American acquisition of Cuba,
its bellicosity rendered a small service to the Russians.

Spain had been considering the despatch of troops to the
Crimea; and now, alarmed by American threats, Madrid re-

quested Britain and France to guarantee its possession of

Cuba in return for support against Russia.
anxious to avoid
such

a

a

But England,

second war if possible, refused to give

guarantee, and Spain abandoned any thoughts of join-

ing the Allies.
Upon his return to London after the Ostend conference,

Buchanan turned his efforts towards preserving friendly relations with Great Britain,

a

task made doubly difficult
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by the srowing pro-Russian
sentiment in the United States
and by British alarm over American
designs on Cuba as well
as Central America.
Buchanan »s basic dilemma was that
Englishmen who normally sympathized with
the United States
supported the war. Repeatedly stressing
the popularity of
the war in Britain, he warned America
of the loss of many
of its friends due to the anti-British
tone of much of its
press. He urged Secretary Narcy to persuade
the Washington
Union to tone down its editorial hostility
to Britain.
At

the same time, he believed Russian diplomatic
support to be
vital on occasion, in order to protect American
national

interests.

When Lord Clarendon suggested submitting the

Anglo-American dispute over the Mosquito protectorate to
a
third power for arbitration, Buchanan replied that Britain
was now at war with the only arbiter the United States

could accept.

Buchanan was convinced that the British ministry would
not dare to make

a

compromise peace with Russia, since it

would lead to its fall.

In a letter to John W. Forney, the

editor of the Washington Union, he explained England's attitude towards the war:

The present war with Russia is a war of the
masses of the British people. It is especially
a war of those who from their liberal and progressive sentiments are most strongly inclined to
favor our country. Their only apprehension is
that the Government from dynastic prepossessions
have not conducted it and will not conduct it

^^^c^^yigo^ as they ought to have done.
or wrongly, the British Liberals
promote progress
^
'^.^^
^ and
rtll^^^
^
free
^
principles. 38

So^hf
Whether rightly

Buchanan was frequently approached by European
revolutionary leaders inquiring about possible American
sup-

port.

Despite his sympathies for the Polish, Hungarian

and Italian causes, he carefully avoided giving
the radicals any official encouragement.

Once again he was caught

between two fires; the American doctrine of neutrality
as
well as the need for Russian diplomatic support on the one
hand, and America's enthusiasm for oppressed European na-

tionalities on the other.

France's radicals did not great-

ly appeal to Buchanan since they were not subject, unlike
others, to foreign rule.
a usurper;

Napoleon III, he believed, was

yet the French people had ratified his seizure

of power by an overwhelming vote.

The French "have chosen

Louis Napoleon," Buchanan concluded, "let them have him.

...

I am

not partial to him, neither to Ledru Rollin,

Louis Blanc, or Victor Hugo, or any red Republicans and

Socialists."

Buchanan conferred with Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, in late December 185^.

In Aberdeen's opinion, the

importance of "a sincere and lasting friendship between
Great Britain and the United States could scarcely be over-

rated."

He added that the war in which Britain was now en-

Saged

it .ore important than
ever to „,aintain good
relations with America.
Buchanan, concurring,
remarked that
"the progress of civilization
throughout the world, required that Great Britain
and the United states
should be
the best of friends."
n,ade

Despite this cordial exchange,
England now definitely
refused to accept a "free ships,
free goods" treaty similar
to that signed by the United
States and Russia in 185^.
When Buchanan suggested such a
convention to Clarendon,' the
Foreign Secretary "replied in
a significant manner: 'I
presume this is the same Treaty
you have already made with the
Emperor of Russia.' I said. Yes,
the very
same."

In the course of this conversation
Clarendon complained
about the pro-Russian tone of the
American press, and alluded to an article in the London Times
which rationalized
Russo-American friendship on the grounds of
mutual aggressiveness and lawlessness. Extreme democracy
and rigid autocracy produced the same results. Buchanan
denied that
this explained the partiality of some
Americans for Russia;
and attributed it to a concern over possible
Anglo-French

intervention in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.
In England, meanwhile, revelations about the
condition
of British soldiers in the Crimea had produced a
great out-

cry against the Aberdeen Coalition government,

was introduced in Commons which would set up

a

A motion

Parliamen-

tary committee to investigate the conduct of the war.

With
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its passage, the Coalition government
resigned.

Lord Palm-

erston, the Home Secretary, formed a new
ministry and promised a more vigorous prosecution of the
war.
Buchanan was
sorry to see Aberdeen supplanted by Palmerston,
who had
long opposed American expansion in the Western
Hemisphere.
He now anticipated greater difficulty in
resolving the Central American question. He also worried about
the relative

increase in French prestige following the revelations
of
British blunders. Napoleon III, in Buchanan's opinion,

would never agree to end the war until Sevastopol had been
captured.

The Emperor must have a peace with glory or

would probably be overthrown.

If Prance were to play the

leading role in taking Sevastopol, it could be dangerous
for the United States because of Napoleon's eagerness to
check American expansion.
In contrast to Napoleon, the British governing class

wanted peace, Buchanan believed, but hesitated to suggest
it because of the popular demand for victory:

"The govern-

ing class in this country are doubtless anxious for peace.
The continuance of the war may still further demonstrate
the incompetency of the existing system successfully to

govern the country and the necessity of
the popular element in high places."

a large

infusion of

hh

Nathaniel Hawthorne agreed with Buchanan that the Cri-

mean War was weakening aristocratic political dominance.
The American consul considered the present nobility to be
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superior in character to any previous
generation.

Neverthe^

less, the test of war had found it
wanting in intelligence;
hence it would no longer be able to
maintain all the pre-

rogatives "quietly conceded" to it.

One year of war had

"done the work of fifty ordinary ones-;
thus England had
been given "a vast impulse towards democracy."
Hawthorne

revealed that his own feelings with respect
to the war were
closely related to prevailing American opinion.
Separation
from his country made him aware of "a continual
and
imme-

diate correspondence with the national feeling."
The collapse of the Aberdeen Coalition provoked extensive comment in the American press.

The Tribune was unable

to discover any redeeming qualities in this regime:

Great Britain has had many a seedy administration to boast of, but a Cabinet so seedy,
needy and greedy, and at the same time so presumptuous as All the Talents never existed.
They began with unbounded boasting, lived upon
hair-splitting and defeat, and ended in disgrace
as Complete as it is possible for man to attain. 46

The Tribune also offered the new Palmerston ministry
some advice on how to remedy the conditions which had

brought down Aberdeen's government.

Britain's army would

have to be drastically reformed if she were to continue to

exercise any major influence in Continental affairs.

To-

wards this end it urged the introduction of conscription,

better training of officers, and
promotion by merit rather
than by purchase. Any army raised
entirely by voluntary
enlistment would be aristocratic in character,
the Tribune
stated, because the rank and file would be
drawn mainly
from the lowest social classes and the officers
would form
an exclusive caste.
The middle sections of society

are ab-

sent from such an army, which then was not
genuinely repre-

sentative of the nation.

Such Criticism was aimed at both

the British and American armies.

The latter, according to

the Tribune , was "one of the most aristocratic in the

world."

The American and the British armies could only be

democratized by adopting

a

form of conscription similar to

the Prussian.

The Spring:f ield Republican saw the replacement of

Aberdeen by Palmerston as a sure sign of Allied determi-

nation to prosecute the war more vigorously.

Hardly enthu-

siastic about this development, it did not go as far as
the Tribune in denouncing British policy.

According to the

Republican , pro-Russian sentiment was not strong in the
United States, except among certain Southern politicians.
Instead, most Americans were indifferent to the outcome of

hostilities because it was now clear that whatever side
won, there would be no benefits for Europe's masses.

Aus-

tria was "the most unrelenting and cruel despotism on the
globe," the Republican declared, and English and French attempts to draw her into the war on their side did more than
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any other event to discredit their cause
in the eyes of
Americans.

Many papers predicted an expanded conflict
following
the alliance between the Western powers and
Austria,
but

some American readers were more fascinated by
religious

prophecies about the war's effect upon the world.

Republican printed

a

The

lengthy discussion of Edward FletchI

er»s pamphlet which forecast events for the next fifteen

years.

Fletcher had deduced from a study of the strange

beasts in the Book of Daniel that a Russian conquest of

Turkey as well as
pacy was imminent.
of the Continent.

ning.

a

French victory over Austria and the PaThe sequel would be Russian domination

Such developments were only the begin-

Fletcher went on to prophesy that the English would

occupy Palestine and restore the Jews to their old home.
Russia would then seek to expel Great Britain from the Holy
Land, and the United States would intervene on England's
side.

At this point, owing to a fit of "Judicial madness,"

civil war would break out in Russia; and, as

a

result, the

two Anglo-Saxon powers would emerge supreme in the worldo
The victory would be a prelude to "the good time

governments will no longer be needed by

a

Fletcher's pamphlet sold 150,000 copies in

.

.

.

when

perfected race."
a short time and

is an excellent example of the eschatological literature

that flourished in both nineteenth century England and the

United States.

:

secular forecasts about the future
also circulated in
the winter of 185^-55- There
was a rumor to the effect
that Russia and the Western powers
would

make peace and in-

vade the United States.

The Republican

,

ridiculing this

report, offered some suggestions for
improving Springfield'
defenses

I£."the subsequent disclosures

.
.
„
confirm
these dire portents of war, we have certain
sue-gestions to make to the legal authorities for
the resuscitation of the old redoubt on Armory
Hill and the erection of mud barricades overlooking the several railroads, by which the invaders will doubtless enter Springfield after
sacking Boston and New York. SO

4-v

While the opposing armies in the Crimea prepared for
the spring campaign of 1855, the attempt to revive the

idea of mediation in the American Congress failed, despite

petitions from important commercial groups.

American re-

lations with Britain and France deteriorated rapidly during
the last half of 1854, precluding any acceptance of United

States mediation, even if

a

new offer had been made based

on a Congressional resolution.

The Greytown affair, the

Ostend Manifesto, Anglo-French suspicions of American designs on the Sandwich Islands, and several lesser disputes

ruled out this possibility.

Allied mistrust of American

plans had reached the point where Eugene de Sartiges, the

French minister in Washington could believe that the United
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States intended to turn China
into an "American India."
Events in the Caribbean would
continue to damage relations
between the United States and
the Allied powers as American
filibusterers attempted a private
application of the Ostend
Manifesto in Central America.
Concurrently, other Americans
were active in Russia itself,
testifying to the fact that
Anglo-French suspicion of collaboration
between the giants
of the East and West had some solid
foundations.

CHAPTER

VII

Russia's American friends
made numerous offers of
assistance. Baron de Stoeckl,
the Russian minister
in Washmgton, received many inquiries
from persons wishing to
fit
out privateers for Russia,
or otherwise contribute
to her
war effort. If American
privateers were secretly sent
out
and captured by the British,
the confrontation, Stoeckl
believed, would initiate an
Anglo-American war. This conflict
would effectively divert
England fzom the war in the
East.

Additionally, America's involvement,
Stoeckl expected,
would force her to cease protecting
revolutionaries and
troubling other states.

Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign
Minister, was
less enthusiastic about attempts
to draw America into the
war. Satisfied with American
neutrality
and the "free

ships, free goods" treaty, he feared
that any secret privateering enterprises would only turn
American opinion against Russia. He therefore ordered Stoeckl
to be cau-

tious. ^
In early 1855 Stoeckl believed he had found
an irresistible privateering opportunity. Beverly Sanders,
a San
Francisco businessman involved in trade with Alaska,
had
been a leading figure in an abortive plan to turn
that colony over to an American private company for safekeeping

during the war.

He now offered to send several privateers

to attack the British gold fleet after it left Australia,

This adventure also interested
Senator Gwin of California,
an ardent expansionist. Stoeckl
wrote Nesselrode on Feb-'
ruary 5, 1855 urging him to accept
the Sanders plan. But
Nesselrode, apparently convinced that
the days of Sir Francis Drake were over, refused to
endorse his minister's plan
Rather he instructed Stoeckl to inform
his American friends
that if they wanted to send any ships
to a Russian Pacific
port and have them fitted out as
privateers there,
it

would be acceptable.

This procedure would not have been a

violation of American neutrality in the opinion
of the
United States government, since Secretary Marcy

had in-

formed Stoeckl at the outset of hostilities, that
he did
not care what Americans did at their o^n risk
abroad,
so

long as they did not use American territory as their
base.
Sanders, as Nesselrode undoubtedly expected, was not inter-

ested in such terms and the project was dropped.

^

Ivan Golovin, an anti-Czarist Russian nobleman living
in exile in New York City, commented extensively on the

commercial spirit of the Americans, which he thoroughly
disliked.

In his Stars and Stripes

,

or American Impres -

sions he found that hostility to Great Britain was the

main motive behind the apparently widespread pro-Russian
sentiment in the United States.

But Golovin also observed

the eagerness of Americans to profit by selling their muni-

tions to both sides:

°^ Americans for
Kussians are
RussianI
So'^of^^^S'
of a harmless nature; the Yankoo=
sell gunpowder to both belliserent
nartif,
'
greatest part of their toniagls
employ el' in
woS:ied'soiiizrof
uiers
01 the Allies to and from the
Crimpa
'To
the Russians, who should
complain of sioh ^ T>ra
^
oeeding they reply that they
would
be
ver?
happy indeed to lend their ships
to the Czar but
opportunity of
making SoLy!T*

I

The United States, Golovin concluded,
was following
the wrong path in politics and morals.

The competitive
'

spirit in business and an "unbounded love of
material interests" were not going to resolve the
great questions of
the nineteenth century. Like a generation
of British
and

French travelers before him, Golovin believed
European advocates of democracy had been misled into an
exaggerated
belief in the perfection of American institutions.
To

Golovin, the greatest service the United States could render to European democracy would be the purification of its

institutions, placing them "above the sneers and criticisms
of European monarchists."

Corruption in America was re-

markably similar to corruption in Russia:

Suffice it to say, that the Americans themselves confess that corruption among them is so
great that despotism alone can extirpate its
root . . , that New York is a Sodom. As for the
magistrates, they are nearly all of them indicted this very moment for misdemeanors; they must
steal, having but this resource, for their situations are worth nothing, and take their whole
time.
The very reasoning you meet with in fius-
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sia.
Russia alone can match America
upon thic:
point; there they steal hay from
horses medi
cine from the sick, bread from
the
iruits and wine from the Emperor. so!diersf
5

Andrew D. White, then an attache at
the United States
Legation in Saint Petersburg, observed
many of the Americans who came to the Russian capital during
the war.

He

described how the "heavy conservatism of
Russian officialsthwarted Samuel Coifs efforts to sell them
an
improved

musket similar to the Minie rifle which the
British and
French were using in the Crimea. The Russian
officers,

convinced that their men were too ignorant to use
any weapon other than the old "Brown Bess" musket,
refused to
give

Colt a contract. ^

White described some of his countrymen, who were con-

fidence men, as "curiosities of civilization" and purveyors of nostrums which would guarantee a Russian victory

over the Western powers.

Thomas Seymour, America's minis-

ter in Saint Petersburg, and his aides had to be constantly on the alert to keep these adventurers within the bounds
of propriety in their dealings with the Russian government

and with each other.

Hoping to sell a new type of cannon

to the Russians, one inventor gave a demonstration of his

weapon to some of the highest ranking officers in the
Czar's army.

When the gun was about to be fired it was

discovered that

a

rival inventor had stolen an essential
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part of it, and the demonstration
ended in failure.
Another promoter in Saint Petersburg,
a New York City
ward boss and agent for a breech-loading
musket company,
had smuggled some specimens of arras
over the frontier.
This "big, rough, and rosy" politician
was presented to the
Czar, who provided two aides-de-camp
to show the salesman
and his wife around the Russian capital
in court carriages. ®

Russian agents in Paris, at the outset of the
war, had
persuaded a large number of young American
physicians and
surgeons who were studying in that city to join the
Russian
array.

These men were given high pay and rapid advancement

in the hope that this would strengthen pro-Russian feeling
in the United States.

However, their speedy promotion

aroused anger among Russian surgeons, and some of these

Americans were badly treated and died.

Seymour intervened

to extricate others from Russian service, a task which he

took very much to heart:

On several occasions White "saw

tears in Governor Seymour's eyes as he dwelt upon the

death of some of these young fellows whom he had learned
to love during their stay in Saint Petersburg." ^

In the spring of 1855 the Anglo-French squadron re-

turned to the Baltic.

White went to Cronstadt to observe

this impressive fleet.

One hundred three-decked ships of

the line were stretched across the Gulf of Finland in front
of the fortresses of Cronstadt.

The Russians kept their
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own fleet in port, sheltered
by the guns of the fortresses.
White later commented on the
Russian failure to cover a few
of their large ships with
railway iron which was available
in Saint Petersburg. Since all
the British and French ships
were made of wood, a few iron-plated
ships would have enabled the Russians to win "the most
prodigious naval victory of modem times." He made this
comment much later,
however, after perceiving the value
of ironclads in the
American Civil War.

American opinion of the war again had

nity for expression when Czar Nicholas
March 2, 1855.

I

a

major opportu-

died suddenly on

Nicholas had suffered blow after blow: the

failure of his troops to expel the Anglo-French force
from
the Crimea (in the autumn of 1854), the loss of Austrian
support, and the Russian defeat by the Turks at Eupatoria

in February 1855.

Weakened by

a

severe cold, Nicholas re-

fused to curtail his official activities.

Exposing himself

too often to the winter weather, he died of pneumonia.

Thomas Seymour lamented his death and recalled several

friendly interviews with him.

In Seymour's opinion, Nicho-

las possessed a "perfectly irresistible" personality, and
his handshake was "a good republican grasp."

Andrew D.

White saw the Czar several times including one occasion

when Nicholas was riding in a sleigh about

a

week before

his death.

The appearance of the Czar
made a deep inipression on the young American:
"Colossal in stature, with a
face such as one finds on a
Greek coin, but overcast with
a shadow or Muscovite
melancholy ... he bore himself
like a God."

British theatre audiences cheered
the news of the Emperor's death, but the American response
was quite different.
Most newspapers and periodicals had
at least moderately favored the late Czar. The United
States Review
that organ of "Young America" (formerly
the Democratic Review) had been consistently pro-Russian
since the war began and now denounced British rejoicing.
The Fort
,

,

Adams,

Arkansas, Item bitterly commented on the British
reaction
to the Czar's death:
"It is said that a lion never preys
upon a carcass. The British Lion is an exception
to this

rule."

-"-^

Putnam

'

s

concluded with

Magazine had
a

a

long article on Nicholas which

generally laudatory summary of his career:

Russia contains in her soil the greatest
diversity of mineral wealth; but Nicholas knew
how to use the granite, converting it into a
safeguard of national independence and greatness.
... In the history of Russia Nicholas will
ever shine as one of her most useful sovereigns,
as the efficient pioneer of her ultimate destiny.
... He simultaneously diffused light and darkness; but light is perennial, and darkness dissolves and disappears in the abyss of Time. 14
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According to Putnam's, Nicholasgreatest error had been
his intervention in Hungary in
support of Austria in 18^3.
If the Hapsburg Empire had then
broken up, Russian influence on the Continent would have been
much greater. Austrian opposition to Russian expansion in
the Balkans was

now threatening to add another member to
the anti-Russian
coalition. Nicholas, it followed, had gone
against the

national interest in aiding Francis Joseph in
the name of
"monarchical solidarity." "'^
The National Intelligencer had high praise for
Nicholas I and expressed hope that his son, Alexander
II, would

seek peace with the Allies.

It also rebuked the British

for rejoicing over the Czar's death, commenting that such
actions would only encourage Alexander to continue the war.

Nicholas had occupied one of the most important places in

modern history, according to the Intelligencer

,

and

may be regarded, perhaps, as the greatest Sovereign of modern times, and few have filled a wider space in the history of the world. . . . With
the genius of Frederick in administrative capacity, he had almost the genius of Napoleon for
war. His moral and conscientious qualities surpassed those of either, 16

The V/ashington Union commended Nicholas for having

resisted the policy of "universal intervention" pursued by
England and France.

It also encouraged Alexander II to

continue the struggle against the coalition which claimed

"a right to clip the wings
of nations whenever they
aspire

to too high a flight."

Shortly before the death of the
Czar, the Union had printed a
letter signed "Old Louisiana"
which compared the Cossacks to
Kentucky and Tennessee frontiersmen of Jackson's day. Any man
who had conversed with
Nicholas, the writer declared, would
take his word against
the bond of all the rest of Europe.

A New York Tribune editorial praised
Nicholas as an
upright man but condemned his basic
principle of autocracy.
It contrasted him with American
"doughface" politicians
(Northern men with Southern principles), noting
that the
Czar never assumed a false mask of liberalism
or "concocted
his schemes in darkness." But great men were
becoming

anachronistic in the nineteenth century.

Since the age was

great in itself, it was not favorable to the growth
of

"captains of the race."

The Tribune continued to deplore

the tendency of the war to strengthen the old despotisms
of Europe.

Austria's alliance with the Western powers was

particularly galling.

In contrast to its portrait of an

upright Nicholas, the paper described Francis Joseph as "a
consummate diplomatic trickster."

Despite an almost total

difference of opinion on domestic issues, the Tribune and
the Union agreed that England rather than Russia was the

chief threat to the world balance of power.
The very vocal Southern support for Russia, which was

combined with

a

desire to expand in the Caribbean and Cen-

!
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tral Amei-ioa, caused a leading
English magazine, the Westninster Revievj, to sarcastically
comment that "America has
a Russia within her borders." ^9
typically, the expansionist United States Review,
shortly after the death of
Nicholas I, produced a short poem
glorifying Russian heroism at Sevastopol:

^^^^
sea and land,
w^f^^J
With bristling guns your ramparts
stand.
Defiant, isolated, grand,
Sebastopol
The unconquered spirit of the Czar
Still hovers o'er the field of war.
Flashing from death, a shrouded star,
Sebastopol! 20

CHAPTER

VIII

Although maoority opinion in the United
States favored
Russia by the end of 1854, anti-slavery
and missionary
movements provided strong ties binding
New England to Great
Britain. Nathaniel Hawthorne was the
only prominent New
England intellectual who was sympathetic to
Russia,
and he

had long been skeptical about abolitionism
and most other
reform movements. Emerson, Thoreau, Theodore
Parker, William H. Channing, Edward Everett, Thomas W.
Higginson, and

Charles Sumner all favored Great Britain with varying
degrees of enthusiasm. Most of these New Englanders,
though

disturbed by the British alliance with Napoleon III, generally accepted it as a necessary evil. The great variation in their political opinions, ranging from conservative
Whigs like Everett, to radical abolitionists like Parker
and Higginson, suggests the inclusiveness of New England

support for the Allied cause.
The North American Review , Boston's leading literary

journal, was pleased with the initial success of the Allied

forces in the Crimea.

It dispelled the excessive fear of

Russian power that had prevailed since Napoleon
aster in 1812.

I

met dis-

Understandably, then, the Review praised

the "promptness and vigor" with which Britain and France

had formed their "countervailing alliance."

But it was

very critical of what it considered British complicity

with Russian aggression up to 1853

»

since England had ac-

quiesced in every step of Russian
expansion over a half
century. But it concluded that
Britain and France had at
last taken a firm stand and hoped for
an Allied
victory:

France and England forget the contests of the past
the common danger that hovers round the future, let Austria disdain
the heritage of the Caesars at the hands to hold
Czar, and there need be little fear that of the
the Cossack shall ever again cross the Rhine, or
that
the double-headed eagle shall guard exclusively
the waters of the Golden Horn. 2

m

At the beginning of the Crimean War, Ralph Waldo
Emer

son saw the conflict as giving scope to the ancient
"piratical" spirit of the Anglo-Saxons and counteracting the en-

ervating effects of peace, commerce and luxury dominant in

English society since 1815.

The British soon proved that

their old martial qualities remained.

Their heroism, in

Emerson's opinion, excelled that of any other nation:

There is an English hero superior to the
French, the German, the Italian, or the Greek.
When he is brought to the strife with fate, he
sacrifices a richer material possession, and on
more purely metaphysical grounds. He is there
with his own consent, face to face with fortune,
which he defies. On deliberate choice and from
grounds of character, he has elected his part to
live and die for, and dies with grandeur. This
race has added new elements to humanity and has
a deeper root in the world. 3

Emerson admired the exemplary courage displayed by the

English nobility who dominated
the officer corps. It
dispelled the exaggerated fears of
Emerson and others about
the decline of manly spirit
in an
age of luxury.

"There

are few noble families," said
Emerson, "which have not
paid, in some of their members,
the debt of life or limb
in the sacrifices of the Russian
war." His praise of the

English aristocracy partly reflected
upon American political tensions in the 1850»s. For
this was
a

decade in which

self-made men were frequently elected
to high office, and
many New Englanders, including Emerson,
saw this kind of
"democracy" and slavery going hand in
hand. Hence the
anti-democratic implications of Emerson's
praise of England. ^
In the Judgment of Emerson, the world's
security de-

pended upon England's.

Frequently contrasting the ordered

liberty of Great Britain with the turbulence of France,
he
expressed satisfaction with the capacity of English political institutions to avoid the mutability which character-

ized the Continent.

Nineteenth century Western culture,

particularly the "practical common sense of modern society," derived its essential spirit from England.

No nation

could resist the spread of English ideas, even if it were
at war with Great Britain.

To Emerson "the Russian in his

snows is aiming to be English," while "the Turk and Chinese
also are making awkward efforts to be English."

The Ameri-

can genius was "only the continuation of the English genius
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into new conditions more or
less propitious." ^
Despite Emerson's Anglophilic
sentiments, he saw much
to criticize in England. Por
example, he denounced English
foreign policy up to the Crimean
War. This policy, with
its sympathy for European conservatism,
led England
to

"betray" Poland, Hungary, Italy and
(until 1853) Turkey. ^
Henry Thoreau's sardonic comments about
Americans who
eagerly read the war news were not
consistent with his general attitude towards the Crimean War.
Shortly before the
conflict began a young English gentleman,
Thomas Cholmendely, had visited Thoreau at Concord.
A friendship developed and the Englishman, upon returning
home, sent Thoreau some books on Oriental religions. Thereafter
Cholm-

endely enlisted in the British army and wrote that
his regiment would soon be departing for the Crimea. Thoreau
's

reply reveals much about the complexity of his attitude
towards .war.

He had opposed the Mexican War and believed

that man was degraded by military discipline.

But he also

thought (along with many of his romantic contemporaries in
both Europe and America) that

a

military life exemplified

certain virtues which were rapidly disappearing in the com-

mercial civilization of the nineteenth century:

believe that it is only necessary that
England be fully awakened to a sense of her position, in order that she may right herself, especially as the weather will soon cease to be
her foe. I wish I could believe that the cause
I

in which you are embarked
is the cause
cau<.P n-r
oi i->.^
the
people of Fnp^innH

time to timP

L"^

in the good fight

*° ^^<l"i^^ ^

....

"^i-

f^o-

o^uuxs ever

7

Like Emerson, Edward Everett,
former Secretary of
State and President of Harvard
College, supported the Allies against Russia. As a leading
member of the Massachusetts Whig Party and one of the
most articulate conservative spokesmen in the North, he was
hostile to abolitionism, unenthusiastic about the 18^8
European revolution, and
feared the Russian menace to the Western
world more than
did Emerson. In a letter to the National
Intellio:encer
.

Everett deplored the anti-British and
pro-Russian tone of
much 0^ the American press. He prophetically
warned that
those who. are still alive in fifty years "will
see Russia
the scourge of all Europe, Asia, and even America."
The

Allied powers were "engaged in a great and glorious
work
for the liberties and security of the whole civilized
world."

Everett's 1854 Fourth of July speech was

a

call

for American national unity in the face of great opportunities.

He predicted a transfer of world power to the

Western Hemisphere: the European war and

a vast

immigrants would accelerate this process. ^

influx of

William H. Channins, another
Boston Brahmin, spent the
winter of 1854-55 in England.
Strongly endorsing the war,
he warned that if Russia was
able to become a sea power as
well as a land power, all of Europe
as
well as the East

would eventually fall under her
domination.

The obo'ective

Of Allied campaigns in the Baltic
and Black seas was to rid
Europe of "this giant incubus" by
destroying the Russian
fleets and bases in the two inland seas
and preventing her

from ever rebuilding them.

Channing was impressed by the

"wonderful unanimity" of all the English
classes in support
of the war.
All Dissenters as well as most Anglicans
saw
the war as a means of diffusing a purer
form of religion in
the East. The dominant tone was, Channing
wrote,
"We are

in for it, now let us go through with it." ^

Despite these prevailing sentiments, Channing noted
the existence of several vocal anti-war groups.

On two oc-

casions he found himself in the unusual position of "a

stranger defending the policy of this nation against its
own subjects."

Channing broke down the varieties of anti-

war opinion into two categories: one group feared

victory and emphasized that, for over

a

a

Russian

century, Russia had

emerged triumphant from every war in which it had engaged.
The Russians could protract hostilities until the Western

powers and the German states would be glad to make peace
on almost any terms.

velopment of

a

They could be checked only by the de-

higher civilization which would eventually
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undermine Czarist autocracy and cause
the dreaded empire to
divide naturally into several states.
A second anti-war
group disliked Russia but argued that
Nicholas
was grad-

ually improving conditions there.

Moreover, the growth of

commerce and industry would reduce Russian
belligerence.
In any case, the Christian Russians were
much better than
the Moslem Turks. This group believed, moreover,
that

the

Orthodox people in Turkey were Russia's natural
allies.
The two great English spokesmen for free trade,
John

Bright and Richard Gobden, Channing observed, denounced
the
war on the grounds that Russia was clearly in the right:

England was interfering in matters which were of no concern to her.

According to Bright and Gobden, the conflict

was "a wicked, presumptuous, heaven-defying war, and

.

.

,

its sure end will be England's humiliation and remorse,"

Channing believed, however, that they had only
following for their anti-war views.

a

very small

"'"^

There was also an English faction which greatly feared

Russia's defeat.

Ultra-conservatives, they regarded Nicho-

las as a bulwark of European civilization,

tive par excellence

,

"

the conserva-

the head of the party of Order; these

dread the letting loose the People of Europe, now awed into
stillness."

Still another small group in the anti-war ranks

were unconditional pacifists.
Furthermore, Channing feared

a

possible increase in the

strength of the anti-war bloc because many government sup-
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porters were angered by the
Anglo-French treaty of alliance
with Austria (of December
2, 1854).
This treaty potentially obliged England to support
(or at least
not to oppose)

the status £uo in Hungary and
Italy.

Such

a

course would

be intolerable to the more ardent
enemies of Russia, who
had assumed that Austria would be
fighting with the Czar at
the outset of hostilities. These
opponents of the Austrian
alliance, he felt, could bring about a
general disillusion-

ment with the war.

Channing nonetheless was optimistic about
the outcome
of the war. Convinced that the Allies
would

capture Sevas-

topol, "because the temper of the French and
English is of
a higher tone than the Russian, and will
win the day," he

also hoped to see Poland and Hungary regain their
national

independence as

a

result of the conflict.

Such

a

develop-

ment seemed possible, Channing thought, although it would
break

-up

ers.

Channing wanted the peace treaty to include guaran-

the entente between Austria and the Western pow-

tees of an independent Poland, Hungary, Finland and (possibly) Bohemia.

He also favored

a

revived Greek Empire,

with Constantinople as its capital, although he did not ex-

plain how this could be reconciled with the Anglo-French
policy of upholding the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire.

Channing advised the pacifists that their cause would

ultimately benefit from an Allied victory over Russia.

"An immense development of the
peace principle" would resuit, he wrote, from the
reaction against the military
system represented by the Czar:

Nicholas looms up above the
like a gigantic embodiment of the bloody cloud
very principle
Of all evil; as the great arch-fiend
and the
prince of devils, the wholesale
murderer . Hi.,
pretence of being the ?epresentatI7i-5f-Ghristian order, serves but to complete
the hideous
"^'^
,^^^P°^i3^PeacefufchrL-.
t^anfLpf
tians leel - as 'r^'
toward a wild beast - that the
whole war system, of which he is the
ation, must be destroyed and they areimpersonreally
lighting lor a peace which shall be
permanent. 15
;

The war taught some lessons pleasing to Channing.

One

was to confirm that the higher forms of
civilization (i.e.
England and France) produced "the grandest style of heroism."

The battles at Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman could be

so interpreted: intelligence and virtue, Channing
concluded,

was superior to brute force in battle as in other situations.

Another lesson, "terribly taught," was the grow-

ing importance of science to those engaged in conflict:

...

war as a science is fast reaching its
possible culmination, by insuring such swift and
sweeping destruction as to make fighting impossible.
- So far as the Russians have done anything in the Crimea, it has been by their scientific engineering and gunnery. ;*.nd in a few days
we shall hear a most appalling account, I presiime, of the superior French and English science
in the same branches. 17

Channing found two final
reasons for satisfaction
with
the war: the reoonciliation
and alliance of France
and England after centuries of
hostility; and the stimulus
war
provided to the growth of
democracy in England. Regarding
the first point, the French
and the English were united
in
"the upholding and diffusing
of a form of civilisation,
the
essence of which is constitutional
freedom, and the outward signs of Which are peaceful
industry and
commerce."

Napoleon III was an autocrat, to
be sure, but in the long
run this did not matter because
France
was "at heart

a

nation of freemen."
Revelations of aristocratic incompetence
in the Crimea, Ghanning believed, would lead
to a greater emphasis
within the British government and army
on promotion according to merit rather than by purchase or
patronage. He
was

pleased to observe

a

general acknowledgement that the mid-

dle and working classes were the most
vital elements in

British society.
reforms and

a

And he hoped that

a

series of practical

widening of popular education would enable

Britain to fulfill its role as "the leader of free
governments in Europe." "'^

The early years of the nineteenth century encompassed
the Second Great Awakening.

The intensity of this reli-

gious revival gave rise to the overseas missionary move-
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ment.

In Britain, both Anglicans and
Dissenters established foreign missionary societies
in the 1790' s, and
American churches soon Tollowed
this precedent. The American Board of Commissioners for
Foreign Missions, chartered
in 1810, was essentially an alliance
of Presbyterian and
Congregational clergymen who agreed to
subordinate their
doctrinal differences to the great task
of spreading the
light of Christ among the heathen.

The Ottoman Empire soon became one of
the main areas
for American missionary endeavor. Since the
Holy Land was
part of the Turkish domains, missionaries
felt a particularly strong emotional attachment to this
region. They
believed that the century would witness the collapse
of the

Pope and the Sultan, the two "great impost ers."

Their in-

terest was further stimulated by the many nineteenth
century prophecies about the imminence of the millennium,

and

conversion of the Near East would be

a sure sign of it.

These missionaries carried American secular civilization
as well as religious convictions with them.

The United

States, they thought, should serve as a model for less for-

tunate nations,

ditionalism.

a

belief they combined with Christian tra-

21

American missionaries concentrated on converting the
Orthodox, Armenian and Nestorian Christians in the Near
East.

Although their activities alarmed the Turkish gov-

ernment, missionary work continued, owing to the efforts of

Stratford de Redcliffe, the influential
British ambassador,
who was able to persuade the Porte
to acquiesce.
Largescale conversions of Moslems to Christianity
was the great
Turkish fear. But this anxiety was
unwarranted. American
missionaries made little progress among the
Moslems by the
1850' s.
Nonetheless, the Orthodox Church obstructed
Protestant activity in every possible way. To be
sure, some

conversions took place, as well as a number of transfers
by
Armenian Christians to the sects represented by the
mis-

sionaries. 22

Orthodox hostility toward American missionaries intensified the long-standing Protestant antagonism towards Russia, particularly amongst the Calvinist and evangelical

groups.

American sympathy for Kossuth and the Hungarian

cause in 18^9 had been based partly upon the fact that he
was a "Protestant hero," struggling against both Catholic

Austria and Orthodox Russia.

The growth of Protestantism

and of liberal political institutions were inextricably

linked in the minds of most American reformers.

Protes-

tantism was believed to provide the combination essential
for any successful democracy; namely, education, social

responsibility and freedom from foreign influences.

It op-

posed Russian and Austrian absolutism as well as the agnostic and atheistic radicalism of both France and Germany.
It alone seemed capable of creating

tween liberty and authority.

a

proper balance be-

A Protestant triumph in
the Near East, many
believed,
was the best strategy for
outflanking the influence of
European despotism and eventually
undermining it. Most of
the missionaries regarded
Islam as a dying religion, incapable of effective opposition
to the Protestant surge.
On the other hand, the "corrupt"
forms
of Christianity,

Catholicism and Orthodoxy, would
be capable of fanaticll resistance. Since Turkey was
increasingly dependent
on the

protection of European nations,
particularly Protestant
England, conversion prospects
seemed even more favorable.
Biblical prophecies about "the drying
up of the Euphratesjust prior to the millennium were
interpreted as meaning
that the collapse of Islam and the
conversion of the Near
East prefigured the Second Coming.
Some Protestant clergymen in both Britain and the United States
identified
Rus-

sia with the invading tribes of Gog and
Magog, mentioned in
the Book of Ezekiel. Russia's defeat, therefore,
would be
another step toward the millennium. In any case,
the war
would speed up the pro'cess of Islamic conversions.

Missionary spokesmen, early in the Crimean War, tried
to ignore the presence of Catholic France as the
chief ally
of Protestant England.

This was difficult, for Napoleon

III had long been as unpopular as the Czar amongst America's

evangelists.

Most missionaries and their friends at home

sought a simplified explanation: the conflict was between

Anglo-Saxon Protestant liberty and Russian Orthodox despot-

ism.

Fearing that

Russian victory would mean the
expulsion of all non-Orthodox missionaries
from any conquered
territory, American Protestants could
regard France and the
Papacy, at least for the moment, as
lesser evils.
a

The Reverend David T. Stoddard, an
American missionary
in Persia, described his apprehensions
about a Russian victory:

Feb. 17, 185^ - What the end will be we
know not. It may result in the triumph of Russia.
Woe then to missions. Woe to civilization.
Woe to freedom. May God in mercy avert such a
calamity.
We try, however, to give ourselves no anxiety on these subjects, but to
leave them all to Him who will bring light out of
darkness, and, amid all the marchings and countermarchings of armies, will take good care of his
own precious cause. I need hardly say that all
our sympathies are against Russia. We long to
see her humbled, if not crushed. It is cheering
to see that England is at last waking up, and
that the Queen calls Nicholas 'our common enemy. 26

...

•

Stoddard's sentiments were shared by the Home Missionary magazine, which stressed the need for Anglo-American

cooperation in missionary activities.

Denouncing Russian

despotism, the Papacy, French revolutionary turbulence, and
the "infidel" Biblical criticism of German scholars, the

Home Missionary predictably concluded that only the English and Americans had a pure form of Christianity to offer
the world.

While the rest of Christendom stagnated under

oppressive monarchies or experienced outbreaks of "godless

anarchy," the two great
Anglo-Saxon nations had
undertaken
an enterprise in which
they had no hope of
assistance fro.
others. This venture was
nothing less than an "attempt
to
deliver this earth from the
dominion of sin." If the Czar
did not capture Constantinople,
then the Protestants
cer-

tainly would; and, once again,
it would be a "center of
emPire," but it would radiate the
spirit of American Christianity rather than the despotism
of Nicholas. ^7
The 1854 annual report of the
A.B.C.F.M. expressed confidence that Near Eastern events
stemmed from God's general
plan for the evangelization of
the world.
The profane
might attribute the Crimean conflict
to mere earthly rivalries, but missionaries knew the
true source of these hostilities.

The Prophets had predicted ages ago
that everything under heaven would be given
"to the saints
of the

Most High."
design:

Historic events had ever been

a

part of God»s

"Has not God always followed in the track
of the

conqueror, to borrow the illustration of
John Foster, and
borne away the spoil? Have not missionaries,
again and again, sowed the good seed of the Word in
the very furrows
of war?"

Rufus Anderson, Secretary of the A.B.C.F.M. from
1823
to 1866, traveled in the interior of Asia Minor
during the

Crimean War and observed what seemed to be Russian intrigue
among the Moslems. He heard it rumored that if the Russians were victorious, they would protect Islam by expel-
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ling the Protestant missionaries
from Turkey. Anderson
firmly believed that "there are
times when the movements of
armies are evidently made subservient,
in Divine Providence, to the progress of the Gospel" as the Crimean War
clearly proved. Anderson had feared
Turkish compliance

with the Czar's ultimatum on the
protectorate question during the 1853 diplomatic crisis; and, in
his opinion, "only

the seasonable return of Lord Stratford
de Redcliffe" prevented it. A hero and an ally to Anderson,
the British
ambassador was also one to most American
missionaries in
the Near East.

Revelations of incompetence in the British army in the
Crimea, so disturbing to the English press during the
win-

ter of 185^-55, also alarmed the Home Missionary .

Its ed-

itors wondered whether England's position in Europe and the

world would permanently decline.

If it did, they believed,

it would be a great disaster for Protestantism and modern

civilization.

The United States would then have to assume

the role of Protestant champion.

The Home Missionary hoped

that "the mother may not lose the place until the daughter
be prepared to take it."

It criticized England for her

hostile and condescending attitude towards the United

States in the past, adding, however, that "we are, as compared with all other nations, but one people"; and it

warned that her government and army needed immediate reform.

If Sevastopol did not fall, it predicted, aristo-

cratic rule in England would be
over.
In oversimplifying the struggle,
American Protestant
journals continued to ignore Prance's
role, while avidly

seizing upon any evidence of Catholic
sympathy for Russia
as proof that Rome and Saint Petersburg
were really

allies.

According to the Christian Review Catholics
in Austria,
Ireland and England all hoped for a Russian
victory.

Car-

dinal Wiseman of England and Orestes Brownson
in the United
States, the Review declared, were outstanding
examples of
Catholics who leaned to the Russian side. The
duty of
American Protestants in this situation was clear:

The sympathies of American friends of Christian Missions, for whose interests Sir Stratford
de Redcliffe, the English Ambassador, has accomplished so much, are naturally and justly with
the Turk; and it is a marly appeal which the late
series of articles in the Independent is now making to Americans who sympathize too much with
Russia. 51

Some American missionaries in the Near East noted local

pro-Russian sentiment among Catholic priests who, it was
assumed, were afraid of Protestant encroachments.

The Rev-

erend Henry Lobdell, who brought the Gospel to northern
Persia, claimed that priests were urging their small con-

gregations to pray for

a

Russian victory since it would

mean the expulsion of the heretical missionaries.
George P. Marsh, the former American minister in Con-
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stantinople, remained a staunch
supporter of the Near Eastern missions and the Allied
cause. Writing to the 1855 annual meeting of the A.B.C.F.M,,
Marsh noted that missionary
activity fortunately had not been
seriously impeded by
the

war.

Moreover, an Allied victory would free
Turkey from
"the open rancor and secret intrigues
of Greco-Slavic bigotry," and prepare the way for the
regeneration of the East
and ultimately for the oppressed
nationalities of Eastern
Europe. American missionary presence in
the Turkish Empire,
in Marsh's opinion, was one of the main
reasons for
"the

political and military movements which have
shaken Asia and
Europe since 1855." European reactionaries were,
he

stated,

quick to see the menace posed by the extension of
American
influence into the Near East:

The iron heel, that crushed the rising
hopes of continental liberty in 1849, is again
armed to tread out the glimmering spark of civil
and religious freedom in the oriental world.
The friends of human progress in Asia meet their
most formidable obstacle in the relentless hostility of 'the great conservative power of Europe.' 55

Missionaries in the field displayed the same confidence
in the protection of Providence that characterized the writings and speeches of Anderson and Marsh.

Because of heavy

fighting between Russian and Turkish forces in the Caucasus and Armenia, the mission at Erzerura had to be tempo-
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rarily abandoned.

But all the other stations
remained active.
A report from the Armenian
mission, describing the
missionaries' spirit, was read to the
1854 meeting:

Planted in the bosom of the Turkish
emi^ire
convulsed with the shock of arms, and
the ?hea!'
tre of events attracting at this
'moment the
Civilized world, the mission is movinggaze
r.Ltt^
unimpeded prosperity, enjoying peace
As in the bush
"^^^^^
I t
J""
that
burned,
and was not consumed, God is with
^ w^oa
the mission
the fire, 34

^

m

»

In Constantinople, the Reverend William
Goodell

thought that the missionaries had carried on
their work
with less interference during the war than at
any previous
period. He regarded this as certain evidence of

God's sup-

port for evangelization.

During the diplomatic negotiations

preceding the outbreak of the conflict, Goodell also noted,
the missionaries had offered a special prayer for Lord

Stratford de Redcliffe, that "devoted friend of the cause
of Christ."

Another missionary in Constantinople, Cyrus Hamlin,

rendered considerable assistance to the British army when
its commissariat collapsed during the winter of 1854-55,
He established a bakery (in which all workers were converts
to Protestantism) and contracted to supply bread to the

British troops.

This enterprise proved so successful that

Hamlin then set up

a

laundry establishment which operated

in the same way.

Another contract was signed with
the Brit
ish army, and the laundry, like the
bakery, earned a
rep-

utation for efficiency in the midst of
incompetence. ^6
The national magazine of the Methodist
Church, the

Methodist Quarterly Review

,

like the American Board's mis-

sionaries, supported the Allied cause.

The Reverend J. H.

Perry of Brooklyn, thought that every friend of
human progress, and particularly every citizen of the
United States,

should sympathize with the Allies.
be, in his opinion,

A Russian victory would

"the most disastrous event that could

occur to civilization, to freedom, or to Christianity."

If

the Russians were to gain control of Constantinople, they

would turn it into the base for "another wave of that dark
sea" of barbarism which had swept over Western Europe dur-

ing the declining years of the Roman Empire.

The Review

had no doubt that Britain and France were acting in accordance with the right principles:

But aside from political reasons, if we can
suppose the nations to be moved by motives of
justice or equity, the Allies are fully justified in interposing in behalf of Turkey. VJe
have an unshaken belief in the righteousness of
the abstract doctrine of 'intervention.'
A
strong nation is under as clear an obligation
to interpose in behalf of a weak one, threatened
with injury or ruin, as a strong man is to interpose in behalf of a v;eak one when assaulted by
one stronger than himself. 58

The Review's chief expert on military strategy at

tempted to discredit the opinions
of those Russian sympathizers who explained the long
duration

of the siege of Se

vastopol as evidence of Russian
superiority in combat and
ensineering. He asserted that the
campaign was protracted
because Allied generals had neglected
some of the first

principles of siege warfare, rather
than because of the
skill of Sevastopol's defenders.
The Allies had ignored
three of the doctrines of Marshal
Vauban (the great French
military engineer of the reign of Louis
XIV): the
besieg-

ing army must totally surround the
fortress it is investing; it must possess at least five
times the numerical
strength of the defenders; and it must have
superior artillery. None of these conditions existed at
Sevastopol.
As the war continued, more books and articles
contain-

ing eschatological prophecies appeared in the
United States
Some were written by Americans, others by Englishmen.
One
of the American contributions, S. D. Baldwin's
Armageddon,

or the Overthrow of Romanism and Monarchy

,

found the exist-

ence of the United States foretold in the Bible and pre-

dicted that America was destined to "annex peaceably or by
force nation after nation, till our republic embraces the
entire earth."

This process of conquest would begin after

the United States succeeded in repelling an invasion by the
\inited powers of Europe,

America would be "Israel restored

and would play the leading role in bringing about the mil-

lennium.

For expansionists of this type, at least, Eng-
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land would pose no problem to
energetic American activities
throughout the world.

American Unitarians avoided the
millennial emotionalism common to evangelical denominations,
but remained sympathetic to the missionary movement and
favored the Allied
cause. A Unitarian view of eschatology
appeared in the

Christian Examiner, in

a

review of

a

sermon by Dr. John

Gumming of the Church of Scotland (entitled
"The War and
Its Issues"). Gumming, who supported the
war, urged
prayers for victory; but he nevertheless predicted
that
Russia would be temporarily successful and "sweep
Continental Europe." The last great battle between the
English

and

Russians would be fought in the Holy Land:

The formidable pov/er from the East and
North, symbolized by the great northern hail,
that is to light upon the nations and upon Antichrist during the last or seventh vial, will
close its career where the reasons for that career at first originated - and its very existence also - by the shrines of Jerusalem, the
mountains of Megiddo, or in the land of Palestine. 4-1

The review pointed out the inconsistency in Gumming' s pro-

war stand and his prediction of

a

Russian victory.

It re-

gretted the wide circulation of such "unsatisfactory discussions" among America's Christians.
The Examiner

England.

'

s

editors, to be sure, firmly supported

They saw no reason for immediate American inter-
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vention in Europe but thought that
at some future date the
American and British flags might fly
side by side in "the

last great struggle against the
aggression of Orientalism."
Meanwhile, Americans would have to
overcome two varieties
of European despotism at home;
namely, "the absolutism of
the radical terrorist, and of the
despot, whether priest or
king." ^5

The Christian Examiner (of October
185^) contained a
martial exhortation to young missionaries. It
recalled how
the Duke of Wellington, England's late great
military leader, once rebuked a young Anglican minister
who had
ques-'

tioned the value of foreign missions.

"Look to your march-

ing orders," contained in Christ's instructions to
his disciples to "preach the Gospel to every creature," the old

soldier had advised himo

The Examiner thought this a "hap-

py generalization, since Saint Paul had described Jesus

Christ as the Captain of our salvation and his disciples
as soldiers.

In an age when skeptical men were question-

ing whether the doctrine of Jesus was superior to Greek
philosophy, it was good for Christians to be reminded of

their "marching orders":

"...

the single-eyed deference

to authority, regardless of consequences, for which the

Iron Duke was celebrated, shone out in this speech, and

teaches us how much more true and beautiful it is, in matters of such high import, to obey than to criticize."
J. S. Everett, a missionary to the Armenians in Con-

stantinople, reported that
although the new Armenian
Prote,
tant Church was small at
present, it was destined to
grow.

According to him old Armenian
Church members had despaired
Of resisting the evangelical
advance
with arguments, and

simply hoped for

a

Russian victory.

But the reverses suf-

fared by the Czar's forces in
the Crimea had shaken even
this last hope and "multitudes
are already convinced of
their errors, and they say that the
truth is altogether
with the Protestants."
In an article on "The Future of
Constantinople," the

Missionary Herald commented on the shock
felt throughout
Christendom when Constantinople fell to

the Turks in 1453.

But this event, the Herald rationalized,
had ultimately secured the city as a field for Christian
effort in the nineteenth century, and Constantinople was now
becoming
"the

great base of operations for the social and
moral regeneration of Asia." American missionaries were conducting
a

new siege of Constantinople.

Their guns consisted of semi-

naries, printing-presses, and Christian schools, "an
artil-

lery more pacific, but infinitely more effective than
the
great cannon of Mohammed."
It was fortunate for Protestantism that the Orthodox

Church had not remained in control of Constantinople since,
according to the Herald

,

there is no power that persecutes

the Gospel more relentlessly than a false form of Chris-

tianity.

Turkey was more tolerant than Austria or Russia
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because she was weak and obliged
to depend on the Christian
powers for protection. Eventually,
the spreading Protestant message would free the regions
around the Black Sea
"from the incubus of Turkish and
Russian tyranny."
P. 0. Powers,

chief of the missionary station at
Trebizond on the Turkish shore of the Black
Sea, described
the

wartime tribulations of his parishioners.

Unemployment and

the difficulty of obtaining the necessities
of life had

forced some of them to move elsewhere.

Prices, since the

outset of war, had doubled or tripled.

Merchants and farm-

ers were making large profits, Powers noted,
but most Protestants in Trebizond were "humble artisans." A
cholera ep-

idemic had added to their troubles, and several parishioners had died.
A more optimistic report came from the Greek Protes-

tant congregation at Demirdesh, near Constantinople.
(These people had been regarded as apostates by their fel-

low Greeks who sometimes, attacked them.)

Its fortunes

suddenly changed when the French Vice Consul was faced with
the necessity of hiring someone to take charge of the vast

number of cattle that the French army kept in the area.
chose the leading Greek Protestant of Demirdesh,

giving

him authority to hire and pay for the necessary workers:

This brought all Demirdesh to his feet, and
those who hod sometimes beaten him, and even used
weapons of death against him, came bowing down to

He
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estly, thus
es?lv
thu^/?^
returning good for evil tn i-hc ^1
2^'
tonishment of his enemiec.
anH^^ testimony
I
^^®°iies and
for
the truth. ^9

m

^

The mission to the Armenians at
Erzerum was closer to
the actual war zone than any other
American station. Indeed, there was heavy fighting
between the Russians and
Turks in this area all during the
war. For several months
in 1855 a Russian advance on Erzerum
was constantly
ex-

pected.

Many of the Protestant converts fled;
and, naturally, no new ones were forthcoming in
this atmosphere.
Those who were inclined to Protestantism
avoided the missionaries who consoled themselves by noting
that a large

number of persons were "intellectually convinced"
of the
truth of Protestantism, and some of these confessed
that

"we know our duty but do it not."

While the Erzerum Protestants were fearfully expecting
the Russians to take their city (as they had during the
war
of 1828-29), the missionaries to the Nestorians in northern

Persia experienced no interruption in their work.

(The

Nestorians were a Christian sect that had broken with the

Orthodox Church during the doctrinal disputes of the early
Middle Ages.)

The United States at this time was attempt-

ing to negotiate

a

trade agreement with Persia, which the

Russians favored because they hoped it would counterbalance

British influence in that country.

The Czar's agents.
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therefore, were very generous in
their dealings with the
missionaries. Indeed, the latter
were actually assisted
by the Russian consul in Tabriz
and the commander
of the

Russian troops in the area when
communications with Erzerum
and the West were disturbed, and
Russian officers
saw to it

that they were soon able to communicate
with their brethren
again. 51
In general the missionary movement
remained pro-Allied,
fully convinced that the war had contributed
to the spread
of Protestantism.
Speeches at the Missionary Jubilee at

Williams College in the summer of 1855 suggest
as much.
This meeting, which commemorated the fiftieth
anniversary
of the founding of the missionary movement,
was addressed
by the Reverend Elias Riggs, a twenty-four year
veteran

of

the Armenian mission.

He described some of his experiences

in Constantinople during the war:

We witnessed reviews of the Allied forces
and saw their regiments depart in their completeness and pride; and in some instances we saw
their shattered fragments return after the campaign. But in the immediate vicinity of the capital there was no fighting. In respect to our
work I should say that, on the whole, the progress of the war rather promoted than hindered it,
and that in many ways which time forbids me even
to enumerate. 52

Rufus Anderson was even more strongly persuaded that
the Crimean War had contributed to the spreading of the
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Protestant gospel in the Near
East.
Jubilee, Anderson even asserted

In his speech to the

that almost every war,
rev-

olution, invention and discovery
of the nineteenth century
had been used by Providence
to prepare the way for
the conversion of the world. The only
serious difficulty now
troubling the Missionary Societies
was that of finding recruits to fill the many places
available all over the.
world.
In an attempt to arouse Williams
graduates of 1856 to
Join the missionary movement, the
Reverend Miron Winslow,
a Ceylon missionary, exhorted
them to remember the lessons
of Sevastopol.
Interested in increasing the number of
recruits for service in India, Winslow
pointed out that a
sergeant's guard could never have taken
Sevastopol, and
that the present size of the Indian mission
was equivalent
to such a force.
In Winslow's opinion it would be a good
thing if half of New England's pastors migrated
to India.
It would be a great gain for India, and God's
Providence

would certainly see to it that new ministers would
come forward to take charge of the work at home.

William G. Schauffler, an American missionary active
in the Near East since the 1850' s, had an opportunity to
give his opinion on the Crimean War to Princess Olga,

daughter of Nicholas

I,

and Crown Princess of Wurttemberg.

Born in Stuttgart, Schauffler had migrated to Russia with
his parents as

a

child, and then came to the United States.

He graduated from Andover
Theological Seminary and Joined
the small group of American
missionaries in Turkey, devoting many years there to a largely
unsuccessful attempt to
convert the Jews of Constantinople,
Smyrna and Salonika. ^5

Visiting Stuttgart in 1855, at
the height of the Crimean War, Schauffler spoke to a
large meeting and blamed
the war on Russia's desire to
control Constantinople
as

well as Greek Orthodoxy's jealous
fear of the American missionary inroads. The Greek Patriarch,
according to Schauffler, had warned the Russian Embassy
in Constantinople that
if the Americans were not speedily
expelled from that city
he could not answer for the consequences
of their presence.
The Crown Princess, disturbed by Schauffler
's speech, granted an interview at which she heatedly
denied that her father the Czar had any designs on Turkish territory.
His
sole objective, she declared, was to secure
guarantees for
the rights of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman
Empire.

Schauffler denied that the Czar's intentions had

been motivated by religion but added sarcastically:

"It

may, however, now be a consolation to Russia to see
that

the wishes of Russia about Turkey, as defined by your Highness, are now being in course of accomplishment by the war

itself."

(After this comment the Princess "dropped back

into her sofa without replying a word.")

British missionary organizations fully appreciated the
work of their American counterparts and approvingly noted

their mutual agreement on the
Eastern Question. Lord
Shaftesbury, the reformer, in an
address to the British
Turkish Missions Aid Society,
praised the Americans for
their pioneering work in the Ottoman
Empire.

The East ern

Question, he noted, had provided the
means for establishing peace and friendship between two
old enemies, Britain
and France. The same sense of common
interest between Brit
ish and American Protestants in the East,
in Shaftesbury's
opinion, should also lead to better
relations between their
countries. The greatest achievement of the
American missionaries was their demonstration to Moslems
and Jews a-

like, that there existed a form of Christianity
untainted

with idolatry.

Shaftesbury's view of the "idolatrous"

Eastern Christian churches was echoed by the American
Reverend William Goodell, who said that Christianity in
this

region had become

a

"ghastly skeleton."

The Crimean War dealt

a

severe blow to the activities

of peace societies in both Great Britain and the United

States.
1853.

These societies had flourished between 1848 and

Elihu Burritt, the "Learned Blacksmith," worked

closely with British advocates of international arbitration, among them the two leaders of Manchester liberalism,

John Bright and Richard Gobden.

reached

a

Peace sentiment had

high point in 18^1 at the time of London's Great

Exhibition, with its theme of human
prosress. Louis Napoleon had proposed a reduction of naval
armaments to Britain
in 1849, promising to make proportional
reductions in the
French fleet if Britain agreed to such a
policy. But the
ministry rejected this offer on the grounds
that its fleet
had global commitments, while the French were
not
in a com-

parable situation.

Nevertheless, the proposal had aroused

enthusiasm among the peace societies.

In I851 it was gen-

erally believed that the progress of industry and
commerce
and the decline of militarism went hand in hand.

When war between Russia and Turkey began, it soon became apparent (as Burritt ruefully acknowledged later),
that much of the Anglo-American peace sentiment was super-

ficial.

The near-unanimous support that both the English

Dissenters and their American colleagues gave to the war
was particularly disappointing to thorough-going pacifists,
who had formerly shared many reform enthusiasms with
them.

The opposition of many New England clergymen to the

Mexican War seemingly provided the basis for

a

strong peace

movement among America's evangelical Protestants.

opposition had been based more on

a

conviction that the war

was a Southern plot to extend slavery rather than
that armed conflict was evil.

But this

a

belief

The Crimean War began at a

time when many Northern clerics, in the wake of the threat-

ened extension of slavery into Kansas and Nebraska, were
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revising their attitudes towards
the use of force. Men
like Charles Sumner, who a few
years earlier had described
war as a relic of barbarism with
no place in the nineteenth
century, now urged support for
Kansas free-soilers in their
war with the "slave power." The
reaction
of most evangel-

ical Protestants to the conflict
in the East was similar.
Russia's advance posed a threat to
American missionary activity, which was diffusing the light
of a pure Christianity in the Turkish territories. Russia,
like the American
slave states, was threatening to reverse
the
beneficent;:

course of nineteenth century civilization.

such a menace, few were able to maintain

In the face of

stand in favor

a

of unconditional pacifism.

American Quakers, like their counterparts in England,
remained unalterably opposed to the Eastern war. One
of

their journals, the Friends

'

Intelligencer

,

emphasized the

effects of the war on the American people:

Our merchants and manufacturers, our banks
and railroads, our commerce and navigation, owners of real estate, investors in stocks of all
sorts, employers and employees, the rich and the
poor, but especially the thousands of unemployed
and well-nigh famishing poor, all are real,
though indirect sufferers from the war now raging six thousand miles off upon another continent. 61

Deploring the "comparatively insignificant" causes of
the war, the Intelligencer praised the English Society of
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Friends for its anti-war position and
lamented the slow
progress of Christianity in Western
nations. These nations
were following the "heathen models" of
Greece

and Rome rath-

er than the doctrine of Christ.

One of the worst aspects

of this situation, declared the Intellig:encer

.

was the

false glamor which poetry and music gave
to war.
Such a
tradition, which ultimately went back to
Homer's Iliad ,
could only be overcome by a better understanding
of Christian principles:

All goes to prove what strange and halfsighted creatures we are. Were it not so, war
could never have been seen in any other asoect,
than that of unmingled hatefulness; and I can
look to nothing but the progress of Christian
sentiment upon earth, to arrest the strong current of the popular and prevailing partiality
for war. 62

Although Quakers differed from most of America's evangelicals in their opposition to the Crimean War, they
shared the satisfaction of all missionaries over the decline of Islam and over prospects for a renaissance of

Christianity in the Near East.

The Intelligencer was

pleased to note that the missionary schools and the printing press were more potent means of conversion than the
swords of the old Crusaders.

Turkey might survive as a pow-

er but the Islamic religion would surely perish as Chris-

tian schools were established in its territory.

The books
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Of the missionaries, according
to the Intelligencer enabled every educated Turk to see
"at once that the Koran
is not inspired, but only the
composition of an ignorant
camel driver."
,

Quaker concern with the false views
of war cultivated
by poetry and music is a good
example of one of the main
problems facing sober-minded pacifists
like Elihu Burritt
at this time.
By the mid-nineteenth century
most educated
people in the Western world had been strongly
influenced
by romantic literature.

Although romanticism was not syn-

onymous with a glorification of war, most
romantics emphasized the value of individual heroism.
Dislike of insti-

tutionalized militarism often went hand in hand with
admiration for the heroic individual who stood out in
battle.

Emerson, for example, denounced the evil effects of mili-

tary discipline during the Mexican War, but he had high esteem for Napoleon I, whom he regarded as being the archetypal man of the century.

During the Crimean War, as in-

dicated earlier, he was gratified by the martial spirit of
the British nobility: commerce had not completely destroyed
the old heroic virtues.

Here is the obverse of the convic-

tion of Burritt and others that commerce and peace were

partners in

a

beneficent development.

For the romantics

saw commerce as undermining the tradition of individualism
and personal courage, and feared that it would be disas-

trous for Western civilization.

Thoreau, like Emerson, had
always admired heroism.
When his friend Cholmendely
departed for the Crimea,
he
later interpreted it as a
demonstration that manUne'ss
was
not absent from the modern
commercial world. Thomas W.
Higginson followed the same
path in expressing admiration
for Lord Cardigan's performance
during the charge of the
Light Brigade. In emphasizing
the need for heroic individuals to combat a corrupt
social system, abolitionists
such
as Thoreau and Higginson invoked
a tradition of military
heroism which remained strong in
their age.

Essentially romantic is the conviction
that when evil
appears Just men must fight. The
moral stance of the Christian soldier became more exciting
than pacifism in both the
United States and Britain, as missionaries,
abolitionists,
and transcendentalists rallied to a
variety of martial
causes in the 1850's. Even William Lloyd
Garrison, who was

still advocating pacifism during the Crimean
War, could modify his stand a few years later.

Such convictions made the campaign of Elihu Burritt
and other pacifists impossibly difficult. Burritt,
during
the American Civil War, described the Crimean
conflict
as

the initial disaster in a chain of wars that had
wrecked

the high hopes prevailing at the time of the Great
Exhibi-

tion in 1851.

A strong anti-slavery man, Burritt nonethe-

less believed that civil war was

a

greater evil than slav-

ery even if the conflict led to its abolition.

One of his
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chier concerns for .any
years had been the development
of
Anglo-A.erxcan friendship. He
hoped to put an end to the
legacy of bitterness deriving
from the American Revolution
and the War of 1812 and to
see the two Anglo-Saxon
powers
cooperate in the peaceful diffusion
of civilization over
the globe. But when the Crimean
War began, Burritt

was con-

cerned about American dependence
on the British press for
news about the war, and feared
it would create excessive
anti-Russian feeling in the United
States.

Burritt deplored the conflict between
Britain and Russia as much as he deprecated a
possible Anglo-American war.
He agreed with the American
missionaries on England's part
in spreading civilization, but he
differed from them in
also reserving an important role for
Russia. Although opposing all war, Burritt believed that
"imperialism" was
beneficent insofar as it confined itself to
peaceful commercial and religious activities.
Like many of his contemporaries, Burritt regarded
the
Teutonic race as the source of all that was best in
Western civilization, and he envisaged a process whereby
England and Russia would collectively "Teutonize" China
and
the rest of Asia.

He even believed that truly progressive

people in Russia were either Germans or under German influence.

Once this influence became dominant, the last ves-

tiges of Russian barbarism would disappear and Russia would

Join Britain in diffusing the Teutonic way of life.

Brit-

ain would lead the way in
Southern Asia, and Hussia in
the
northern part of the continent.
Thus, rivalry would be replaced by cooperation in the
spread of civilization.
Gerritt Smith, the New York
abolitionist Congressman
who had abandoned his pacifism
to support Commander Ingraham in the Koszta case, returned
to denouncing the European "war system" early in 185^.
In a speech opposing increased appropriations for the United
States army and navy,
Smith asserted that Europeans needed
a repudiation of war
debts more than a revolution. For its
part, the United
States should avoid another "wide and sad
step backwards"
such as the Mexican War. "The nation which
is determined
to keep out of war," in Smith's opinion,
"will never find
itself involved in war."

Like

maiTjr

pacifists. Smith began to make distinctions

between Just and unjust wars.

The United States, as

al nation, must maintain an army and navy.

a

mor-

Soldiers and

sailors should be "the conservators of the public peace"
and "characterized as Christians and gentlemen."

This new

armed force would be paid higher wages than now existed in
the army and navy.

It would also be of higher quality, by

which Smith meant, moral force would have

a

greater role.

He invoked the memory of Cromwell in a manner which suggests
a

common bond between Smith and the more militant American

missionaries:
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xooxea upon as a simple brute constituted, are
lookeruoorL^"^
force- anrt
lo
such they may serve to
strike ter^ir
Buf.om

Of conscience are respected
and ^e^r^d by tSeir
oonscientxousnesslakL 'their
hSIr^rAonfth^l"
the less courageous, and
their arms
nonp ?ho
^11-trated in

.

The foreign policy advocated by
America's missionaries
and reformers was quite different
from that favored by the
government and the majority of the people.
It was both more
isolationist and more interventionist than
the policy
of

the Pierce administration.

In the Western Hemisphere, the

missionaries opposed expansionism by war or
filibustering
which was advocated by the supporters of
Manifest Destiny.
They disliked both the pro-slavery and
anti-British aspects
of President Pierce's Cuban and Central
American actions.

On the other hand, missionary spokesmen frequently
asserted that if Britain were ever seriously threatened
by a

Continental coalition, the United States should enter into
a

military alliance with her.

The evangelists emphasized

the spiritual community between the United States and Great

Britain and favored Anglo-American cooperation in the work
of spreading Christianity and civilization around the

globe.

Here was the second great point of difference be-

tween the missionaries and the advocates of Manifest Des-
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tiny.

According to the latter,
the United States was
the
unique .oral exemplar for
the rest of the world
and. in the
western Hemisphere, the
direct propagator of
Anglo-Saxon
democracy. Britain was part
of a corrupt Europe
and. to

some, was even more decadent
than the rest of that continent.
In addition to this. Britain
was the chief obstacle
to the spread of American
influence in the world. But
the

missionaries wanted the United
States and Britain to stand
together as carriers of the
purest form of Christianity and
the best that Western civilization
had to offer less fortunate nations.

CHAPTER

IX

In January 1855
Piedmont-Sardinia, whose
1848 challenge to Austria had
aroused .uch American
enthusiasm, alixed herself to Britain,
Prance and Turkey. An
expedition
ary force of fifteen
thousand men was sent to
the Crimea
Count Cavour, the Sardinian
Prime Minister, believed
that
an alignment with the
Western powers would set
the stage
for introducing Italian
issues at the peace conference
and
ultimately for the expansion
of Piedmontese power in
Italy. 1

Surprisingly, the Piedmontese
entry into the war did
not reverse the anti-Allied
trend dominant in the American
press at this time. Even Sardinia's
staunchest admirers
deplored her alliance with the
Crimean coalition. Americans had applauded her role of
gallant underdog in
the

struggle against Austria during
1848-49.

They were also

impressed by Cavour- s economic policy,
which improved agriculture and encouraged industrial
growth.
Moreover, the

regime's anti-clerical policy
(particularly the secularization of many raonastaries) endeared
Sardinia
to ardent

American Protestants.

But these factors apparently were

not enough to win approval for the
Sardinian decision to
enter the war.

America's press generally portrayed Piedmont as
of the Western powers.

a dupe

The New York Tribune asserted that

the Italian kingdom had allowed itself to be
drawn into
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fighting the battles of its enemy,
Austria,
Which would set back Italian
liberalism

a

development

for years.

Haps-

burg power in Italy would be stronger
than ever when the
war ended. Russia, the Tribune
acknowledged, had given
diplomatic support to Austria against
Sardinia in the war
of 1848-49, but it could see no
possible gain for Italian

nationalism in Cavour's policy of intervention
on the side
of the Western powers. ^
Sardinia's entry into the war was criticized
on similar grounds by the Washington Union which
once again found
itself in the unusual position of agreeing with
Horace
,

Greeley.

The Union added some disparaging comments on
the

quality of Italian troops and was confident that
they would
give the Russians little trouble. The British
subsidy
to

Piedmont, declared the Union

,

was proof that John Bull was

up to his old game of paying others to fight his battles
for
him.
a

(England's support of Spain's retention of Cuba was

similar policy applied to the Western Hemisphere.) ^

Another criticism of Piedmontese policy came from a
very different source.

Orestes Brownson's sympathies had

turned more and more in the direction of Russia as the war
went on.

Although apprehensive about the future growth of

Russian power, he believed that Britain's maritime supremacy was as hostile to "the best interests of the human
race" as any potential Russian preponderence.

Brownson had

long disliked Sardinia because of its role in the 1848 revo-

lution and particularly
because of the recent
secularization Of its monastaries.
The Piedmontese, in
Brownson's
opinion, represented the
vanguard of British commercial
civilization in Italy, Commerce
and revolutionary atheism
were ultimately moving towards
the same goal; i.e.,
the

destruction of Europe's traditional
Christian culture.
Consequently, it was not surprising

that "ever since 1822,

Great Britain has been the well
known ally of the revolu-'
tionary party on the Continent."
Sardinia's entry into
the Crimean War provided further
confirmation. ^

British commercialism and British
Protestantism were
equally objectionable to Brownson, and
he believed that the
basis of American foreign policy should
be opposition to
both.
In general, Brownson could be relied
upon to take a
stand exactly opposite to that of the
American missionaries
on any issue. England's purpose in
waging war on
Russia,

he thought, was to destroy Czarist maritime
power and thereby eliminate a potential threat to her own
commercial supremacy. The United States should "shake off the
remains
of . . . colonial dependence." If this were done
America

would soon supplant Britain as the world's leading trading
nation.

The United States should build a navy capable of

challenging England's and attempt to counter the AngloFrench entente with a "close alliance with Russia, Spain
and all the American states."

possessed the potential of

a

The United States already

great world power:
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Nothing prevents us from being
,
the f ir^t
military
power in the world but thf want
of dow
erful neighbors and a battlefield.
am IS destined one day to pale befor^ us Bri?
as
Tyre paled before her daughter
when there will be no Romt to Carthage and
avenge her,
her or tn
to
ingulf us in our turn. 6
.

.

There was

curious contradiction in Brownson's
attitude towards America's future commercial
and military
a

great-

ness.

On the one hand he hoped that America
would supplant
England in both fields; on the other, his
dislike of modern
commercial civilization led him to seek an
Anglo-American
war, thinking it would force the United
States to become
more of an agricultural nation again: The
injuries that
the British fleet could inflict on American trade
and on

her coastal cities would "in the long run, prove an advantage to us, both under an economical and a moral point of

view."
Brownson, then, oscillated between advocacy of American

maritime supremacy and contempt for commerce as the means
by which English Protestantism had corrupted modern civilization.

In his opinion America would need a stronger reg-

ular army as well as an enlarged navy.

He deplored the na-

tion's traditional prejudice against regular troops.

Un-

like Buchanan, who regarded Napoleon III as a greater menace to the United States than Great Britain, Brownson saw

the British as the main enemy.

mean

V/ar

At the outset of the Cri-

he had suspected that the French emperor was the

prime ™over behind the
conflict, but by 1855 he
was convinced that England had made
the new Man of Destiny
her
dupe:

internal peace, to subserve the
policy of thf
haughty Island Queen. 8

Brownson was pleased by the shift in
American public
opinion toward the war as it progressed,
for

it seemed in-

creasingly closer to the national
interest.
began "the sympathies of this country

When the war

were very generally

with the Allies; now they are as generally
with Russia."
Ultimately, Brownson believed the war would
strengthen
Russian power. The Western allies had thrown
Russia back
upon herself and compelled her to develop her
resources.
They had injured her, Brownson declared, but
the Crimean
invasion was not enough to make it difficult for such
a

vast empire to recover from the losses it had sustained. ^
This war, in Brownson 's opinion, had again demon-

strated British diplomatic skill, particularly in enlist-

ing the support of her ancient enemy France in the campaign to check Russian expansion.

The weakening of Russia

as a maritime power would be an indirect blow to American

interests, he thought, since the United otates in theory

207

Should look favorably upon all
challenges to English commercial primacy. Eventually, British
power would certainly
decline, but not because of a war:

contingency, we, therefore cannot
^^^^
Great Britain; she will
kJ? ^ fall one
doubtless
day, but not by FreAch policy, or Continental combinations;
when she falls
It will not be by a European war, but
through
successful competition in trade and manufactures
of the United States, and the rivalry
of her
colonies become independent states. 10
T.r>oH-^^J

While Americans continued to debate the merits of
each
side in the war, Allied troops opened their spring
campaign

against Sevastopol.

After

a

heavy bombardment, the Allies

captured the outlying redoubts of the city, but only at

high cost.

Meanwhile, an expedition to Kertch,

a

port that

supplied Russian forces in Sevastopol, achieved

a

great

success.

The Allies took the Russians by surprise and cap-

tured the town with few casualties.

However, the Allied

sack of Kertch and the mistreatment of civilians, particu-

larly by the Turks, injured their cause in the eyes of neutral public opinion, particularly that of the United

States.
In the Baltic, the British fleet commanded by Admiral

Richard Dundas unsuccessfully attacked the Russian fortress
of Sveaborg.

12

The Allies sustained a more serious de-

feat on June 18, when a
.aa'or assault on Sevastopol
was repelled. Their losses were
heavy, and for a while
there was
much sloomy talk about the
impossibility of capturing Sevastopol. Carroll Spence, the
American minister in Constantinople, informed the State
Department that "the most
sanguine have now become the most
discouraged."

•

the momentary Allied despondency
was unjustified. The massive Allied bombardment caused
continuous Russian casualties, and the destruction of
their supplies at Kertch had
also been a severe blow. In addition
to this, the Czar was

forced to maintain large forces in
Poland, the Baltic territories and along the Caucasus frontier.
Thus, Russian
military strength was dispersed over four
fronts.
Lord Raglan, the British commander, died
of cholera
shortly after the failure of the June 18
attack.

His suc-

cessor. General Sir James Simpson, possessed
little more
ability or dynamism than Raglan, but by now the
main direction of the campaign was in French hands. General
Jacques

Pelissier, who had recently succeeded Canrobert, was de-

termined to capture Sevastopol regardless of cost.

"^^

During the early summer of 1855 peace negotiations at
Vienna between the Allies and Russia foundered because of

Britain's insistence upon the demilitarization of the Black
Sea (i.e. Russia would not be permitted to maintain warships there). 16 The Russians now made a final effort to

break the siege.

But their assault having failed at the

Tchemaya, the Russian senerals were
convinced that

S evas-

topol would soon be untenable, and
they began to make prep^
orations to evacuate the city.
-'-'^

The Allies, heartened by their success,
in early September opened the heaviest bombardment
in the history of
warfare, and on September 8 the final
Allied assault took
place. General Pelissier had seen to it
that the French
trenches were pushed close to the Russian lines,
so that
the assault troops would have only a short
distance

to cov-

er.

His troops captured the Malakov redoubt, which
com-

manded the rest of the Russian fortifications.

An attack

by British troops failed, however, because they were
re-

quired to advance

a

greater distance than were the French.

But the fall of the Malakov was decisive.

"^^

During the night of September 8 the Russians blew up
the harbor forts, set fire to the remaining ships, and e-

vacuated the city.

They retained control of the fortifi-

cations on the northern side of the town.

British and

French forces entered the ruined city on September 9.

October 15 the rJational lntellip;encer reported the last
days of the siege:

Our readers will not regret that we have
devoted so large a space in our columns this
morning to the details of the final assault of
the Allies upon the town of Sebastopol, which
resulted in the destruction of that city and of
an important portion of its vast fortifications
together with the formidable navy of the Czar,

On
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Taken together it presents a vivid
narrative of a series of the most and thrilling
stupendous and
recorded upon the pages

orhis?ory/jf

American press opinion in the summer of
1855 continued
to favor Russia.
As the siege wore on for month after
month, admiration for the Russian defenders
mounted.

enthusiastic expression appeared in

a

One

letter to the New

York Tribune:

The descendants of Ivan and Peter have risen in their strength, and with their own trusty
arms hurled defiance at their foes. Sampsonlike they have broken the lion's Jaw, and the
Cross of St. Vladimir has held at bay the Cross
of the Legion of Honor and the Gross of St.
George from a bloody field. 20

Several factors contributed to continuing American

sentiment for Russia.

Tension with Great Britain, France

and Spain increased in 1855, despite Secretary Marcy's dis-

avowal of the Ostend Manifesto.

In March the Cuban ques-

tion again briefly flared when Spanish ships fired upon an

American steamer and

a

United States consul was arrested

for allegedly assisting Cuban rebels.

President Pierce

ordered the navy's Home Squadron to Cuban waters and

strong protest was sent to Madrid, coupled with
for a commercial treaty

v/hich,

a

a

request

it was hoped, would gradu-
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ally insinuate American
influence xnto Cuba. The
Spanish
authorities released the
consul but once aga.n
procrastinated on the other issues.
Since the administration
would
not risk the domestic and
foreign complications that
an invasion Of Cuba would almost
certainly produce, the
United
States achieved nothing.
The Cuban situation had
quieted down when, in the summer Of 1855, William walker,
an adventurer trained in
both
medicine and law, intervened in
a Nicaraguan civU war
with
a force of fifty f
ilibusterers . The "Grey-Eyed Man
of Destiny" had been invited into
Nicaragua by one of the contending factions, and he soon proved
to be a masterful military
strategist, winning several spectacular
victories over superior forces, and capturing Grenada,
the Nicaraguan capital.
Walker became the country's virtual
dictator under a
figurehead president. The American
minister in Nicaragua
recognized his regime, but Secretary Marcy,
again apprehensive of Anglo-French reaction, disavowed
this action.
Although Marcy had some difficulty in persuading
President
Pierce and the more ardent expansionists in
the Cabinet to
agree to the disavowal, his opinion finally
prevailed.

Walker's activities in Nicaragua were heatedly denounced in the British and French press. The Westminster

Review and Eraser's Magazine were convinced that
American
support for Russia and for the filibustering expeditions

proceeded from the same source: the Southern slaveholding

Oligarch., Which was
supporting hoth policies.
The London
^conosist criticized those
Americans who claimed that
British hostility to the
growth of the United
States was responsible for pro-Russian
sentiment. Only America's
filibusterers. it stated, had
anything to fear from the
AngloFrench alliance.

Both American and Russian
public documents, declared
the London Weekly Chronicle,
were characterized by the
same
kind of bombast:
"Substitute
the words

Tree and enlight-

ened- for -patriotic and
religious' and the Russian documents would do for America
The London Times again asserted that the differences
between American democracy and

Russian autocracy were only
superficial:

slaveholding states sympathized with
as a slaveholder; the filibustering
^^^y ^0^1^ imitate if they
could, the vast scale of his
aggressions;
Democracy claiming that its will should and
be asympathizes with a man who has esfor himself the same awful exemption;
and i^^^
both are led by their several creeds,
so contrary
appearance, so identical in fact, to
hate a country where the law asserts her
acy over the will of the many or the few, supremwhere the absolute equality of mankind is and
no
part of the political system; and therefore
serves as an excuse neither to the despotism of
the one nor the tyranny of the other. 2M^y.^
the n'^^^
Czar

m

The French press was equally critical of America's

Caribbean policy.

La Patrie asked whether it was Just

prudent that the nation which already extended from the

St. Lawrence to the
Columbia River should
also possess the
countries that bordered on
the Caribbean and the
Guir of
Mexico. Several French
writers also claimed that
America
and Russia were essentially
similar in nature despite
their
surface political differences.
But La Gazette de France
coupled such comments with
a reminder that war
with the
United States would have a
disastrous effect on world commerce.
It pointed out the great
extent to which France,
during the conflict with Russia,
had to depend on American
foodstuffs to Offset crop failures.
This ambivalent attitude was typical of both the
French and British press.
Frequently there was bold talk about
action to halt the expansion of the "universal Yankee
nation," but it usually
ended with statements about the
need to preserve peace so
as not to wreck the whole structure
of the Western world's

commercial relations.
Ihe American press responded in kind
to Allied threats,
and all aspects of the Anglo-French
conduct of the war were
scathingly criticized. Lord Raglan's death
produced much
comment about the folly of aristocratic
domination of the
British army. The New York Tribune described
Raglan
as

being an example of what the English system
"in its best
form" produced. Crimean events had proved that
the

best of

the English system was far from adequate.

Raglan's whole

training had emphasized that "as long as things go on
by
the prescribed regulations all is well."

The Boston Dail^ Chronicle
thought that Lord Raglan's
greatest failing as a soldier
had been an excessively merciful temperament.
If Raglan had been like
his great mentor, the Duke of Wellington,
he would have captured
Sevastopol within ten days after the
battle of the Alma. However, Raglan did not want to
cause heavy casualties either
among his own troops or Sevastopol's
civilians. So he began regular siege operations after
a long detour around Se
vastopol instead of immediately assaulting
its northern de
fences. The consequence of this
decision was 100,000 Allied casualties.
"Humane war" in the opinion of the Chron
icle was always "the most merciless of
things."
.

Angry editorials appeared in the American
press about
the sack of Kertch after its capture by
Allied
troops, es-

pecially the destruction of some ancient Greek
relics in
the city's museum. When the British press
emphasized

the

"Hango Massacre," an incident in the Baltic in which
Rus-

sian soldiers allegedly fired on and killed several British sailors who were landing under

a

flag of truce, the

American papers recalled Kertch or French ruthlessness in
Algeria.
A vehemently pro-Russian book, William Giles Dix's

The Unholy Alliance

:

An American View of the War in the

^^^t appeared in the summer of 185^.

Its author predicted

disaster and final ruin for Britain and France if they persisted in the war.

Regarding Russia as the champion of

"Christian ascendency" in the
Near East, he claimed that
England followed a reactionary
policy based on a "narrow
jealousy of the laws of national
growth." Dix professed
to be an admirer of England
and urged a change of course
before it was too late:

urp;ently entreated by one
?
who loves her
as warmly as he loves his
native
land, to consider which she
prefers, to ?ake
such ground as an Anglo-Saxon
and Christian
realm, as will not only invite
but insure Ameri°" ^^^^^^^
P-^-^^
road'^o'ru?^ '"^'i^'
^"^^
eventually
ground
to powho?
^^^^^^^
Russia, the West and the
itlii^ast, Ir''''
the upper and the nether millstones
of the
divme vengeance. 29
"^^^^

•

I

The New York Tribune took
of the belligerents.

a

similar view of the merits

In an editorial entitled "The War and

Freedom," it claimed that most Americans residing
on the
Continent were opposed to "Louis Napoleon & Co."
France's

autocracy was worse than Russia's, because the Czar
had
always governed in an authoritarian manner, whereas
Napoleon,

by his coup d'etat of December 2, 1851, had deprived

the French people of rights they already possessed.

The

Tribune summed up the differences by saying that "Russia is
despotic, but she is naturally, honestly so."

After the fall of Sevastopol, the Tribune was convinced
that the war would soon end.

Chagrined by the Allied suc-

cess, it thought that failure of morale and inadequacy of

216

supplies were major factors
in the Russian decision
to
abandon their Black Sea bastion.
In the opinion

of the

Tribune, "the cause of Russia
is that of civilization,
and
her defeat an injury to the
progress of the world." ^1
The Tribune also praised Russia
for having provided a
diplomatic counterpoise to the
great maritime powers. Her
role was evident as far back as
the Armed Neutrality of
1780, and was beneficial to all weaker
commercial nations,
including the United States. Great
Britain was "the most'
dangerous and direct enemy of the
prosperity and civilization of other states" because of its
policy of Free
Trade, which was only a euphemism for
world-wide British
commercial and industrial supremacy. Indeed,
according to
the Tribune, Free Trade was even worse than
this, for it
was dedicated to "perpetuating slavery where
it exists and

creating it where it does not."

Thus, the Walker expedi-

tion and other Southern adventures in the Caribbean,
which
the Tribune regarded as acts of brigandage, were really
in

harmony with British policy.
news to John

This claim would have been

Bright and Richard Cobden, but it was per-

fectly consonant with the Tribune

's

image of the English

upper class as "that worst of all aristocracies" whose
"whole soul is found in its breeches pocket."

The National Intelligencer was less hostile to the Allies than the Tribune .

probably came closest to

Among America's major papers, it
a

genuine neutrality.

In its

opinion, the „ost beneficial
result of the fall of
Sevastopol would be renewal of the
peace negotiations which
had
collapsed in the spring when
the Russians had refused
to
accept the British demand for
demilitarization of the Black
Sea. However, for some time
after the Anglo-French success at Sevastopol there were
no signs of new peace talks.
A Paris correspondent of the
Intelligencer expected another
great battle in the Crimea before
the winter. The paper
was particularly concerned about
the danger of an AngloAmerican clash growing out of British
resentment of both
United States support for Russia
and its activity
in the

Caribbean.

Consistently opposed to all adventures
in the
Caribbean, the Intelligencer denounced
Walker's invasion

of

Nicaragua, advised Pierce to take a strong
stand against
filibustering and, urged his administration
to do everything possible to avoid a deterioration of
diplomatic relations.

While the siege of Sevastopol was drawing towards its
end, an American military commission was in Russia
attempt-

ing to obtain permission to visit the Kussian lines around
the besieged city.

This commission was established under

an order issued by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis on

April 2, 1855.

It consisted of Major Richard Delafield,

Major Alfred Mordecai, and Captain George B. McClellan,

three outstanding officers.

Secretary Davis,

a

veteran of

the Mexican War and an ardent
Southern expansionist, instructed them to obtain information
"with regard to the mil
itary service in general, and
especially the practical
working of the changes which had
been introduced of late
years into the military systems of
Europe."

Each member of the committee was

a

specialist: Dela-

field concentrated on fortifications
and other aspects of
military engineering, Mordecai on the
organization and recruitment of the European armies, and
McClellan on infantry and cavalry tactics. There was
some overlapping in
their reports, particularly between McClellan
and Mordecai.
Much younger than his fellow officers,
McClellan had es-

tablished

a

brilliant record in the Mexican War when he
was

only twenty years of age.

A considerable amount of ten-

sion developed between the young captain and his
older colleagues.

McClellan was the most pro-Russian of the members

of the commission; Delafield regarded all the European
pow-

ers as potentially hostile to the United States because of

its republican form of government; while Mordecai was mod-

erately in favor of the Allies.
When the American officers had first arrived in Lon-

don they were given a friendly reception and immediately

received permission to visit the British lines in the Crimea.

The ministry provided them with letters of intro-

duction to Lord Raglan and Admiral Lyons, the naval com-
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mender in the Black Sea.

However, the co.roission
.e.bers
did not set out immediately
for the Crimea. They
intended
to cross Europe first and
hoped to visit the Russian
positions at Sevastopol before
observing the Allied forces.
When Delafield, Mordecai, and
McClellan arrived in Paris,
they met their first rebuff.
Napoleon III gave them an Audience, but the French army refused
to permit American officers to visit the French camp at
Sevastopol if they also
intended a tour of the Russian lines.
McClellan attributed
the denial to French displeasure over
the Ostend Manifesto. 56

After leaving Paris, the three-man commission
proceeded to Berlin where they had a friendly
interview with

Baron

Manteuffel, the Prussian premier, and received
permission
to observe the Prussian army.

The Russian minister in Ber-

lin also received the Americans in a cordial manner
and

provided them with letters of introduction to Russian
officials in Warsaw. However, they were unable to obtain

permission to visit the Crimea from the Russian embassy in
Berlin, and were informed that only Saint Petersburg could

grant it.

In Warsaw, Field Marshal Paskievitch and his

subordinates received the American delegation in

a

most

friendly spirit and (according to McClellan) manifested
"every desire to cultivate the 'entente cordial'" between

Russia and the United States.
In Saint Petersburg, Delafield, Mordecai, and McClel-

lan were presented to Czar
Alexander II, who had recently
succeeded his father Nicholas
I.
Remarking on the good
reeling between the two
countries, Alexander expressed
the
hope that it would "not only
subsist but increase,"
The

Americans visited the Cronstadt
naval base and an encampment near Saint Petersburg.
After leaving

that city, they

proceeded to Moscow, where they again
received a cordial
reception from Russian army officers.
McClellan was convinced that this kindness came from

"their regard and good

feeling for Americans and clearly
comes from the heart."
After reading of the failure of the

Allied assault of June

18, McClellan expressed his pro-Russian sentiments
in a let
ter to his brother John:
"I suppose you have long ago re-

ceived the details of the assault of June
18th and are convinced that the Allies were handsomely thrashed
and com-

pletely defeated.

God grant that the same result may fol-

low all future assaults and I believe it will be
so." ^®

Despite the consistently cordial official attitude,
the three officers were denied permission to visit
the Rus-

sian camp at Sevastopol.

fused

a

Like the French, the Russians re-

permit if the Americans also planned to visit the

Allied camp.

But the British and French eventually per-

mitted them entry into recently captured Sevastopol.
McClellan thought that

a

study of the wars in which

the Russians participated over the years would provide val-

uable knowledge for the American army.

They had waged both
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large-scale and limited campaigns "at one time carried on
by great masses on the level and
unobstructed plains of
Europe, at another by small detachments
in the rugged mountains of the Caucasus and Asia Minor, or
on the frontiers
Of Tartary and China . . .
Unlike the United States

army,

which during peacetime was dispersed in small
detachments
on the Indian frontier, the Russian army
was maintained

in

large masses for immediate action on the
frontiers.

The

army organization in corps, divisions, etc.,
was maintained
in peacetime, unlike the American army which had no
peace-

time unit larger than

a

regiment; and only on rare occa-

sions were whole regiments brought together in the Indian
country.

Despite McClellan's admiration for the structure of
the Russian "active army," he was well aware of the weak-

nesses that the war in the Crimea had revealed.

Designed

primarily to repel another large-scale invasion across the
Western frontier, like that of Napoleon in 1812, or to intervene in Western Europe in support of established govern-

ments (i.e. the campaign in Hungary in 18^9), it was much
less well prepared to face an attack directed against one

point on the periphery of its territory, particularly when
this attack was combined with a threatening Austrian mobil-

ization and an Allied naval campaign in the Baltic.

In

1812 the vast distances of Russia had worked against Napoleon; in 185^-55 they v/orked against the Russians them-

selves.

McClellan believed that if the
Russians had been
able to concentrate a larger
portion of their forces in the
Crimea before the Anglo-French
invasion, they would have
repelled the Allied forces.

Colonel Todleben's work in constructing
the fortifications of Sevastopol was highly
praised by McClellan,
a

ented engineer officer himself.

tal-

In his opinion, Todleben

had devised "the most triumphant and
enduring monument of
the value of fortifications." McClellan
also paid tribute
to the courage and tenacity of the
Russian troops defending Sevastopol:

...

in our admiration of the talent and
energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten
that the inert masses which he raised would have
been useless without the skillful artillery and
heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger
places than Sebastopol have often fallen under
far less obstinate and well-combined attacks than
that to which it was subjected. There can be no
danger in expressing the conviction that the
siege of Sebastopol called for the most magnificent defense of fortifications that has ever yet
occurred. 42

McClellan had great admiration for the Russian cavalry, which he regarded as the best mounted in Continental

Europe.

He thought that the English heavy cavalry horses

were somewhat better than the Russian, but that the English

had "nothing to compare with the mass of the Russian animals for that purpose."

The Cossacks aroused great enthu-
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siasm.

NcClellan spoke with an old
Russian general who had
served from Austerlitz to Paris
in the Napoleonic
Wars, and

later fought against the Persians
and Turks.
McClellan that the Cossack never used

He informed

his sabre but relied

entirely on his lance, and that the
carbine, which every
Cossack carried, was used only for
signaling. This Russian
general believed that a dashing spirit
was of paramount importance for a cavalryman, and respected
such a spirit when
he observed it amongst his adversaries.
McClellan commented that his Russian informant was
"strongly in favor of
snaffle-bits, sharp spurs, and Balaklava
charges."
In the

Allied camp, McClellan was later informed that
the Cossacks
were even more versatile than their commander had
portrayed
them as being:

the chasseurs d'Afrique told marvelous
stories of the expertness of the Cossack in the
use of the musket on horseback; and the Cossacks
of the line in the Caucasus, engaged almost daily
in hand to hand conflicts, have abandoned the
lance, and they are more dreaded by the mountaineers of the Caucasus than any other Russian
troops. 43
.

McClellan was so impressed with Cossack ability in

frontier warfare that he urged his government to form units
of Indians organized in a similar manner.

Just as the Cos-

sacks were invaluable in the Russian campaigns in the Caucasus, Indian troops, incorporated into the American army

and commanded by "active
and energetic regular
ofricers,'*
would be or great help in
contests wxth hostile Indians!
McClellan thought that frontier
tribes like the Delawares
and Kickapoos could produce
"partisan troops fully equal
to the Cossacks." Even in
a large-scale war with
a European power on the American
continent, the use of Indian
cavalry, "under the regulations
and restrictions necessary
to restrain their tendency to
unnecessary cruelty, would
be productive of most important
advantages."
In McClellan's opinion Lord Raglan
and Marshal SaintArnaud displayed none of the qualities
of great commanders

in the initial advance on Sevastopol.

"Slow and blunder-

ing" on the march, they failed to
keep clearly in mind
.

their objective, the rapid capture of
Sevastopol, and to
press steadily towards this goal. McClellan
appreciated
the Allies great advantage: namely, their
ability to reinforce and supply their troops by means of
steamships. He

pointed out that they could never have maintained
such a
long siege so far from their home bases in the
days of

sail-

ing vessels.

The Russians, he further noted had failed to

appreciate the advantages that steamers gave to

tacking Sevastopol by land.

a

force at-

Most of the permanent fortifi-

cations were designed to meet a naval attack.

Hence, Tod-

leben had to rapidly improvise land defenses; and if the
Allies had quickly followed up their victory at the Alma,
he would never have had time to set up his system of earth-

works. ^5

Allied naval operations in
the Baltic and Black Seas
convinced McClellan that
well-built rortxfxcat.ons would
always prove superior to the
strongest fleets. This confirmed an opinion that had long
been held by "all intelligent military men." Sir Charles
Napier's decision
not to

attack Cronstadt in 1854 (a policy
that was also Tollowed
by Admiral Dundas the following
year) and the failure of
the Anglo-French naval assault
on Sevastopol of October
17,
1854 were outstanding examples of this
truth.

NcClellan had

a

low opinion of detached expeditions,

such as the one to Kertch and the Sea
of Azov in the spring
of 1855. He did not think that they
had any important effect on the outcome of the war. They
weakened the main
body of the Allies while only annoying the
Russians.
In
addition, they resulted in the destruction of
"more private than public property." ^'^

Conceding that he and his fellow officers received a
friendly reception when they visited the Allied camp after
the fall of Sevastopol, McClellan was still hoping for a

turn of the tide in favor of the Russians.

English officers "in

a

He admired the

personal manner," but thought there

was a strong probability that Britain and France would

turn against the United States if they succeeded in defeating the Russians without exhausting themselves. ^®
NcClellan, at Sevastopol, also much admired the French

226

zouave regiments (units
of light infantrymen
in Algetrian
costu-nes).
„cClellan enthusiastically
described them"The zouaves are all
French; they are selected
from the old
campaisners for their fine
physique and tried courage,
and
have certainly proved that
they are what their
appearanc e
would indicate, the most
reckless, self-reliant and
coraplete infantry that Europe
can produce." '^9

Major Delafield agreed with
McClellan that the European powers might attempt to
check "the spread of American
power and ideas." But Delafield
thought
that all the con-

tinental powers were potential
enemies of the United States
and might jointly intervene in
the Western Hemisphere,
while McClellan believed that the
mutual rivalry between
Britain and France on the one hand,
and the United States
and Russia on the other would
guarantee a certain amount
of

friendship between the latter two nations.
Since the extension of American influence "tends
to crush the ruling
principle, and with it involve the governors,

nobles, aris-

tocracy, and monarchs in ruins," the United
States, according to Delafield, could not expect to find
any political
friends amongst the European governments. ^°

Major Mordecai greatly admired the French army
as it
had been reorganized in the age of the Revolution
and Napoleon.

France, in his opinion, had the only army in the

world with

a

"truly republican constitution."

The old

privileges of special units and families (i.e. the purchase

or commissions) had been
abolished and promotion was
based
"on the single consideration
of efficiency."
The French

army provided "ample means
of instruction to those
who may
not have possessed the
advantages of early education."
Common soldiers were frequently
promoted to official rank,
something rare in other European
armies. Mordecai thought
that this practice could only
be applied successfully where
the army, as in France, was recruited
by conscription from
the whole population; a small
peacetime army
like that of

the United States could not so
operate.

Although Mordecai was certain that the
French system
of commissioning and promoting
officers was
best, he was

less caustic in his criticism of the
British purchase system than many other Americans. Some good
could be said for
it, he thought, although it was outweighed
by the disadvantages:

Such a system may secure the appointment of
men of refined character and high sense of honor,
ready to expose their lives freely in the service
of their country; it is not equally well adapted
to obtain men capable of the patient endurance of
labor, and the close attention to minute details
of duty and instructions, which form an important
part of the services required from a good officer, 52

In explaining the poor state of the British forces in
the Crimea, Mordecai noted that the army had made no prep-

arations for large-scale campaigns before the war.

Most of
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its troops were scattered
around the world in
regimental or
smaller units. With the
exception or Ind.a, (and
so.e hastily improvised maneuvers
at Chobham dur.ng the
French invasion scare of early
1853) there had been no brigade
or
divisional formations since
Waterloo. The British army,
moreover, had no organized
land transport corps, such
al
the French possessed, a
deficiency mainly responsible
for
the collapse of its supply
and medical services in the
Crimea.
Mordecai praised the way in
which British private
enterprise went to work to remedy
this plight:

sufferings of the army
in thP^rSn^of r""^^ ^f"^
ed ac?in? n? private
^^^r enterprise, by whichconcertsuch
^reaf
rP^n?f are always produced
great results
in England,
'°
governmenf; and at
?hP time
t^r^""^
the
of our visit to the Crimea, near
the
close of the war, the British army was
in fine
clothed, well lodged in huts sent
^^^^^v"""?'
irom
England, and abundantly suDplied with
necessaries of life, and even many luxuries.the
53

Mordecai had the highest praise for the small
corps of English horse artillery. He admired the richness
of
its uni-

forms, the high quality of its horses and
equipment, and
its quickness in maneuvers.

Carefully noting every instance of American equipment

being used by the various European armies, Mordecai was
pleased to discover that the new British arsenal at Enfield
was being built in imitation of the United States Arsenal

at Springfield, Massachusetts.

(English

omcers, having

Visited Springfield in the
spring of 13,,, recommended
the
abandonment of the old British
practice of relying on private contractors to make
the army^s
weapons.)

Mordecai al-

so Observed that the machines
being installed had been purChased from the Ames company of
Chicopee, Massachusetts.
At the same time, he reported
that Russian officers were
in the United States to buy
similar machinery. Prussian
and Austrian arsenals used American
sewing machines in order to make cartridge bags and
similar materials. ^5
.

In Mordecai

's

opinion, the vast number of artillery

pieces used at Sevastopol, and the high
proportion of guns
of large caliber, distinguished
this siege from any previous one. He gave a graphic description
of the quantity
of

ammunition that had been expended:

"One of the ravines

leading to the town, on the left of the
English attack, was
known as 'The Valley of Death'; in the bottom
of it, in

some places, our horses literally walked on

a

pavement of

cannon balls lying close together,"
.

Mordecai even joined Orestes Brownson and

a

small

group of Americans who praised some aspects of the Austrian

political system.

Becoming friendly with many Austrian

officers, he was particularly impressed by their courteous

manner, for they treated the Americans with almost the same

comradely spirit as they observed amongst themselves:
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courtesy and amiable
^^^^^^^
frankness
of
in no country which
we
had we a more cordial visi?|| in nn^"-"'
recfotior,
^"V™®^'
'^^'^ i"
or more ac:reeab:p s,o=„if
" ?h?n
Austria,'
than
^f?°=^a,*=^°ns
with
trian officlr^ of
Aus^""^ ""^Shest to
the lowest s^ade- ?iom
f
?h
^"^'^
marshal to the
lieutenant. 57

^

'

While the American military
commission traveled in
Europe, and the fall of
Sevastopol was impending, a
dispute
gradually developed between
the United States and
Great
Britain which, combined with
their long-standing rivalries
in the Caribbean, almost
produced a diplomatic
break.

It

grew out Of a British attempt
to recruit a foreign legion
in the United States for
service in the Crimea.

CHAPTER

X

Heavy British losses early in
the Crimean campaign resulted in a serious manpower
shortage toward the end of
Unlike the Continental powers,
Britain could not expand its army rapidly by conscription,
and, although the
war had great popular support, there
was no patriotic rush
to enlist.
Parliament, however, would be unable
1854.

to enact

conscription law, even if it had desired
to do so.
The
Continental system of raising armies had
long been regarded
a

as un-British, and liberals and
conservatives alike detested it.
,

Since outright conscription was out of the
question,
and most of the militia were too poorly
trained

to be in-

corporated into the regular army in the near future,
the
government decided to resort to a variant of the old

eight-

eenth century practice of hiring mercenaries.

A Foreign

Enlistment Bill was introduced in Parliament in December
1854, which authorized recruitment of foreign legions for

service with the British army, ^
•

The British government decided to concentrate its re-

cruiting activities in the smaller German states, Switzerland, and the United States.

John P. Crampton, Britain's

minister in Washington, described by Secretary Marcy as "a
full-blooded John Bull," was charged with co-ordinating the
enlistment campaign in America with the Governor-Generals
of Canada and Nova Scotia. ^

'
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British Officials in the United
States and Canada decided to focus enlistment efforts
on recent German immigrants. Few native Americans
would be interested in going
to the Crimea, it was reasoned,
while the Irish, who formed
the largest group of low-paid
laborers in the Eastern
cities, were bitterly hostile to
Britain.

Some of the Ger-

mans had served in the armies of
their native states before
migrating across the Atlantic and,
therefore, would make
valuable recruits. That there was much
unemployment in the
northern cities in the winter of 1855 added
to the chances

of success. ^

Since the American neutrality law prohibited
enlist-

ments in foreign armies on American soil, British
agents
had to use the subterfuge that they were hiring
laborers
for work in Canada. Once there, the recruits were
formally

enrolled in the British army.

The British consuls obtained

the services of numerous German agents to take charge of
the recruiting in their localities.

Joseph Howe, a Cana-

dian who worked with Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General
of Canada, was charged with co-ordinating the campaign.

Contact was also established with

a

small number of former

Polish officers (veterans of the anti-Russian revolt of
1830), then living in the United States, who were quite ea-

ger to try another struggle against the Russians. ^
This enlistment campaign was ill-starred from the beginning.

Making little effort to conceal his purposes, Jo-

seph Howe travelled across the
Northern states contacting
the various local recruiters.
He repeatedly used the
American telegraph system to inform
Crampton and Head about his
progress. He even used Crampton
's name in the telegrams
he
sent.
Initially, Mr. Barclay, the
British consul in New
York, had consulted Oscar Cromrey,
one of the local
agents,

as to whether it would be best
to send the recruits to Canada by ship or railroad. Cromrey
advised the use of the
latter and Howe concurred in this.

Barclay cautioned Crom-

rey that it was necessary to keep
the matter secret, but
Howe's indiscretions had already made this
impossible, ^
After Howe had been active for a few months,
Sir Edmund Head became alarmed over the potential
consequences
for American-Canadian relations. When Head
had visited

Washington in October 1854 he had warned Sir George
C. Lewis, the Colonial Secretary, that the American
government
might "commit some desperate act in the hope of receiving

popularity by an anti-British cry."
recruit

a

The British attempt to

foreign legion in the United States would pro-

vide an excellent pretext for such an attack.

Head's con-

cern was increased by the fact that Britain had reduced its

Canadian garrison from seven thousand to three thousand men
in order to strengthen the expeditionary force sent to the

Crimea.

American filibustering expeditions might take ad-

vantage of this weakening of forces by staging raids.
Head's greatest fear was that the United States government

misht seize the opportunity to
declare war on Britain and
thereby divert public attention
from the slavery controversy.
In order to ease these
potential dangers Head suggested that the center of recruiting
activity be transferred from Canada to Nova Scotia
(then a separate
prov-

ince).

Nova Scotia, unlike Canada,
did not have a long exposed land frontier and the fleet
units at Halifax could
ward off filibustering expeditions.
Crampton and Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, Nova Scotia's
Governor-General, agreed to
this change. The recruits were now
sent by ship to Halifax. ^

American authorities, meanwhile, alerted
by Howe's activities, began to take action. The British
consulate in
New York, despite Barclay's advice about secrecy,
had be-

gun to circulate recruiting handbills.

Caleb Gushing ordered

a

Attorney General

halt to this practice on the ground

that it was a violation of the American neutrality
law.

On

M^rch 22, 1855 Secretary Marcy called Crampton into his office and protested the use of the handbills. Crampton disavowed the action of the consulate and denied that Britain
had any intention of violating American neutrality.

Marcy

stated his firm policy of enforcing the neutrality law, but
did concede that there was nothing wrong if

untarily went to Canada to enlist.

a

person vol-

After receiving Cramp-

ton's report on the attitude of the American government.

Lord Clarendon instructed his minister to "have no conceal-
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ment" from Marcy. ^

Crampton, xn early May, conferred
with'sir Edmund Head
at Quebec and with Sir
Gaspard Le Marchant at Halifax,
It
was agreed that Howe's tours
had been indiscreet. Reli
ance
henceforth, would be placed mainly
on local recruiters

New agents were now hired and
Crampton arranged for 1 ree
passage for the recruits to Halifax.
While Crampton was in
Canada, his charge d'affaires,
John S. Lumley, visited
Marcy and read Clarendon's recent
instructions. However,
on Crampton 's advice, Lumley
altered the despatch to conceal the fact that Clarendon had
ordered

a

halt to all re-

cruiting activity that conflicted
with the British interpretation of America's neutrality law. ^
While these events were taking place, American
officials apprehended several of Crampton 's
agents in Philadelphia. They were tried in the Federal District
Court with
Judge John Kane presiding. Kane ruled on March
22 that the

government had not presented any clear-cut evidence of

conspiracy to violate the 1818 Neutrality Act.

a

Enlistment

contracts signed in the United States, he ruled, would be

a

violation of this law, but conversations promoting enlistment or paying passages to Halifax were not.

On May 28, 1855 Marcy informed Buchanan about the re-

cruiting campaign and instructed him to demand an end to it.
He accompanied this despatch with some very unfavorable com-

ments on the reasons for England's war with f?ussia:
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^he character in the eves
others ^^I"^^
which she herself gives to
In i?I
'° ^^-^
asaiAst Rus''
sia
lS?ified
b^;^?r^
suspicion
that the Emperor
?^
?i?Ar.H f i
intended
to do what she has been in
the practice
of doing for a century and one
half - encroachterritories of other
nationr^ll
r.^
of

The Philadelphia trial and the
prospect of similar lit.
isation in which the American authorities
would have strong,
er evidence, convinced the British
government that the recruiting drive should be terminated; and,
on June 22, instructions to this effect were sent out.
Buchanan, however, was not immediately informed of the
suspension and
he

presented his government's protest to Clarendon.

Referring

to British concern about the possibility of Russian
priva-

teers being fitted out in American ports, he stated that

British recruitment of soldiers in the United States was
equQlly

a

violation of the neutrality law.

Clarendon re-

plied by citing Judge Kane's opinion upholding the legality
of paying passages to Halifax for prospective recruits.

But Clarendon did concede that the activities of certain

"unauthorized agents" were contrary to American law.

He

also informed Buchanan of the order of June 22 which had

terminated the enlistment campaign.

Marcy, in the mean-

time, sent another note to Buchanan, instructing him to de-

mand the dismissal of all those who were enlisted on American soil, but Buchanan neglected to present it to Claren-

don for several months and
Anglo-American correspondence
on the issue ceased for some
time.
In August 1855 the United
States government was able
to obtain evidence clearly
linking Crampton with the recruiting drive. At the Philadelphia
trial,

one of the al-

leged agents, Max Strobel, once

a

captain in the Bavarian

army, turned state's evidence,
described his contacts with
Crampton, and claimed that Crampton had
discussed the recruiting drive with him in Washington
in January, On July
11, 1855 Strobel had written to Crampton threatening
to

inform the American government about his
activities if
Crampton did not send him£lOO to finance a trip
to

Europe.

Crampton failed to do so, and Strobel told his story.
chief defendant, Henry Hertz, formerly a Danish

The

soldier and

then employed as a Philadelphia salesman, added his
own

con-

fession.

Marcy then informed Buchanan of the evidence gathered
against Crampton but Lord Palmerston had already announced
the end of recruiting.

In replying to Marcy Clarendon

strongly criticized American methods of obtaining evidence
against the agents.

According to him. Hertz and Strobel

were untrustworthy and their testimony should not have been

accepted against the word of

a

gentleman like Crampton.

relying on such men the United States was following

a

In

prac-

tice "sometimes resorted to under despotic institutions"

but which "all free and enlightened governments" disdained.

Clarendon's note also critxcized
American munitions sale s
to Russia, thereby countering
the charges that Britain
had
violated American neutrality. ^5
Marcy, in reply, denied that
any "irregular" means had
been used to obtain evidence.
As for munitions sales, the
United States had sold far more
weapons to the Allies than
to Russia. Moreover, the Allies
had chartered many American ships to transport their troops
and supplies to the
Crimea. The sale of weapons to both
belligerents, he argued, was clearly justified under
international
law.

The British government soon found
that some of its
other agents were equally troublesome
once the enlistment

campaign was suspended.

William Schumacher testified that

in April 1855, he and several others
went from New York to
Halifax where they met Governor Le Marchant.
Appointed
a

lieutenant in the new foreign legion, he then
returned to
New York to begin raising men for his unit. Schumacher

de-

scribed his activities as follows:

We went in Liberty Street and put up at a
German boarding house, which was a good place for
enlisting. The next day Mr. Weiss arrived and
told us he had seen the man who furnished the
money (Mr. Turnbull) for the enlistment, and we
advertised in two German papers for "five to ten
young unmarried men who wanted to leave New
York." The next day we sent ten or eleven men,
and so on every day, for three or four days; on
the fourth day we were arrested. 17

Upon release, he continued
to enlist men until August.
Mr. Stanley, an assistant
to the British consul,
actively
participated in the campaign, and
Schumacher and his associates called almost every day
upon him. He gave Schumacher two hundred dollars in
cash to take ten recruits to
Montreal. Mr. Barclay, the consul,
was in the office at
the time. According to Schumacher,
Barclay "always bowed
to me, or made some sign of
recognition."

Further testimony by William Schumacher
and Oscar
Cromrey revealed that a certain Max
Thoman received large
sums of money from Stanley for his services
in obtaining
recruits. Thoman and Stanley despatched the
ship "Ade-

laide" to Nova Scotia with a large party of
enlisted men.
Later, Thoman furnished affidavits to the
British govern-

ment which challenged the veracity of Hertz and
Strobel.

Thoman claimed that Hertz suddenly started to live in
style
after- he turned state's evidence in Philadelphia.

This was

supposedly because he had been paid by Russian officials in
that city for giving information to the American authorities. 19

Louis Celagi, an agent who worked with Crampton in

Washington, asserted that he copied an agreement between

a

Polish officer named Smolenski and Colonel Ansell of the

British 76th Infantry Regiment.

The document they had

signed appointed Smolenski a colonel in the foreign legion:

Crampton was present at this meeting.

Another former Polish officer,
Louis Kazinski, who was
commissioned in the British
foreign legion, contributed
an
unsigned article to the New
York Tribune entitled
-The Mys-

teries of British Recruiting."

when Kazinski was arrested

and tried in Boston for sending
recruits from there to Halifax, Stanley paid his legal
fee.
The Polish officer
Claimed to be "on familiar and
confidential terms- with
Stanley. Stanley, he asserted,
was a hard-drinking man and
"very communicative when intoxicated";
and, according to
Kazinski, he revealed the details
of his regular correspondence with Crampton on the recruiting
campaign. ^1

While the trials of the British agents
proceeded, the
Canadian government began to take precautions
against
a

possible American invasion.

Alarmed by the Walker expe-

dition to Nicaragua, they suspected that similar
filibustering raids might be made on their territory.
Another
source of anxiety occurred early in the war - when
rumor
had it that the Russians were planning to smuggle

soldiers

into the United States under the guise of immigrants,
and

then have them invade Canada.

Then, too, Anglo-American

tension over the recruitment question heightened Canadian
^'^
concern. 22

Since the number of British regulars in Canada had
been drastically reduced, the provincial legislature enact-
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ed a law in 1855 designed
to strengthen the militia.
The
provinces of Nova Scotia and New
Brunswick took similar action. The legislative
committee which drafted the
Canadian
militia bill made the following
comments on possible American designs:

The Committee are also impressed
with the
conviction that a large and lawless
party exists
the United States unfriendly to
Great Britain
and desirous, if possible, of
depriving her o?
^l^^^^'^^lK^^^rican Colonies. Should the War be
protracted, or the course of events
render it
necessary to employ the whole Military
force of
the Empire
the East, the Committee have too
much reason to believe that attempts
those from time to time made on Cuba, similar to
and in the
year 1838-39 on Canada would be made by
the par^
ty alluded to. 25

m

m

The British and Canadian governments were
also concerned about the possibility of an Irish-American
invasion
of Canada, or even an attempt to stir up an
insurrection

in Ireland itself.

At the outset of the conflict John

Mitchel, a leading Irish nationalist living in the United

States, visited the Russian minister, Baron de Stoeckl, in

Washington.

Mitchel suggested that the Russian government

send military supplies to Ireland.

would be

a

A major Irish revolt

formidable diversion for Britain.

Stoeckl,

while interested in Mitchel 's plan, did not give him much
encouragement.

He said that since the Allies were blockad-

ing the Baltic, it would be impossible for Russia to send
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any weapons to Ireland.

Stoeckl's attitude was based
on conservative principles as well as military
practicality,
rejecting Mitchel's plans he reflected the
opinions of Nicholas I. Priding himself on being the
guardian of order

m

in Europe, N.cho-

las could never have countenanced
an Irish revolution, even
though it might have been militarily
advantageous. Another
more practical factor influenced
him.
If Russia encouraged
the Irish to rebel, Britain and
France could easily retaliate by fomenting insurrection in
Poland. The consequences
were incalculable, and could be
disastrous for Russia.
These considerations caused Stoeckl
to reject Mitchel's
project.

But rumors of possible Irish raids into
Canada persisted throughout the war.
The Philadelphia Ledger reported
that five thousand Irishmen were planning
to invade Canada
in cooperation with a Russian demonstration
on the North-

west coast (British Columbia).

A Russian agent was supposed

to be the "chief engineer of the whole concern."

The Brit-

ish government, in the light of these rumors, was
apprehensive about possible attacks from Russian America.

A naval

base was established at Esquimalt, and one warship was per-

manently stationed there.

But the Russians made no move

and the British for their part refrained from attacking

Alaska.

The private agreement between the Hudson's Bay

Company and the Russian American Company, which prevented

hostilities from being extended
to the North Pacific, was
maintained, and their profitable
trade remained undisturbed.
Irish-Americans were vocal in expressing
their proRussian sentiments. In December
1854, a meeting was held
in New York to congratulate William
Smith O'Brien, (one
of the leaders of the abortive "Young
Ireland" revolt of
1848, upon his escape from imprisonment in
Australia),
Three cheers were proposed for the Emperor
of Russia, and,
according to the New York Citizen "the enthusiasm
with
which the call was responded to was quite
overwhelming.'^ ^7
,

The Massachusetts Irish Emigrant Aid Society,
an or-

ganization designed to serve as

a

commissary for an expe-

ditionary force of Irish- Americans, made plans for

a

land-

ing in Ireland which would hopefully lead to revolution.
But factionalism split the Irish leaders and thwarted any

action.

Even if their differences had been composed, Amer-

ican authorities would probably have prevented

a

filibus-

tering fleet from sailing,
American officials tended to dismiss the reports of

projected filibustering expedition to Ireland as
cal joke.

ously.

a

a

practi-

The British, however, took them much more seri-

During the autumn of 1855 about three hundred Irish-

Americans returned to their native land in small groups.
On October 11 Crampton met Marcy and presented him with ev-

idence about the plans of Irish liberation societies.

Re-

2^
eapding Crampton-s ™ove as an
attempt to find an issue that
would counterbalance the recruiting
case, Narcy did not reply to his note.
A few weeks later, Lord
Clarendon raised the Irish invasion issue again in a conversation
with Buchanan. The

Foreign Secretary claimed that
the three hundred emigrants
who had recently re-appeared in
Ireland were "returning to
their country piecemeal to create
disturbances." Buchanan,
however, denied that there was anything
serious behind the

talk about an invasion.

Another issue that re-appeared was that
of Russian privateers. During the conference at which
Crampton raised
the Irish filibustering matter with Marcy,
he also claimed
that the Maury, a barque then being fitted
out in New York,

was intended as

a

Russian privateer.

Marcy thought that

this too was a means of diverting attention from
the re-

cruiting controversy, but he suggested that Attorney
General Gushing investigate. Gushing reported that the
Maury
was designed for the Ghina trade and carried
a

protection against pirate junks.

a

few guns as

Glarendon too had men-

tioned the Maury in his talk with Buchanan about the return
of the Irish-Americans and was also informed of the ves-

sel's true purpose.

^"^

With the fall of Sevastopol the British government,

alarmed by Walker's Nicaraguan campaign, decided that the
time was ripe to make

a

show of force which would deter any

new filibustering expeditions.

The British fleet in West

Indian and North American waters was
greatly strengthened.
It was hoped that this action would
demonstrate Britain's
ability to take a strong stand in the
Western Hemisphere
while still engaged in war with Russia.
The appearance of

a

reinforced British fleet in the

Caribbean caused great excitement on both sides of
the Atlantic. Buchanan, in a letter to his niece Harriet
Lane,
wrote that "the aspect of affairs between the two
countries
has now become squally." He suggested, in an interview
with
Clarendon, that the fleet be withdrawn since its presence
was causing great excitement in the United States.

Buchan-

an also told Clarendon that a war between their nations

would be disastrous to the cause of liberty and civilization. 5^

Clarendon denied that the despatch of the fleet signified an aggressive intent.

There was no truth to the ru-

mors that British ships might enter American harbors to

destroy suspected Russian privateers.

According to Claren-

don, the orders issued to the fleet forbade any close ap-

preach to the American coast.

Buchanan was somewhat re-

assured by this statement, but he derived greater comfort
from the fact that English manufacturing and mercantile
classes were opposed to war with the United States.

His

greatest fear was that Napoleon III might be the prime mover behind the despatch of British ships across the Atlantic.

If Britain became
involved in a war with the
United States
Napoleon would have free
rein to pursue his ambitions
in

both hemispheres.

Repeatedly expressing concern
over the
growing power of France at
this time, Buchanan noted
the
relative decline of England
as illustrated by Prance's
rol
in the capture of Sevastopol:
"Louis Napoleon at the pres
ent moment wields more real
power than ever his great uncL
did.

All the potentates of Europe
dread him, and are paying court to him. He has
England in leading strings, nearly as much as Sardinia. How
have the mighty fallen!" ^5
A few days later Buchanan
described the new European balance of power to Secretary Marcy:

lighting for -the balance of
power/^ and} tt^
the effect will most probably be
to
impair

the power of Russia to such a degree
as
no longer to leave her a counterpoise
to that of
^^"^
^o^is
Napoleon the arbiter
J®??^'

Shortly thereafter, Buchanan saw indications that
Napo
leon III was less belligerent than he had feared.

On No-

vember 30 the American minister reported that Napoleon
was
eager to end the war with Russia and might force Palmerston
to accept peace.

England, on the other hand, was making

extensive preparations for the 1856 campaign, and Palmerston hoped that the capture of Cronstadt would redeem the

reputation of British arms which, at Sevastopol, had been
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badly shaken in comparison
with those of Prance. ^7
Buchanan now began to worry
that England might make
peace with Russia before a
new campaign could be fought.
Should that event occur,
Palmerston could be tempted to
use
his well-prepared forces
to settle some scores with
the
United States. Reinforcement
of the British fleet in
American waters might be the first
step in this direction,
he

conjectured; but he was pleased
to observe that peace sentiment seemed to be gaining ground
in Britain and that
Palmerston -s despatch of the fleet
was strongly opposed in
commercial circles. Should peace
come to Europe, Buchanan
thought, it would be a "most happy
consummation"
if the

treaty brought down Palmerston.
Some of the staunchest opponents of
the Crimean War
shared Palmerston 's belief that the United
States was a
dangerous rival of Great Britain. John
Bright, for example, declared in a speech at Manchester,
that the United
States "is the true rival of this country."
Admiring America and hoping that this rivalry would be confined to
•

the

commercial sphere, he nonetheless pointed out that the
United States was already the world's second trading nation.
Britain, he declared, would fall far behind her former colonies if she continued to engage in continental European
wars.

on November 16 Lord Clarendon
replied to ^^arcy's note
demanding the dismissal of all
persons recruited Tor the
roreign legion. He denied that
there was any reliable evidence of enlistment contracts
having been made in
the

United States, and once again
criticized American reliance
on the confessions of Hertz
and Strobel. He also rebuked
the administration for following
a disguised pro-Russian
policy.
According to Clarendon, the United
States, with its
democratic professions, might have been
expected
to sympa-

thize with the Anglo-French war
against Russian despotism;
but this had not been the case.
Buchanan, meanwhile, denied that American
public opinion was "universally favorable" to Russia,
although he conceded that "a considerable portion of the
press took their
side." He again asserted that the anti-British
sentiment
in the United States derived from English
attempts to interfere with American interests in the Western Hemisphere
and,

more recently, English violations of American neutrality.

President Pierce sharply criticized British recruiting policy in his annual message to Congress in December
1855.

At the same time, the general tone of this message

was conciliatory despite the recent reinforcement of Brit-

ain's American squadron:

It is difficult to understand how it should
have been supposed that troops could be raised
here by Great Britain without violation of the

municipal law. The unmistakable
obipct nf i-ho
law was to prevent every such
act which if let
""'"^"^
violation of the law ^r
±n stLT.f
either alternat?vP the
tho actri^'-^^
tive
done would be alike injurious
to
the sovereignty of the United
States. !
^^^^ ^h^t the
cause of ^oS^^^^'^f^^^^''''^'
design, entered upon
with fun
vL f^J^^''^^^
full knowledge
of our laws and national polresponsible public functionarLs imSenS,'^^
present the case to the
R^t^. Ih Government,
"^t
British
order to secure not only
^
a cessation of the wrong, but
its reparation.
''^^^^ discussion, the
of
which will be communicated to you in due result
01 wh^^f
^
time. 42

m

The recruiting campaign intensified Anglophobia
in the

American press.

A parallel was frequently drawn between

the new British foreign legion and the German
troops which

they had purchased during the American Revolution.

Some

papers even thought that the English might be planning to
use the mercenaries to repress a possible revolution at
home.-

The New York Tribune, pointing to the events of
1855

as evidence of England's declining military power, spoke

scornfully of British attempts to enlist "the scum of
both hemispheres."

.

.

Crampton had allegedly told Hertz that

he need not worry about American popular reaction against

his enterprise because the United States was so economi-

cally dependent on England that it trembled when

Liverpool business house failed.

a

single

This led the Tribune to

denounce once again the British policy of free trade,

pointing out that America could be truly independent only

.
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by following a protectionist
policy.

The performance of

Russia in the Eastern war was
evidence of the "masnif icent
advantages of the Protective System
to domestic industry,
wealth and strength." The Tribune
thought that Crampton's
dismissal would be the only proper
course for the administration.
While the protectionist Tribune sang
the praises of
Russia, the newspapers of the free trade
South continued to
denounce Britain for their cwn reasons.
The British government, according to the Washinp:ton Union
had engaged in
"kidnapping" men for their army under the
false pretense
that they were needed as railroad workers
in Nova Scotia.
These enlistments proved that England had sunk
into "servility and decay." The Union also denounced the
abolitionists
and philanthropists for remaining silent while
"hundreds of

white men are kidnapped in midday, and taken off by
fraud."

^

Only one of the leading American newspapers, the New
York Courier and Enquirer

,

the Union later noted with pleas-

ure, dared to defend British recruiting.

Here was one issue

on which North and South spoke with a single voice.

The

Union praised Attorney General Gushing for his vigorous action in prosecuting the British agents.

In his instruc-

tions to the district attorneys in New York, Philadelphia
and Cincinnati, Gushing had denounced the policy of the

British government for its violations of American sever-
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eignty.

This use of outspoken language
was regarded by the
Union as one of the best ways of
dealing with John Bull. ^5
On November 23, 1855 the Union
criticized the London
Times for its defense of the
British foreign enlistment
policy. The Times had denied that
any men were actually
enlisted in the United States; and,
therefore, there was no
violation Of America's neutrality law.
In reply, the Union
pointed to the Times,' denunciations of
American filibus-

tering expeditions.

The men who joined such enterprises

also frequently left the United States
in the guise of "emigrants" or workers. Editorials against
recruiting from
the London Telegraph and the Manchester
Examiner were reproduced as evidence that many Englishmen agreed
with the American stand on the question. The Union also reprinted
a

whole column from the New York Tribune which claimed
that
the Eastern war had humbled England before the world.
When
it praised one of the Tribune's attacks on the London

Times, the Union added (remembering domestic political dif-

ferences) that the New York paper "has not often so good
an excuse for its strictures as the present occasion."
In the opinion of the Union

,

the Times

'

construction

of America's neutrality law was only one instance of a

wholesale disregard for truth which characterized the war
reports appearing in the British and French press.

The

Allies, for example, never emphasized the fact that even

after the Russians evacuated Sevastopol, they still held
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fortifications on the north side of
the town

Anglo-French alliance has
teemed with
wn t-h fS
l^^
teemed
the most gross and palpable
attempts
systematically pursued, to impose on
the creducontent
with
falsifying
lltl
J?''''^^absolutely perverted language
llU ^h^-""^^"
to suit
their purposes. They have given
Sew
^
names to things. 47

'

^

The New Orleans Daily Picayune took
essentially the
same stand on the recruiting question as
the Union
.

It in-

sisted that if filibustering expeditions
against Cuba were
illegal, then the same standard must be applied
to

the Brit,

ish foreign legion.

The Picayune doubted that the British

government would disavow the actions of its agents; and,
therefore, the President would have to expel them.

episode was

a

The

great blow to "British honor and good

faith."

After the conviction of Hertz in Philadelphia, the

Picayune called for both the immediate expulsion of Crampton and reparation from Great Britain.

The paper compared

the situation with President Washington's insistence upon
the recall of Citizen Edmond Genet, the French minister, in
1793«

(Genet had issued letters of marque to American pri-

vateers at

a

time when the President had proclaimed the

neutrality of the United States with respect to the AngloFrench war.)

In addition to this, the Picayune cited emi-

nent legal authorities such as Emerich de Vattel and Chan-

cellor Ja.es Kent in support
or the charge that Britain
had
violated American neutrality.
The editorial concluded by
expressing the hope that there
would be "no backwardness"
on the part of the
administration in handling the
case. ^9
Secretary Marcy, however, spent
several months trying
to obtain a complete disavowal
of the recruiting policy
from Lord Clarendon. As the
Picayune had predicted, the
British government supported its
agents with the argument
that since the enlisted men were
not actually enrolled
in

the British army on American soil
there was no violation of
the neutrality law. The New Orleans
paper denounced the
idea that Clarendon and Crampton had
the right to interpret

American law as they pleased.
When Britain reinforced its naval squadron
in the Westem Hemisphere, the Picayune considered war to be unlikely
(although some British schemes were of "deadly
hostility"
to American interests), and placed its faith
in England's
"great middle class" which always favored peace with
the

United States.

The Picayune also ridiculed the British

claim that the Maury was

a

Russian privateer and that

a

filibustering expedition to Ireland was being planned in
America.

These charges, and the war scare which grew out

of them, were a "political ruse" by the Palmerston ministry
to divert attention from the enlistment controversy.

The New York Times

,

which was committed to opposing

the extension of slavery, shared the anger of papers in
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Washington and New Orleans.

Pierce, it asserted, should

have dismissed Crampton at
the end of the Philadelphia
trials. If it was legal for
Great Britain to raise troops
in the United States, then it
would be equally proper for
Russia to fit out privateers in
American ports. The British minister, the Times believed,
was "a broken man,
and

must necessarily seek to win his
diplomatic spurs in some
other field."
The National Intelligencer continued
to stand out from
the majority of American newspapers
by the moderate tone
with which it discussed the new dispute.
While opposing
the British recruiting drive, it also
opposed any action
against Crampton. It favored a negotiated
settlement of

both the enlistment and Central American disputes,
believed
that everything possible should be done to avoid
a conflict
with the Allies, and (since it had criticized
American authorities in the past for winking at filibustering expeditions) tended to take

a

more tolerant view of British

violations of the neutrality law.

Such violations, after

all, were not all on one side.

A Paris correspondent of the National Intelli^^encer

reported the extreme talk of some English and French officers about supposedly planned actions against the United

States.

If these comments had any official support, Bu-

chanan's worst fears might have been confirmed;

255

thei/?alk^''w^

English are now loud in

that the squadron of four or
five
of-battle ships, which the Bri^IIh laree linP
nounced are fitting for the Americanpaoers an!
s?a?ioS
are intended to blockade these
Russian ships \n
'^^^ ^^^^ ^^^l P^^^'^l^
enter
ente^^^e'^Sr^'^^'/"^
the ports to destroy them.
None of them
p''^'^-'"^ inquiry as to what port or
ports
?hLf
these Russian ships are building at,
or
where
they are to be delivered to the
Russians, whither
wxi^baer
at Cronstadt or Sebastopol. 54

President Pierce, according to the IntelliG:encer

.

was

not conciliatory enough towards Britain
in his annual message because, the paper went so far as to
hint, he might
be attempting to foment a war with England
over the enlist-

ment and Central American questions.

It reminded its read-

ers of President Polk's activities before the Mexican
War

and pointed to the present situation in the Caribbean area,

While the Intelligencer denied that it was drawing

a

clear

parallel between Polk and Pierce, it left no doubt that
this was the general tenor of its argument.

Pierce's pol-

icy was characterized by "a disposition to make capital by

fomenting national jars into national hates."

Buchanan was correct in observing that Napoleon III
was more eager for peace than the British after the fall of

Sevastopol.

Paced with increasing public hostility towards

the war, the French Emperor
hoped to arrive at a peace
settlement before another campaign
had to be fought. Lord
Palmerston, on the other hand,
wished to inflict a more
serious defeat on the Russians
before coming to terms with
them.
In particular, he wanted
an English victory at Cronstadt to offset the primary
role played by the French
at

Sevastopol.

There was strong public support
for this policy in Britain.

Meanwhile, Allied forces in the Black
Sea made a successful naval attack on the fortress
of Kinburn at the
mouth of the Dneiper River, and there
was extensive discussion of new campaign plans in London
and Paris. But it
remained only in the talking stage. The
French Emperor continued to concentrate on finding ways to end
the war by negotiation. 57
In order to induce the British to accept his
policy,

Napoleon hinted that if the war were to continue
for another
year, it would be necessary to broaden it by encouraging

Polish revolt against Russia.

a

Since Poland was very pop-

ular in both Catholic and liberal circles, such an action
would revive French enthusiasm for the war.

Napoleon's

proposal, as he had hoped, gave the British second thoughts.

They did not want to defeat Russia at the price of com-

pletely disrupting the Vienna settlement of 1815 and possibly making France supreme in Europe.
Thus, as the year 1855 closed the question of peace or
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wider war hung in the balance
in Europe.
the American dispute with
Britain
a

Simultaneously,

over the latter- s re-

cruiting practices reached
its clin>ax, and the threat
of an
Anslo-Amerxcan conflict was Joined
to the Crimean War as
one of the great issues of
1856.

CHAPTER

XI

Secretary Marcy regarded Lord
Clarendon's defense of
Britain's recruiting policy
as highly unsatisfactory.
He

therefore instructed Buchanan
on December 28 to demand
the
recall of Crampton and Messrs.
Rowcroft, Mathew, and Barclay, the British consuls in
Cincinnati, Philadelphia and
New York respectively. However,
when Buchanan received
his instructions in mid- January,
changes in the interna-

tional situation made it unpropitious
for the United States
to press Great Britain.
In January 1855 Austria finally
agreed to Join the Allied spring campaign if Russia refused
an ultimatum calling
on her to accept peace on Anglo-French
terms. Since the
Russians had scuttled their Black Sea fleet
at Sevastopol,
there was little point in maintaining their
objection to

the demilitarization of that sea, particularly
if this
meant, acquiring another powerful enemy. Faced
with a serious shortage of money and munitions (one of the
points

raised in the Council of Ministers in favor of peace
was
the impossibility of obtaining large amounts of
weapons

from the United States), Alexander II agreed to

a

peace

congress on the basis of the Austrian proposals. ^
The American demand for the recall of Crampton and the

three consuls reached London shortly after Russian acceptance of Austria's peace terms.

Lord Palmerston, feeling

Britain's position strengthened by the approaching end of

the war, decided to ta.e

a

strong stand.

Now sevent.-two

years of age, he had lost
none of that renowned
hellicosit,
whxch in word or deed,
was familiar from
Schleswig-Holstein
to Canton.
Since "the strong arm of
England" (which Palmerston praised in his Civis
Romanus sum speech of
1850 for
the protection it extended
to Britons all over the
world)
was now stronger than ever,
the Prime Minister
was not go-

ing to recall passively his
representative from Washington.
Palmerston advised Clarendon to
tell Buchanan that Crampton
would not be summoned home, since
his actions were fully
supported by the English government.
Clarendon informed
the American minister of this
decision on February
1,

al-

though in a somewhat less peremptory
tone than Palmerston
had suggested. ^
When the news of Marcy's demand became
public, the
London Times and some other Journals
again denounced the

United States.

Buchanan expected that he would be given

his passports if Crampton were dismissed,
although he did
not take the threats of war in the press
too seriously:

You cannot fail to have observed the vain
boastings and the threats contained in the British public Journals. In the event of a war, according to them, our cities on the seaboard are
to be bombarded, our ports blockaded, our commerce swept from the ocean, our Union divided,
and a servile war excited by the landing of
Black Regiments in the South. Their perfect
preparation - and it is true they have never
been so well prepared for war at any former period of their history - is contrasted with our
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eged want of preparation. ^

Buchanan, while holding an
unfavorable view of Palmerston,
did not believe he would
deliberately go to war with the
United States to maintain his
own power. Nevertheless,
some danger did exist because
"human nature is too prone
honestly to believe that course
of public policy which
chimes in with selfish interest." ^

Rumor of an American treaty with
Persia, containing a
pledge of United States naval support
in event of war, was
another issue which arose in early
1856 and which angered
Palmerston. Since Britain and Persia had
been on bad

terms

during the Crimean War, such

a

treaty seemed to be, accord-

ing to Palmerston, "impudent intermeddling."

He was con-

vinced that Russian intrigue was behind the
treaty.
fact, the Persian government had requested
such

a

In

clause,

promising American naval support, but Spence, the
minister at Constantinople, who was supervising the

negotiations,

rejected it out of hand.

Persia to sign

a

The Russians had encouraged

treaty with the United States (in the hope

that American commercial activity would create

a

counter-

balance to British influence), and their consuls in that

country had interceded on several occasions to protect American missionaries.

Understandably, the British government,

even without the naval clause, was strongly opposed to any
close Persian-American ties.
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Despite the attitude of
Palmerston and of much of the
London press, mercantile and
manufacturing interests once
again protested when talk of
war with America began to
spread. The government was
obliged to defer to their views.
While Clarendon remained firm
on the Crampton case, Buchanan reported, he stressed the
British willingness to arbitrate the longstanding Central
American dispute. Palmerston
had advised concessions in this area,
since he doubted the
practicability of a canal in Nicaragua:
"If we wanted to
recede with dignity, a reference to
arbitration, the verdict of which would probably be given
against us whatever
the merits of our case, might be the
easiest way out."
Now that the European war seemed to be
ending and AngloFrench differences were appearing, Buchanan
was more agreeable to arbitration than in 1854. Clarendon's
conciliatory
mood was also seen in his criticism of the anti-Ajiierican
tone of many articles in the London press.
When,

Palmerston addressed Commons on the subject of

Anglo-.\merican relations, he emphasized Britain's willing-

ness to arbitrate the Central American difficulties and de-

nied any hostility to American interests.

He also tried to

smooth over the recruiting controversy: when Buchanan had

complained to Clarendon the previous July about the enlistment campaign, he declared, the Foreign Secretary had in-

formed him that on the mere report of American concern, orders had been issued to end recruiting by June 22.

Accord-
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ing to Palmerston, Buchanan
expressed great satisfaction
with this decision. The Prime
Minister would not discuss
later American complaints, stating
that the charges were
being investigated. He also made
no reference

to the ques-

tion of Crampton's complicity or
to the American demand for
his recall, ^

Palmerston was challenged in the House of
Commons by
John A. Roebuck, who quoted documents
recently published by
the American government, including some
of Crampton's own
letters which confirmed his role in the recruiting

campaign.

Palmerston angrily denounced Roebuck for "holding
in his
hands the brief of the antagonist of his own country."

How-

ever, these revelations had gone far to discredit
the Prime

Minister's earlier speech, particularly for commercial interests. ^

Palmerston, in both speeches, had spoken of Buchanan's
.

alleged "satisfaction" with Clarendon's order of June 22,
1855, but the American minister regarded this as a distor-

tion of his opinion:

Had Lord Palmerston . . . been careful to
consult accuracy, he would have said:
'When the
communication to which I have referred was made
to the American Minister in London he expressed
the satisfaction he would have in communicating
it to his Government; but having subsequently
learned that the British Minister at Washington
was implicated in the transaction, he informed
Lord Clarendon more than once that he did not
knov/ the fact when he expressed this satisfaction.' 10

While Parliament debated
recruiting, the United States
Congress extensively discussed
Anglo-American relations.
Senator Lewis Cass of Michigan,
long-time expansionist,
former minister to England, and
leading Democratic spokesman on foreign policy, stressed
the seriousness of the disputes between the two powers. He
praised the foreign policy section of President Pierce's annual
message, and deplored the National Intelligencer 's
charge that the administration was fomenting "national Jars into
national

hates."

-^-^

Cass denied that anyone in the administration
favored
war, but warned that a conflict could not be
avoided

fusing to believe it was possible.

by re-

According to the Intel -

ligencer, there was little danger of war when statesmen

kept their senses; but, Cass noted, recent evidence con-

cerning English public opinion indicated that

a slight in-

cident might produce a clash with the United States.

This

development was "anything but honorable to the boasted intelligence of this middle of the nineteenth century."

Approving Secretary Marcy's demand for Grarapton's recall, Cass asserted that the dismissal of a minister was

no cause for war.

Prussia, he noted, had recently secured

the conviction of an English consular agent who had en-

gaged in recruiting in that nation.

Spain had dismissed

Sir Henry Bulwer, the British minister at Madrid in 18^8,
for giving unwanted advice on Spanish internal affairs.
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England herself would never
per.it such a flagrant violatxon Of her laws. Thus,
the Intelligencer s
opposition to
the administration's handling
of the Crampton case had
no
solid basis. Cass concluded
by calling on Congress to
pass
a resolution reaffirming
the Monroe Doctrine, as a
warning
to Britain and Prance against
any anti-American interven-

tion in the Caribbean or Central
America. ^5
New lork-s William H. Seward, a
staunch expansionist
and one of the Whig Party's
experts on foreign affairs, was
also critical of Britain's Central
American and recruiting
policies, but urged that every
possible course be taken to
avoid war. He was convinced that within
twenty-five years
Britain would peaceably withdraw from
the Western Hemisphere
Conflict might hasten this development,
but could also delay It. 14 If hostilities did break out,
Seward believed,
they would probably become part of the
larger European conflict. He agreed with Napoleon Bonaparte's
prediction
that someday Europe would be either all
Republican or all
Cossack, blamed Great Britain for being "unfaithful

to the

cause of free institutions in Europe," and described
the

government of Napoleon III as "a hateful usurpation."

De-

spite these sentiments, Seward clearly preferred the Western powers to Russia and disliked the idea of an American-

Russian alliance, that probably would be
Anglo-American conflict:

a

consequence of

Ad.inxstrations
are te.'Syt'and
'prLtlcanf
the Russian Empire is an ^h. J- ^V^^^^"'^''^^' ^^^^^
obstinate and portentous
reality
t
monarchical masis'of the A!??f^^'?^.^'^"f
western
nations contendinp- Lainst an .nf.^
no dutf ^nrnl\r^^^^^^^
on their side, I sLuld^e
?ery u^wiUinf ?o en'
sage my country in a
combination^gaiis?\hem! I5

^

Although Seward hoped to avoid an
Anglo-American war,
he did not fear its outcome.
The United States possessed
greater resources than Britain
(although less realized
wealth), and a plentiful reserve of
manpower, "as Great
Britain well knows, for she has tried
to penetrate it clandestinely." The State Department should
inform England
that it would take action if she did
not cease to exercise
dominion in Central America within one year.
England,
he

thought, would accede, since a war would
be disastrous to
her commerce and industry. He counted heavily
on the in-

fluence of the British commercial interests, saying
that
the English political system, "hardly less than our
ovm,
a

popular one."

is

The controversy over Central America grew

out of "a caprice of her

.

.

.

administration."

"^^

Senator Stephen Mallory, Democrat of Florida, in

a

speech advocating an appropriation measure of three million

dollars for manufacturing small arms and equipping fortifications, also deplored the possibility of conflict with
Great Britain; but he condemned both her recruiting and

Central American policies.

Mallory, too, believed Spain's
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dismissal Of Sir Henry Bulwer was
sufficient precedent for
Pierce's demand for Crampton's
removal. The siege of Sevastopol, according to Mallory, had
demonstrated
the value of

fortifications against ships.

For many years Congress had

been parsimonious in voting money for
the coast defenses;
and now that steam power had developed,
it was time to improve these defenses. The danger of a
sudden attack was
more feasible, since England could now
plan such an attack
"with oust as much certainty as to time and
place
as an

archer can send an arrow to its mark from his
bow."

Senator William P. Fessenden,

a

Maine Republican, took

issue with Seward, especially Seward's suggestion
of

year ultimatum on Central America.

^'^

a

one-

If such a challenge

were issued, the United States would immediately have to

place its army and navy on a war footing, and make large

appropriations for coastal defenses.

Britain meanwhile

might launch a preventive war since such action could forestall some of the American preparations.

Fessenden rhetor-

ically asked if any nation which planned war against another

nation ever gave

a

year's notice of its intention.

Although critical of British policy in Central ilmerica,

Fessenden could not see that the United States had any
right to demand Britain's withdrawal from the Mosquito

Coast protectorate.

Since no American territory was in-

volved, Fessenden favored

Monroe Doctrine.

19

a

limited interpretation of the
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Senator Albert G. Brown of
Mississippi read transcripts of the recruiting
trxals to show that the Pierce
administration was acting on the
firmest ground when it
called for the recall of Crampton
and the
three consuls.

Among the documents quoted was

a

proclamation publicly

posted in Philadelphia, whxch bore
the signature of the Provincial Secretary of Nova Scotia,
and which was stamped
with the Arms of Great Britain.
The heading of this document read "Men Wanted for Her
Majesty's Service." It held
out a bounty of thirty dollars
on enlistment and a stipend
of eight dollars per month.
Brown pointed out that
such

inducements clearly refuted English
contentions that there
had been no violation of the American
neutrality law. De-

nouncing Lord Clarendon for challenging the
veracity of
Hertz and Strobel, Brown also cited a series

of dinner in-

vitations to Strobel from Sir Gaspard and Lady Le
Marchant,
and from several other high ranking British
officers.

These

documents provided certain evidence "that Strobel was
on
terms of social intimacy with these gentlemen, and
is,

there-

fore, unimpeached, and, so far as we know, unimpeachable."

Judge Kane's acceptance of the legality of payment for

passage to Halifax, to those who desired to enlist, was one
of Lord Clarendon's main defenses of the recruiting policy.

Kane had also stated that "conversations" relating to the

possibility of enlistment were legale

Clarendon's note of

July 16, 1855, Senator Brown pointed out, did not mention

Kane's limitation of this
opinion to the case of a Mr.
Bucknell, who had engaged in
such "conversations." In
Hertz's case the Judge revealed
the existence of evidence
which indicated that the defendant
had actually hired men
in Philadelphia for the British
service. Kane dismissed
the charges against Bucknell, but
Hertz was convicted after
the Federal District Attorney
presented this material.

Strobel's confession was one of the main
exhibits which led
to the conviction.
The close relationship of Strobel and
British officials in Nova Scotia, and
Clarendon's failure
to mention Judge Kane's action with
respect to Hertz,
in-

dicated the flimsiness of the British defense
of the legality of recruiting practices.
Another item which Senator Brown introduced was

a let-

ter of instructions from Crampton to Strobel, written
in

Crampton's own handwriting.

This letter emphasized the

need for secrecy and for avoidance of any actions "which
might bear the appearance of recruiting within the Juris-

diction of the United States."

According to Crampton it

was essential that no gatherings meet in such places as

beer halls, for they would easily draw official attention
and lead to prosecutions.

Crampton correctly predicted

that "the institution of legal proceedings against any of
the parties in question, even if they were to elude the penalty, would be fatal to the success of the enlistment it-

self."
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After these extensive quotations
from the records including Roebuck's challenge
to Lord Palmerston in Commons - Senator Brown criticized
Clarendon's attempt to introduce the issue Of American
munitions sales to Russia into the controversy.
Like Secretary Marcy, the Mississippian saw this as a subterfuge:

How many thousand barrels of pork,
flour
and beans have England and France
bought in the
United States for the use of their
armies? - and
yet Russia has not complained. These
articles
'"'"'"^
ammunition,
but they are stores
2^
^f^li-'^'lt
oust as essential
-co the success of an army
as
powder and ball. How many of our ships
have the
Allies chartered to transport their armies
their warlike stores? - and yet Russia has and
charged us with bad faith or double-dealing.never
Men are very apt to lose their temper when
.
.
.
in discussion they are driven to the wall:
and
when Lord Clarendon could no longer answer the
statesman-like notes of Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Marcy, he lost his temper and became childish in
fact, almost womanish. 23

Brown concluded his speech by stating, as so many others had before him, that commercial considerations would

probably deter the British government from risking war with
the United States.

However, he expressed confidence that,

were Britain to make demands which America could not com-

ply with. North and South would put aside their domestic

differences in

a

common war effort.

Senator W. W. Boyce of South Carolina also denounced

Crampton for violating "every possible obligation resting

upon him as an ambassador.'.

He suggested that the
neutral-

ity law should be made more
stringent and called for the
immediate dismissal of Crampton.
But Boyce was more emphatic than some of his colleagues
about the necessity of
avoiding war with England fearing
as he did the great increase of power that would accrue
to the central government during such a conflict.

Senator Boyce also took

a

higher ground.

It was "mon-

strous," he declared, that war was still
the most common
means of settling national grievances
after eighteen hun-

dred years of Christianity.

Of all wars, he thought, a con-

flict with England would be most deplorable:

The advanced position both countries occupy
as the exponents of civilization and free institutions, would make a war between them disastrous in the extreme. It would do more to retard civilization than any event which could
occur; it would put back the clock of time half
a century.
Our intimate commercial relations the general spirit of our institutions - our
common origin - the fraternity of literature,
all speak trumpet-tongued against calling on the
sword as the arbiter between us. 26

Denying the influence of "Anglo-mania," Boyce described England as "our great rival - almost our enemy."

Britain was trying to retard national progress in manufac-

turing and commerce by checking American expansion and,
above all, she was encouraging the slavery controversy.

He

regarded the main British objective to be disruption of the

Union.

The real rival of England was
the industrial and
commercial North; and, once the
anti-slavery agitation pro
duced dissolution, England would
support the South against
the North. ^'^

Senator John J. Crittenden of Kentucky,

a

leading

anti-expansionist Southern Whig, opposed
the dismissal of
Crampton. He contended that the British
government had
given a sufficient apology to the United
States by

suspend-

ing recruitment after the initial American
protest.
Crittenden's opinion it was beneath the dignity

In

of a great

nation to dismiss

a

subordinate official after his govern-

ment had acknowledged its error.

warned against "leaping

which he feared might be
missal.

.

.

a

.

into

The Kentucky senator
a

war with England,"

consequence of Crampton 's dis-

Conflict with England over the enlistment ques-

tion would not be based on any genuine national interest,
but rather on a matter of irritated pride.

His argument

was essentially the same as that of the National Intelli -

gencer

,

which had accused the Pierce administration of

being deliberately bellicose in its dealings with England.

Crittenden contrasted certain persons "disposed to be appeased" (i.e. himself) with others not so inclined, among
them being the President and his congressional supporters. 2^
One pro-administration senator. Democrat Charles James
of Rhode Island, compared English recruiting to the im-
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pressment of American seamen
during the years before the
War of 1812. In the tradition
of Jefferson and Madison,
Pierce had "sternly rebuked"
this new English violation of
American neutrality. Praising
Attorney General Gushing,
for his energetic action which
put an end to the "nefarious
proceedings" of British agents, James
(like Senator
Brown)

also quoted Judge Kane's opinion
in the Hertz case to rebut
Lord Clarendon's contention that an
American Judge had upheld the British interpretation of
the American neutrality
29
1
law.

^

The general trend of this Senate debate
followed the

pattern that had existed throughout the Crimean
War.
Militant anti-British sentiment was strongest in
the Democratic party while the Whigs were much more
conciliatory.
All

speakers were agreed that war with England would be

a

great

evil, but they differed on how far the United States
should
go to. avoid it.

All spoke against war, but practically all

were careful to avoid the charge of being pro-British,

which could be damaging in an election year.

Crittenden

was the only senator who did not seem concerned about pro-

British accusations.

At this time George M. Dallas succeeded James Buchanan
as American Minister.

Buchanan had long desired to return

home, but Pierce and Marcy, owing to political considera-

tions were reluctant to name
a successor.
Buchanan was interested in obtaining the Democratic
presidential nomination in 1856, while Pierce was
hoping for renomination,
George Dallas was finally appointed
and there was a momentary improvement in the diplomatic
atmosphere after
he ar-

rived in London.

Lord Palmerston seemed to prefer him
to

Buchanan, and explained the delay in
responding to the demand for Crampton's recall by citing
Clarendon's absence

from London (the Foreign Secretary was
attending the peace
conference in Paris). The Prime Minister intended
to take

stronger line in dealing with the United States,
but was
waiting upon the completion of the peace treaty in
Paris.
a

Since the end of the European war would free large
British
military and naval forces for action elsewhere, Palmerston
calculated, it could also "lower the political barometer at

Washington."

After the signing of the peace treaty, Palmerston and
Lord Panmure, the Secretary of State for War, decided to

reinforce the garrison in Canada, which had been depleted
at the beginning of the war.
a

Five infantry regiments and

reinforcement of artillery were sent from the Crimea.

The

office of Commander of the Forces in British North America
was revived, and Sir William Eyre appointed.

Panmure, like

the Prime Minister, was confident that these actions would

strengthen the British position in negotiations with the
United Stateso

He said that "Jonathan" had recently been
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"bumptious," but Britain's hands
were now free and the Amerleans would "come second-best-off"
in a trial of strength.
Nonetheless, England was not anxious
to provoke a conflict,
and orders were issued to avoid
any suggestion of menace
when the troop movement occurred.
The transfer decision met with some
opposition in
Parliament. Lord Elgin, the former
Governor-General of Canada, opposed the apparent policy
reversal which the new dispatch of troops implied. He denied that there
was any serious anti-British feeling in the United
States and referred
to his earlier efforts to reduce the size of
British forces
in Canada. A large military force was not
compatible with
the recent concession of limited home rule to Canada.

Pan-

mure, in reply, stated that the troop transfers were only

designed to replace forces withdrawn at the beginning of
the Russian war.

Reports that they were being sent out for

the purpose of aggression were "entirely without foundation." 5^

In Canada itself Sir Edmund Head was extremely appre-

hensive about the possibilities of an American invasion.
He thought that the outbreak of civil war in Kansas and the

increasing animosity between North and South had created

a

situation where the Pierce administration would take any
risk to divert public attention to foreign affairs.
chief fear was of

a

His

possible agreement between Southern and

Northern politicians to sink their differences in support
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of an expansionist program.

Seward's militant tone made

Head suspect that the New Yorker might
be trying to arrange
such an agreement:
... If we have a war I suppose we
shall have to stand the first blow," Head
wrote.

"There is

nothing as yet to hinder my being taken
prisoner any day for
as things now stand the Yankees would have
command
of the

lakes." 5^

While Head worried about an American invasion and

British troops were crossing the Atlantic, George Dallas
was pleased to find that America's "well-wishers" in England were becoming more numerous and outspoken.

He ad-

dressed one dinner where his remarks were followed by assurances from Edward Cardwell,

a

member of Parliament, that

Commons would sustain United States rights "against any

ministry whatever."

According to Dallas, all the House

members present (mainly liberal Whigs and Peelite Tories)

approved Cardwell 's declaration.

Moreover, the American

position was constantly upheld by John A. Roebuck and William E. Gladstone, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer
who had resigned from Palraerston's ministry

Palmerston for

while took

a

a

a

year earlier.

strong line with Dallas,

reminding him that it was up to the United States to choose
between peace and war:
greatest sufferer."

If war came, America would be "the

But the opposition in Parliament and

the press soon forced him to temporize.

He requested more

time to consider the merits of the Crampton case. General-
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ly confident that the manufacturing
and mercantile interests of England would prevent
Palmerston from taking any
drastic action, Dallas had moments
of doubt.
In late April
1856, shortly after the British reinforcements
were ordered
to Canada, Dallas wondered whether
England's need of Amer-

ican cotton could be relied on as a
guarantee of peace in
all circumstances.
But a few weeks later he was convinced
that Palmerston was bluffing. He thought
that Napoleon
Ill's eagerness for a rapprochement with
Russia would contribute to greater British caution in dealing
with the
United States. Above all, the pressure for
peace in Great
Britain was too strong for Palmerston to resist:

All men of opinions worth anything agree in
saying (I should not be surprised to hear it from
his own lips) that a conflict with the United
States IS the only thing he could not stand for
six months, or even half that time. His power
is immense, but that is a rock on which, if he
touch, he founders. 36

Palmerston did persist in his original intention to resist the demand for Crampton's recall.

After Clarendon re-

turned from Paris the Foreign Secretary sent

a

despatch to

Washington which reiterated his earlier defense of the British minister's conduct.

The British refusal to recall

Crampton did not come as

a

surprise to Pierce and Marcy.

Dallas, weeks before Clarendon's despatch, had already so

informed Narcy.

In any cose. Pierce ordered that Crampton

and the three consuls be
handed their passports after
the
^'^
despatch arrived.
Pierce, during this period,
received information that
Britain was willing to sell
arms to Costa Kica for use
aSainst Walker's regime in Nicaragua.
Moreover, a British
naval vessel had stopped an
American steamer, the Orizaba,
in Nicaraguan waters and
demanded her papers. Pierce now
decided to recognize the Walker
government and expel Crampton simultaneously. Secretary
Marcy opposed this combination of events. He supported the
expulsion decision but
regarded Walker as a reckless adventurer
who had broken the
American laws. But Pierce was determined
to take a strong
stand on both issues. In his opinion
Britain would soon
send troops in support of the Costa Ricans
if the United
States did not recognize Walker. An American
warship was
ordered to the Nicaraguan coast to prevent any
repetition
of the Orizaba incident and the Nicaraguan
envoy was re-

ceived a few days before Crampton was expelled.
Pierce and Secretary Marcy agreed that Dallas should
be authorized to resume negotiations with Britain over
the

Central American question.

But there was a possibility

that the British government, having officially sustained

Crampton 's actions, might retaliate by dismissing Dallas.
When the news of Crampton 's dismissal reached London in
early June, Lord Palmerston strongly favored sending the

American minister home.

He said that any other course

would be "dirt eating" to
the United States.
In an angry
letter to Lord Cowley, the
British ambassador
in Paris

Clarendon said that the
Americans were rapidly becoming
a
"universal nuisance." The
French government should
take
notice Of this danger, since
its interests were also imperiled by American expansion.
Dallas, meanwhile, wondered
Whether he would be the last
American minister to Britaxn.
But English peace advocates
now demonstrated their
strength.
Roebuck's use of the recruiting
documents had already
partially undermined Palmerston's
American policy. After
the dismissal of Crampton, the
mercantile and manufacturing
classes made it very clear that they
were opposed
to any

retaliation against Dallas.
consisted of

Since Palmerston's government

coalition of old Whigs and Liberals, and
the
Liberals were closely connected with the
manufacturing
a

in-'

terests, the Prime Minister could not risk
the collapse of
his ministry. Several cabinet members made
it clear that
they would not support a strong anti-American
policy. The
Conservative opposition in Commons also was very
critical
of Palmerston's policy.

Benjamin Disraeli, former Chan-

cellor of the Exchequer, and Conservative leader, declared:
,

"It would be wise if Britain would at least recognize
that

the United States, like all the great countries of Europe,

have a policy, and that they have
icy." ^0

a

right to have

a

pol-

Faced by such varied opposition,
Palmerston decided
against Dallas' expulsion and the
only retaliatory action
for the Crampton dismissal was
failure to appoint a British minister to Washington while
Pierce was in the White
House, The cabinet also decided to
quietly abandon
the

British claim to

a

protectorate over the Mosquito Indians.

Rationalizing his concessions, Palmerston
played down the
Crampton case and stressed that he was "most
anxious" to

maintain diplomatic relations with the United
States.
also emphasized a conciliatory policy for Central

He

America.

This reversal of recent positions on the enlistment
and

Central American questions proved very effective and
the
ministry emerged from the controversy stronger than before.

In the United States the announcement of Crampton 's

dismissal caused

a

minor panic on Wall Street, and the pos-

sibility of war was taken quite seriously by some people.
George Templeton Strong confided to his diary that although
he. disliked the prospect of a conflict with England, he

could see it might have some positive results.

It would

probably halt the activity of both pro and anti-slavery
fanatics,

a

prospect pleasing to Strong, since he regarded

both Southern expansionists and Northern abolitionists as
lawless.

Although few prominent Americans seriously de-
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Sired a war with England,
there was a widespread
assumption
that such a conflict
would again draw the North
and South
together,
(a few years later, after
the states of the deep
South had seceded, William
H. Seward would briefly
toy with
this idea as a last-ditch
means of reuniting
the two sec-

tions.)

On the other hand, some
Englishmen in 1856 thought
that New England would either
remain neutral or Join forces
with Britain in the event of an
/mglo-American war. Garrison's Liberator could even
visualize Franklin Pierce as a
providential instrument for ending
the slave system in the
South.
^

.

Rumors of war passed quickly when

it became apparent

that the British government had no
intention of sending
Dallas home. During the course of the
enlistment affair
Pierce's administration was frequently
accused of using it
as an electioneering device in the
1856 campaign. This
charge was made most commonly by the London
Times and other
British newspapers, but it occasionally appeared
in American papers like the National Intellip:encer .
Pierce, to be
sure, did hope that his action against the
British minister

and the three consuls would improve his chances of
renom-

ination; and Grampton was given his passports about

before the Democratic National Convention met.

a

week

But domes-

tic issues dominated the convention, and James Buchanan who

had recently returned from England, received the nomination.

Since Buchanan had been out of the United States

during the years of
increased agitation over
the expansion
Of slavery, he was
considered "safe" on the
issue.
The con
vention did endorse Pierce's
foreign policy in strong
language, notably with
respect to the Monroe
^5
Doctrine.

Most American papers
approved of the dismissal
of
Crampton with varying degrees
of enthusiasm.
The New York
SEibune Claimed that the British
were far more nervous over
the Crampton affair than
the Americans, and approvingly

noted the role of British
public opinion in forcing Lord
Palmerston to modify his policy.
Anglo-American commercial
ties had become so close,
according to
the Tribune, that a

.

war between the two nations was
very unlikely.
Although the New Orleans Picayune
criticized Pierce
for delaying the dismissal of
Crampton, it applauded the
action when it finally came and
observed with satisfaction
the less belligerent tone of the
London Times a few
weeks

after news of the dismissal arrived.

The Times had aban-

doned its original suggestion that Dallas
should be sent
home. In the opinion of the Picayune
Pierce's handling of
the Central American affair deserved more
criticism
than

his policy in the Crampton case:

If he had recog-nized the

Walker regime earlier, the British would not
have dared to
encourage Costa Rica to declare war on Nicaragua.
The New York Times

,

in approving the administration's

action in the enlistment dispute, contrasted Secretary

Haroy's letters favorably with the "offensive character" of
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some Of Lord Clarendon.

s

despatches.

It also had high

praise for Hoebuck's defense of
the American position; and,
though opposed to Walker's
Nicaraguan adventure, asserted
that the English record in India
did not entitle her to complain about American expansionism.
^''^''^^ ? ^^--^Fjazine
'

on recruiting.

also supported administration
policy

It criticized England for
trying to use the

alliance with Napoleon III to check
American as well as
Russian expansion, denounced anti-American
diatribes in the
British press, and asserted that almost
all Americans were
in favor of peace, but that they would
be ultimately victorious in any war with England.

Drafting the peace treaty was comparatively easy,
since the Russians had agreed to the main Allied
demands in

January 1856.

The Treaty of Paris prohibited Russia from

maintaining any warships on the Black Sea (except small
coastal patrol vessels); so were the Turks, but they now

had an advantage over the Russians since their fleet in the
Sea of Narmora could easily move into the Black Sea in the
event of war.

The Danubian Principalities were given au-

tonomy under Turkish suzerainty.

Bessarabia, v;hich had

been annexed by the Russians in 1812, was rejoined with the

Principalities.
Turkey was further protected by being admitted into

285

the Concert of Europe in
return for a pledge to
guarantee
the civil rights or her
Christian subjects. In the
Baltic,
Russia was forced to agree
to the demilitarization of
the
Aland Islands, which had been
captured by Sir Charles
Napier's expedition in the summer
of 1854.
The Declaration of Paris establishing
new rules for
maritime warfare was the section
of the Treaty of Paris
that most directly concerned the
United States. At the beginning of the war, the Pierce
administration had tried unsuccessfully to persuade Britain and
France to sign a permanent "free ships, free goods" treaty
with the United
States. Russia immediately agreed to
such a treaty, but
the Western powers insisted that it be
combined with an

American renunciation of privateering.
been American policy to maintain

a

Since it had never

large permanent navy.

Pierce and Marcy rejected any prohibition upon
privateering unless the British and French would agree to abandon
all warfare against private property at sea.

refused to accept such

a

The Allies

limitation, and the matter rested

here until the end of the war.

Although the British were somewhat harsher in their

dealings with the small maritime neutrals (particularly the

North German cities) than with the United States, they
found on the whole that

a

successful blockade of the Russian

ports could be maintained without resorting to the rigorous

search-and-seizure practices of the Napoleonic

V/ars.

Con-

sequently, they were willing to renounce
some of these policies. ^51
•

•

The United States government was presented
with the
important question of whether or not to adhere
to the maritime clauses of the Treaty of Paris which
prohibited privateering, stated that a neutral flag protected
non-contra-

band enemy goods and that non-contraband neutral
goods on
enemy ships were not subject to capture. Moreover,
block,

ades had to be effective if neutral powers were to
respect
them.

The last three clauses of the declaration were very

pleasing to the Pierce administration, since the United
States had advocated them for over half

a

century.

Before

the War of 1812, for example, the Americans had frequently

protested against the "paper blockade" of many European
ports that Britain was maintaining.

The other clauses con-

tained a clear affirmation of the "free ships, free goods"
doctrine.
However, the unmodified privateering clause was as

unacceptable to the administration as it had been two years
earlier.

The French minister presented the treaty to the

State Department in late May 1856 and requested American

adherence to the maritime section.

warded

a

On July 28 Marcy for-

counterproposal to American representatives of

France, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Sardinia.

He suggest-

ed that the provision against privateering be amended with
the following words:

".And

that the private property of the
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suboects or citxzens of a
belligerent on the high seas
shall
be exempted from seizure
by any public armed vessels
of the
other belligerent, except it
be contraband." ^3

England was firmly opposed,
believing that she had already given up enough of her
traditional blockading prac
tices. Some British statesmen
were concerned over the pessibility that, in a future war with
France, England would
find these treaty restrictions too
onerous.
In
event of

such a war, they argued, the old
practices which were considered unnecessary in the conflict with
Russia might again
be valuable.
If the American proposal was
accepted, Brit-

ish sea power would be restricted still
further.

The Con-

tinental powers were more favorably disposed
towards the
Marcy amendment but none of them wished to
challenge Britain openly at this time.

Russia, however, did privately

assure the United States that its adherence to the new

maritime code did not indicate disrespect for America's
right to fit out privateers in wartime.

Marcy 's amendment was generally praised in the nation's
press, and received the endorsement of Elihu Burritt, Amer-

ica's leading pacifist.

But since the European powers would

not accept the amendment, and the United States would not

accept the Declaration of Paris without it, the matter lay

dormant until the Civil War began.

Then Secretary of State

William H. Sev/ard, fearing attacks by Confederate privateers on Northern ships, offered to sign the declaration

without the Marcy amendment.

But the signatories of
the

treaty refused, declaring
that the United States had
been
given such an opportunity
five years earlier and could
not
suddenly reverse its position
because of its present difficulties. ^5
American reaction to the end of the
Crimean War varied.
The National Intelligencer
editorially praised the moderate
peace treaty terms. The Allies
had achieved their wartime
objective, namely security for Turkey
and for Europe from
Russian predominance. At the same
time, the
Intellip:encer

asserted, the treaty was not so severe
as to permanently
embitter the Russians and guarantee a
renewal of the war.

Praising Austria and Prussia for remaining
neutral, the
paper found this policy "masterly."
The New York Tribune found some evidence of human

progress in the new peace settlement.

It was pleased by

the immediate publication of the treaty terras and
com-

forted by the thought that, in contrast to the
eighteenth
century (when

a

war "so finely begun as this was" would

have lasted another ten years), the Crimean conflict ended

after two and

a

half years of fighting.

Europeans, it be-

lieved, would no longer permit such protracted wars.

^'^

Turkey, in the Tribune 's opinion, was the chief loser.
Its admission into the Concert of Europe would only make it

easier for the European powers to expand at Turkish expense.
Since the conservative alliance of the throe Eastern mon-

archies was "the greatest
diplomatic ruin" of the war
the
Tribune predicted that Russia
would eventually combine
with
Napoleon III. it also
expected Russian support for
Sardinia against Austria in Italy.
These predictions were a
fairly accurate forecast of
the European alignment
in the

Italian War of 1859.

According to the Tribune, the Black
Sea clauses of the
treaty were humiliating to Russia,
but would have little
effect ultimately on her expansion:

Navy yards will be built at Archangel
on the
"^^^^^
the Amoor on the Par^r^
cific ^t^U""^^
both having better materials for
the con^^^"^
P^^ts of the Euxi^r^.M-^p'^f/^S''^^''
ine, v/hile to the Amoor machinery
may be easilv
forwarded from the United States^^
.
Russia^
like a steadily rising tide, may be
momentarily
checked, but It will overthrow with renewed
force
any artificial dam. 59
;

.

The Tribune also denounced the strong
opposition to
the peace treaty that existed in England.

It praised the

manufacturers, commercial men, and Peelite Conservatives
who favored peace, contrasting them with the conservative

agricultural classes and "the great masses of England" who
were "burning with a bully's desire to retrieve their failures in the ring."

The British wartime record was deplor-

able and, only the work of Florence Nightingale stood out

amidst a "forest inaccessible of incapacity and disgrace,"
The Tribune did not share the disappointment of some Euro-
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pean radicals who regretted
that the Crimean War had not
developed into a truly revolutionary
conflict. It declared
that only peace could aid in the
emancipation of Europe's
masses.
It was good that peace had
returned to Europe, stated

the New Orleans Picayune, although
the treaty appeared to
strengthen conservatism. The Picayune
also saw signs

of an

impending Franco-Russian alliance.
French entente had achieved

a

Nevertheless, the Anglo-

psychological victory that was

greater than their actual military success.

They had bro-

ken Europe's faith in the invincibility of
Russia, which had
flourished ever since 1812, checked Russia's growing
naval
power, and temporarily ended her ability to threaten
Turkey. ^1
In spite of this, Turkish sovereignty was now impaired
by a general European protectorate.

Austria and Russia were

alienated, and it was possible that the Anglo-French al-

liance might break down soon.

The war had brought no gain

for popular liberties, but "the lovers of humanity" could
still hope that "the hour and the man for deliverance

vv^ill

surely come."
The New York Times said that the peace treaty, like
the war itself, was a product of "selfishness and medioc-

rity."

Nevertheless, the paper stressed the benefits that

peace would bring to world commerce.

France had reaped the

greatest gains in prestige from the war, but England would
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have made

better showing if it had lasted
another year.
The conflict had revealed Russia's
need of "industrial and
commercial development/' and proved
that "a purely military
policy is insufficient." Along with many
Americans
a

and

liberal Europeans the Times shared the
conviction (or hope)
that war was an anachronism in the
new age of commerce and
industry,

One man who did not believe that war was out-dated

suffered

a

decisive defeat

Treaty of Paris,
overthrown in 1857

a

year after the signing of the

William Walker's regime in Nicaragua was
b;y

forces from the Central American re-

publics which were well provided with British arms and advisors.

Although the United States had recognized V/alker,

President Buchanan had no desire to add further fuel to the
slavery question by taking any action on his behalf.

More-

over, Walker had managed to alienate some of his chief fi-

nancial backers, notably Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt.
So the "Grey-eyed Man of Destiny" was left to his fate.

After experiencing

a

long siege, he was compelled to aban-

don Grenada, the Wicaraguan capital, and return to the

United States.

Although the British did withdraw from the Mosquito
protec Lorato, their influence in Central America remained

strong after Walker's defeat.

When in 1860 Walker attempt-

ed another incursion,
he was captured by a
British naval
officer who handed him over
to the Honduran authorities,

sentenced to death, he was
executed by a firing squad. &5
Thus, the Pierce administration's
apparent victory in
both the recruiting and Central
Ainerican disputes in 1856
had been partly illusory.
England yielded to
public pres-

sure in accepting Crampton's
dismissal without retaliation,
but her concessions in Central
America were more apparent
than real. Once the Crimean War
was over Britain could
take a stronger stand in the
Western Hemisphere, which it
did by supporting the campaign
against Walker. Faced with
the increasing sectional bitterness
aroused by the civil
war in Kansas and the Dred Scott decision,
the United
States government's ability to act in Central
America was
weaker than it had been when Britain and France
were engaged in the Crimean War.

CONCLUSION
American reaction to the Crimean
War was closely bound
up with the spirit of
Manifest Destiny and the domestic
controversy over slavery. Some
years earlier the Mexican
War convinced most Americans of
United States hegemony in
the Western Hemisphere. The
Monroe Doctrine, when formulated, seemed to some i^uropeans a
rather ludicrous piece of
bombast by a weak nation with no
power to back
up its

words.

changed.

By the 1850's, however, the
situation had greatly

The temporary lull in the debate over
slavery af-

ter the 1850 Compromise seemed to presage
ist era.

a

new expansion-

More than ever, owing to the California
gold rush,

American attention was focused on Central
America.

Agita-

tion for Cuban annexation, while strongest in
the South,
also had Northern supporters. Santo Domingo was
another

likely goal of America's Caribbean expansion and, in the
Pacific theater, missionaries and businessmen were active
in Hawaii and China.

In 1853 Commodore Matthew C. Perry

succeeded in opening up Japan to

American trade.

Manifest

Destiny clashed with British, French, or Spanish interests
in all of these places.

Spain, being a second-rate power

by this time, was sustained indirectly in Cuba by Britain
and France, and these two nations were America's main ri-

vals.

United States interest in European affairs was growing

rapidly at this time.

Many observers noted that in the

past twenty years, mounting affluence
and the development
of steamship lines had greatly
increased the number of

American tourists in Europe.

The

ms

Revolutions aroused

considerable enthusiasm in the United
States. Kossuth's
American tour in 1851-52 evoked much
sympathy for the Hungarian cause, although some of the
pro-Kossuth sentiment
can be attributed to anti-Catholic
feelings. Senator
Stephen A. Douglas and other "Young America"
spokesmen during the early fifties called for an end to
"Old Fogyism"
which, among other things, demanded perpetual
American abstention from European politics. President Pierce
stated
in his inaugural address in March 1855 that Americans
should

not be deterred from expansion by any fears of being
great.
A few months after his term began Commander Ingraham
res-

cued the Hungarian refugee Martin Koszta from the Austrians at Smyrna.

Since this incident took place during the

early phase of the Russo-Turkish dispute which led to the

Crimean War, many European

and American observers saw it

as portending an active American role in Europe.
.

Ingraham 's action at Smyrna was approved by most of

the American press with the important exceptions of the

most conservative and the most radical journals.

tional Intelligencer

,

The Na-

spokesman for the old V/higs, both

North and South, opposed the rescue of Koszta, just as it
opposed most other actions which were in lino with the policy of Manifest Destiny.

On the other hand the Liberator,
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the voice of Garrisonian
abolitionism, denounced American
hypocrisy in rescuing a
Hungarian abroad while enforcing
the Fugitive Slave Act at
home.
Ingraham's supporters covered the broad press spectrum from the Washington Union,
organ of the Pierce
administration, to the New York Tribune, a strongly anti-slavery
paper which also sympathized
with European revolutionaries.

The National
p-p
Intellirpnf
xiut.j..L±;^encer
_

'

q
s

n•t-^-^ -t-,,^ ^
attitude
foreshadowed the
f>

^.

.

conservative response to the Crimean
War.
The old-line
Whigs were opposed to further
expansion mainly because they
hoped to avoid a resumption of the
agitation over slavery
and also because they regarded war
as a very dangerous game
with potentially disastrous consequences
for American commerce. If new territories were acquired
in the Caribbean
and in Central America, the United States,
they reasoned,
would be faced with the problem of governing
people
who

could not be assimilated into the American
political system.
Many Whigs distrusted European revolutionaries
and

regarded America's liberal political institutions as
applicable (at least for the present) only to Anglo-Saxon peoples.

According to them the American Revolution had noth-

ing in common with the doctrines of French and German socialists .

Conservatives accordingly favored

neutrality for the United States.

a

policy of strict

Their interest in pre-

serving tho benefits of peacetime commerce unimpaired led
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them to deplore anti-British
sentiment and government policies which might lead to an
Anglo- American clash. At the
same time, they tried to be
fair to the Russians. They denounced the vilifiers of Nicholas
I and lamented
the /uiglo-

phobic diatribes of some newspapers,
things easy to do since
they had political and social
reservations about European
revolutionaries. Even Daniel Webster,
despite his welcome
to Kossuth, had conceded that there
were progressive
as-

pects to the Czar's regime.

Conservatives and abolitionists differed sharply
in
tneir attitudes towards the Crimean War.
Abolitionists

were

divided between unconditional pacifists such as
Garrison
and supporters of Great Britain like Thomas
Wentworth Higginson.

But even Garrison clearly preferred Britain
to

Russia, although opposing war on principle.

Higginson, on

the other hand, saw Russia's expansion at Turkish expense
as similar to the attempt of the South to establish slav-

ery in America's Western territories.
The Kansas-Nebraska Act caused many anti-slavery peo-

ple to regard

a

conflict such as the Crimean War in

ferent light than they might have

a

a

dif-

few years earlier.

Pacifist sentiment, which had appeared to be gaining ground
in both Europe and iVmerica for several years, suffered a

disastrous setback in both hemispheres simultaneously.

The

combination of events made some of the New England reformers - a small minority of the total population - the most

consistent American supporters
of the Allied cause. Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Henry David
Thoreau, Charles Sumner and

William Henry Channins all favored
the Western powers while
advocating resistance to pro-slavery
forces in Kansas.

Southern politicians and newspaper
editors were more
outspokenly pro-Russian than any other

group of Americans.

Southern Democrats, unlike their Whig
colleagues, engaged
in frequent denunciations of Great
Britain and sometimes
t

coupled these with enthusiastic praise of
Russia. Although
Southern defenders of slavery had some
sympathy for the
European revolutionaries, there was a tendency
to view Russian society favorably, as comparable to
their own. Both
societies, after all, had a class of servile
agricultural
laborers at their base.
Moreover, many Southerners saw Britain's attempts to

thwart Russia's expansion as identical with her policies
in
the Caribbean.
a

deadly threat.

They also regarded British abolitionism as
One of the favorite Southern methods of

rebutting the British was to dwell at length on the miseries of the people of Ireland and India under British rule.

Some Southerners compared the supposed happiness of American slaves and Russian serfs with the suffering endured by
the Irish, the Indians and English factory workers.

Simi-

larly, the Austrian government would occasionally remind

London about Ireland when Britain rebuked Austria for its
repressive practices in Italy and Hungary.

Thus there was
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considerable similarity of outlook
between Southern defenders of slavery and European
conservatives.
a

Strangely enough, Southern admiration
for Russia and
dislike of Britain was partially
echoed by American advocates of a high protective tariff,
notably the strongly
anti-slavery New York Tribune. But
the British enemy that
the New York paper was fighting
was free trade rather than
abolitionism. It believed that England was
cooperating
with Southern slave-owners in a campaign
to impose
free

trade on America,

At times the Tribune came close to say-

ing that the new British economic doctrine
was

a

plot de-

signed to reduce the United States and Continental
Europe
to the economic level of Ireland or India.

Although anti-Catholicism was widespread in the United
States during the early 1850' s, the role of France in the

Crimean War was not immediately

a prime

factor in shaping

the attitudes of Americans towards the conflict.

beginning of the war, when it was purely

a

At the

Russo-Turkish

conflict, American opinion (both North and South) was over-

whelmingly pro-Turkish.

After Britain and France allied

themselves with Turkey, the dominant American tendency was
to regard the war as primarily an Anglo-Russian conflict.

This attitude was changing by the time Sevastopol fell.

French troops, far outnumbering the British, played the

leading role in its capture.

Moreover, superior French

supply and medical services had been clearly demonstrated
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during the winter of
1854-55, and it alarmed some
American
Protestants (particularly clergymen)
who favored the Allied
cause.
In England the war had
received
more ardent support

from Dissenters than from
Anglicans; so too from American
evangelical denominations (at least
in the Northern states).
But when it appeared likely that
Napoleon III, the protector of the Pope, would be the chief
beneficiary of the
war,

evangelical enthusiasm faded.

Russia might be Gog and Ma-

gog, but the Pope was still the
Antichrist.

American Catholic opinion, on the other
hand, was not
strongly pro-Allied. Orestes Brownson, a
leading Catholic
intellectual, disliked Napoleon III (whose
protection of
the Pope he considered mere opportunism) and
leaned towards
the Czar. As editor, he devoted much space
to refuting
the

contention of some European Catholics that Russia was
secretly a revolutionary power. Brownson also disliked
the

British commercial system, regarding it as being largely

Reformation product.

a

Austria, in Brownson's opinion, was

the keystone in the European balance of power.

She blocked

any one power - be it Prance, Russia, or "the Revolution" who might otherv/ise dominate the Continent.

Since many American Catholics were recent Irish immigrants, they naturally formed an important source of anti-

British sentiment.

The Irish vote was vital for the Demo-

cratic Party and, along with Southern dislike of Britain,

contributed to the pro-Russian leanings of bhe Pierce ad-
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ministration.

British fear of possible Irish
filibustering
expeditions from America heightened the
tense situation
during the autumn of 1855, when the
British reinforced their
Caribbean squadron.
The Crimean War increased the importance
of commercial

ties between the United States and the
Western Allies while
at the same time it contributed to a
deterioration of, political relations. Many American merchant ships
were chartered by England and France to transport troops
and sup-

plies to the Crimea.

The Allies also purchased large a-

mounts or American foodstuffs.

Some munitions were sold to

Russia during the war, but on the whole there was

a

drastic

decline in American-Russian trade due to the Allied blockade.

At the outset of the conflict Russia hoped that the

United States would challenge this blockade in the Baltic.
But the American government respected it despite hints from

the Russians that the United States could obtain the Baltic

carrying trade which had long been dominated by the British,

The Crimean War would have stood out as

a

milestone in

the history of American foreign policy if the mediation

plan which President Pierce considered in the spring of
185^ had come to fruition.

This plan did mark the first

time that the United States government seriously considered

offering its services to end

a

major European war.

British

and French concern over the possible consequences of Amer-

ican intervention in Europe,
plus the disputes between the
Western Allies and the United States
over Cuba and Central
America, soon made it clear that
American mediation
was

not acceptable.

British and French anxiety about rapid
American expansion and their fear of a Rus so- American
alliance indicated
their increasing realization of the
potentialities of
United States power. The London Times and
certain French
writers stressed Russian-American similarities
despite
the

differences in their political institutions.

In France

there was a particularly strong sense of the
relentless advance of the giants of the East and West which one day,
it

was feared, would squeeze Western Europe between them.

While Britain and France worried over the growth of the

United States, many Americans feared that the anti-Russian
alliance would be turned against the United States at some
future date.

Lord Clarendon's statement, at the beginning

of the war, that England and France were in agreement on

all important questions in both hemispheres was interpreted
by Senator Lewis Cass as an indication that the Allies

might be planning Caribbean actions.

Although Clarendon,

in response to an inquiry from Buchanan, stated that he only meant Argentina v;hen he referred to the Western Hemi-

sphere, American suspicions persisted.

Buchanan generally

thought that the old Anglo-French rivalry would soon reassert itself and block any Joint anti-American action.
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However, there were times when he
was less sanguine. Unlike many Americans, including
Secretary of State Marcy,

Buchanan believed that Napoleon III
would be the prime mover behind any maneuvers in the Caribbean.
The possibility of

a

Russian-American alliance was not

seriously considered by the United States,
despite the many
American differences with the Allied powers.
Both Democrats and Whigs preferred to adhere to the
traditional American neutrality policy, although the Democrats
were clearly
more anti-British than their opponents. Pierce was
fortunate in not being directly confronted with a situation in-

volving Russian privateers similar to that of the Genet
case of 1793.

If the Russian government had followed the

advice of its minister in Washington it would have attempted to fit out privateers in American ports.

But Count Nes-

selrode regarded American neutrality as the most that Russia could hope for and preferred not to risk the danger of

completely alienating American opinion.

His decision was

probably wise, in the light of later American reaction to
the Crampton case.

Towards the end of the Crimean War the revelation of
a

British attempt to enlist

a

foreign legion on American

soil helped crystallize anti-Allied opinion.

What was most

notable was the way in which newspapers violently opposed
on most other issues joined in condemning the practice.

These denunciations of British violations of American neu-

trality raised the question
of whether the North and
South
would have put aside their
differences if war with Britain
had broken out in 1855 or
1856. Despite some rhetoric
about war restoring national
unity, it seems likely that
sectionalism was already too great
to make such an event
possible. The New York Tribune
mightaoin many Southern
newspapers and politicians in denouncing
England, but there
was a world of difference between
Greeley's protectionist
antipathy to Great Britain and Southern
hatred of British
abolitionism. Probably an Anglo-American
war would have
found the United States as seriously
divided in sentiment
as it had been during the War of
1812.
Britain would have
faced a similar situation, since an American
war would
have

been almost unanimously opposed by her commercial
and industrial interests.

Another indication that war with England would not
have healed the North-South breach is that Pierce's dis-

missal of Crampton did not help him win renomination.
There was no outburst of patriotic enthusiasm for the President at the Democratic convention,

James Buchanan

v/as

nominated chiefly because he had been outside the country

during the Kansas-Nebraska controversy.

Pierce's defiance

of Great Britain could not counterbalance his involvement

in that dispute.
V/hen one

looks at America's reaction to the Crimean

War in the long perspective, it appears as one of the great

might-have-beens of history.
seemed on the verge of

The United States in 1855

new era of expansion in Central
America and the Caribbean, while
the Koszta affair
a

was a

portent of intervention in Europe.'

If the slavery contro-

versy had not been re-intensified
in 18^4, we might speculate that Texas events would serve
as a model in Central
America with William Walker, a new Sam
Houston, paving the
way for the annexation of Nicaragua.
The European war was
the opportunity for a more aggressive
Caribbean policy
which the Pierce administration recognized
but could not
exploit because of internal division over the
"peculiar in
stitution." If Pierce had not been forced to focus
on domestic affairs, Cuban annexation might have been
accom-

plished rather than the fiasco of the Ostend Manifesto.

Even in the midst of the heightened slavery controversy, his successor attempted to continue a strong foreign

policy, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America.

James Buchanan, on several occasions, unsuccessfully re-

quested authority from Congress to use American armed forces to maintain order there.

The vigor of his policy sug-

gests what American activity in the world might have been
like without an impending civil war at home.

Buchanan a-

chieved one great success; he persuaded the British government to formally renounce its old assertion of the right to

search American ships for deserters, finally laying to rest
one of the causes of the War of 1812.
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If an aggressive American foreign policy
unhampered by

domestic discontent had come into collision with
an oldfashioned British blockading policy during the
Crimean War,
the United States might have become Russia's ally.
Neither
of these factors existed, however, so the war
was of
sec-

ondary importance in American politics.

But the alignment

of opinion on the war revealed that domestic differences

were reflected in attitudes towards foreign policy.

Perhaps the most significant aspects of the American

reaction to the war were the strong anti-British and proRussian sentiment in the South and the generally pro-British stand by

a

majority of New England intellectuals.

Southern animosity during the Crimean War was not forgotten
in London when the South looked to Britain for raajor assist-

ance during the Civil War.

The reaction of the intellec-

tuals (and of the missionaries) is important for two reasons:

First, there is the sense of Anglo-American solidar-

ity in spreading political liberty around the world which

they exhibited; and, secondly, their tendency to accept and
even to glorify war was stimulated by the Kansas conflict.
The Crimean War seemed to fit the same pattern of despotism

versus liberty.

In both the North and South, then, Ameri-

cans were reading their nation's destiny by the light of

European events.

.
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